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ABSTRACT    
Large-scale land acquisition (LaSLA), also called "land grabbing" refers to the 
buying or leasing of large tracts of land, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by 
foreign investors to produce food and biofuel to send back home. Since 2007, LaSLA 
has become an important development issue due to the opportunities and threats for 
SSA countries. LaSLA has the potential to create local jobs, transfer technology, build 
infrastructure, and modernize SSA's agriculture. Nonetheless, it can also aggravate 
food insecurity, perpetuate corruption, degrade ecosystems, cause conflicts, and 
displace local communities. What drives LaSLA, what are its impacts on local people, 
and under what circumstances can we consider it as just and ethical?  
To examine what drives LaSLA, I used country level data from 2005 to 2013 
on economic conditions, natural resources, business practices, and governance to 
estimate LaSLA models. I find that LaSLA increases with increasing government 
effectiveness, land prices, and the ease of doing business, and decreases with 
stronger regulatory regimes. To assess LaSLA's impacts on local people, I conducted 
a comparative case study in Tanzania. I compare changes in peoples' livelihood 
between treatment villages (those experiencing LaSLA) and control villages (those 
without LaSLA projects). The results show that under current practices, the risks of 
LaSLA outweigh the benefits to local livelihoods, yet there are potential benefits if 
LaSLA is implemented correctly.  
To philosophically examine whether LaSLA can be considered just and ethical, 
I apply John Rawls' theory of justice. The analysis indicates that from both 
procedural and distributive justice perspective, LaSLA currently fails to satisfy 
Rawlsian principles of justice. From these analyses, I conclude that if implemented 
correctly, LaSLA can produce a win-win outcome for both investors and host 
countries. I suggest that strong governance, rigorous environmental and social 
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impact assessment, and inclusion of local people at all levels of LaSLA decision 
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On February 25, 2012, BBC published a story with the headline “Is 'land 
grabbing' good for Africa?” (BBC 2012). The African Development Bank (ADB) also 
published an article, “The Expansion of Chinese Influence in Africa - Opportunities 
and Risks.” In this article, the bank claims that China is “the biggest ‘land grabber’ in 
Sub-Saharan Africa” (hereafter SSA) (Ncube 2012). Since 2007, a convergence of 
global crises in food, fuel, finances, and climate have increased the demand for 
farmland around the globe, especially in SSA (Amanor 2012; Borras Jr et al. 2011; 
Deininger and Byerlee 2011; Borras and Franco 2010). This demand has caused a 
rise in, and emergence of foreign investors: national governments, multi-national 
corporations (MNC), sovereign wealth funds, and private investors in SSA with the 
intention to buy or lease large tracts of communal farmlands or government 
controlled lands (Pearce 2012; Vlerken, Van der Wal, and Van Westen 2012; Joachim 
Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). The land is then used to produce food, biofuels, 
and other agricultural commodities to send back to investors’ home countries or to 
the international/global market for profit (Borras Jr, Hall, et al. 2011; Cheru and Obi 
2010; Cotula 2012; K. Deininger and Byerlee 2012).  
This phenomenon whereby investors acquire land being communal or 
government controlled either on a short-term (25 years) or long-term (55–99 years) 
basis is referred to as large-scale land acquisitions (hereafter LaSLA) (Anseeuw, 
Wily, et al. 2012; Borras Jr, Suárez, and Fig 2011; Cotula et al. 2009; K. Deininger, 
Nizalov, and Singh 2013; Olivier De Schutter 2009; Hall et al. 2015; Messerli et al. 
2014). Access to water is critical for LaSLA since many LASLA projects involve 
  2 
irrigation; thus this has also led to an increased demand for water in SSA (Allan 
2012; Borras Jr, Suárez, and Fig 2011; von Grebmer et al. 2012; Woods 2016). In 
general, investors acquire land through negotiations with the host government, 
though in some countries, investors can engage in dialogue directly with rural local 
communities who own the land (Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. 2014; Messerli et al. 
2014; Smalley and Corbera 2012). Typically, a single LaSLA investment deal covers 
over 200 hectares (ha) (Cotula et al. 2009; K. Deininger, Nizalov, and Singh 2013). 
Although some produce for the domestic market, the majority (78%) of investors, 
especially those from the Gulf State countries and Asia, intend to either export their 
production back home to secure the needs of their rapidly growing population or 
elsewhere for profit (Borras Jr, Hall, et al. 2011; Cheru and Obi 2010; Cotula 2012; 
K. Deininger and Byerlee 2012). 
A review of the broader literature on LaSLA shows that foreign investors make 
up to 90% of current LaSLA deals in SSA, but domestic investment is possible 
(Anseeuw, Boche, et al. 2012a; Breu et al. 2016; Gamborg et al. 2012; Gironde and 
Golay 2015; Messerli et al. 2014; Scoones et al. 2013; Toft 2013). Country reports 
make it increasingly clear that wealthy domestic citizens also engage in LaSLA 
independently (Baxter et al. 2011; David & Mittal 2011; Hanlon 2011; Horne 2011a; 
Mousseau & Mittal 2011) or jointly with foreign investors (K. Deininger and Songwe 
2009; Cotula and Leonard 2010; Lahiff, Davis, and Manenzhe 2012; McIndoe-Calder 
2012). The foregoing indicates that LaSLA is not always about large tracts of 
farmland in the hands of foreign investors but can also be considered as domestic 
acquisitions involving domestic citizens. Although the bulk of the literature reviewed 
for this dissertation research focus on foreign investors, LaSLA is used in this 
dissertation to refer to both foreign and domestic acquisition of communal land or 
government controlled land. Acquisitions involving privately owned lands by foreign 
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or domestic investors are not covered under the definition of LaSLA in this study. 
Unless specified as domestic investor, the word “investor” as used in the text refers 
to foreign investors. 
 
Controversies in LaSLA: Two Competing Narratives 
 
Since 2007, LaSLA has become an important development issue. It has fueled 
substantial and contentious debate on the consequences for host countries in SSA. In 
fact, there is widespread media coverage, academic research, policy discussions, and 
civil society engagement on the phenomenon. Discussions on LaSLA tend to be 
polarized between two competing narratives, “responsible agro-investment” and 
“land grabbing.” On the one hand, advocates view LaSLA as a new and important 
pathway for achieving development goals. LaSLA has the potential to create 
employment, reduce poverty, and increase gross domestic product (GDP) (Kachika 
2010; Murphy 2013; Murray Li 2011; Joachim Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; 
Woodhouse 2012). Moreover, LaSLA can play a key role in host countries by 
fostering economic diversification via skills and technology transfer (Aryeetey et al. 
2011; Borras and Franco 2010). There is also a potential for infrastructure 
development that in turns opens opportunities for job creation (Cheru and Obi 2010; 
Cotula 2012; K. Deininger and Byerlee 2011). In addition, building bridges with 
foreign investors potentially presents an opportunity for host countries to extend 
their production towards new and global markets (Murphy 2013; K. Deininger, 
Nizalov, and Singh 2013).  
Furthermore, the synergies that may be created can help transition SSA’s 
smallholder farming into modernized agriculture (Bruinsma 2003; M. Morris, 
Binswanger-Mikhize, and Byerlee 2009). The World Bank and the Food and 
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Agriculture Organization (FAO) particularly emphasize this modernization potential 
(FAO 2009; World Bank 200). For example, the China Africa Development Fund 
(CAD-Fund) has invested $57 million in LaSLA agriculture projects across Africa 
(Brautigam 2015). The fund has provided African governments, especially Angola, 
Mozambique, and Ethiopia, finances to operate their own state-owned farms. 
Similarly, the China Africa Agricultural Investment Corporation ($161 million) by the 
Chinese government and the Africa Agriculture and Trade Investment Fund ($135 
million) by the German government were established in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively, to help African countries improve their agriculture sector (Brautigam 
2015). Obviously, these benefits are particularly relevant for countries with low 
investment profiles in SSA. Hence, investors have increasingly become critical 
economic players in SSA. 
Whereas proponents speak of “responsible agricultural investment”, some 
critics have labeled the phenomenon as “land grabbing” and others have branded it 
as “neocolonialism.” They claim LaSLA is a ruthless exploitation of land belonging to 
the poor (Borras Jr, Franco, et al. 2011; De Schutter 2011; Hall et al. 2015; Oram 
2014). Critics argue that the intended benefits do not materialize and as such, they 
level criticism that LaSLA perpetuates corruption, aggravates food insecurity, 
degrades ecosystems, and causes conflicts and social tension (Arial, Palmer, and 
Vidar 2012; Borras Jr, Franco, et al. 2011; Gingembre 2015; Gironde and Golay 
2015). The human rights community has severely condemned the phenomenon 
because it displaces or evicts local people from their land without their consent, 
resulting in loss of livelihoods (Olivier De Schutter 2011; Human Rights Watch 2012; 
Kaag and Zoomers 2014; Oram 2014). For critics, LaSLA is essentially a 
phenomenon in which investors only seek to exploit natural resources without regard 
to the well-being of the host countries (Sean 2012; Sharlene 2016; White et al. 
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2012). Thus, in the long run, LaSLA does not promote the living standards of local 
people in host countries, but instead, eventually makes them worse off. I thoroughly 
examine these criticisms, i.e., justice and ethical concerns leveled against the 
practice by conducting an empirical research to investigate whether LaSLA actually 
made people better off or worse off and what factors underline these outcomes. I 
examine the findings from the case studies from a moral standpoint to see if LaSLA 
processes and outcomes meet the requirements of both procedural and distributive 
justice in chapter three of this dissertation research. 
Moreover, evidence suggests that investors mostly target export markets and 
as such, LaSLA does not contribute to local food security (Graham et al. 2010; 
Matondi, Havnevik, and Beyene 2011). This happens when land previously farmed by 
local people is transferred to investors while at the same time investors export their 
production to their home countries or international market (Olivier De Schutter 
2011; Allan 2012; Graham et al. 2010). There are also concerns that the economic 
crisis of investor countries can potentially make SSA’s economies vulnerable as well. 
Ncube (2012) argues that, for instance, a slow growth in China’s economy could lead 
to a decline in credit lines from major Chinese banks to SSA. Moreover, the 
production of biofuel, perceived as environmentally unsustainable, has particularly 
been the major source of LaSLA criticism (Toft 2012). Using land to grow food for the 
poor versus fuel for the rich is among the most controversial topics surrounding the 
phenomenon (Thompson 2012).  
In general, land is critical to human life because it provides the basic 
essentials needed for a living. It is viewed from different perspectives as an 
economic commodity or a fundamental input of production, which is limited in supply 
but high in demand (Clark 1998). Recently, the debate on the impacts of LaSLA in 
SSA has intensified because, for millions of people across SSA, land is more than just 
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another ‘commodity.’ For a majority of the population in SSA, access to land for 
agriculture or grazing is not only a source of wealth but also a means of survival, 
identity, and belonging (Amanor 2012; IFAD and UNEP 2013; Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010a). In addition, the land can have cultural and spiritual value—used for burial 
grounds or shrines, for instance, and so local people are often reluctant to release 
their land for LaSLA projects or development purposes. Up to 80% of Africans 
depend on land for small-scale farming, which is their main livelihood (Collier and 
Dercon 2013; IFAD and UNEP 2013; Larson et al. 2012). Even for those whose 
livelihoods are not land based, land is often their greatest asset and safety net 
(Byamugisha 2013). Small-scale farming accounts for up to 80% of food production 
(FAO 2012a) and 30% of SSA total GDP (OECD-FAO 2016). Since LaSLA can directly 
impact the quality and distribution of land, understanding the drivers of LaSLA is 
important to preserving the living standards of small-scale farmers in SSA. 
 
Purpose and Contribution of Dissertation 
 
Overall, my dissertation research examines the opportunities and threats of 
LaSLA for SSA. Sustained interest in the implication of LaSLA for SSA’s agriculture 
and overall development as well as well-being has generated numerous publications, 
books, documentaries, academic conferences, and newspaper articles. Nonetheless, 
there has been little research and studies on: (1) the drivers of LaSLA, i.e., words, 
the processes, forces, or mechanisms that lead to high LaSLA investment in some 
countries and lower investment in others; (2) the actual positive and negative 
impacts of LaSLA on local people; (3) the justice and social dimensions of the 
practice; and (4) what needs to be done to ensure sustainable and equitable 
outcomes for SSA. My dissertation research contributes to our understanding in 
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these areas. First, the current literature on LaSLA focuses more on a global 
perspective of LaSLA drivers. Yet, to ensure that LaSLA contributes to the well-being 
of Africans, it is important to understand the driving forces of LaSLA from the 
perspective of SSA given that countries are different in the context of demographics, 
governance, natural resources, business atmosphere, and economic growth. Chapter 
two of my research covers this area in depth. Second, quantitative assessments of 
the impacts of LaSLA at the local level are inadequately addressed in the broader 
literature and this therefore requires an analysis of how LaSLA plays out on the 
ground within countries in SSA. This is covered in chapter three of this research, with 
case studies situated in Tanzania. Third, philosophical analyses of the justice and 
ethical dimensions of the concerns of LaSLA have been less prominent in academics 
versus the popular media. We need more analysis in this area in order to maximize 
the potential benefits of LaSLA and minimize the harmful effects on people in host 
countries. My work also broadens our understanding on this aspect of land 
acquisitions in SSA. 
 
LaSLA in the Context of Sustainable Development  
 
Sustainable development emerged from the term development (Martinussen 
1997). Until now, there is no consensus on a single definition of development or how 
best to measure its goals (Cuthill 2010; Dillard et al. 2009). During the 1950s, 
development was conceived primarily as economic growth (increasing per capita 
income while reducing poverty in society) by international financial institutions such 
as the World Bank and FAO (Willis 2011; Halperin 2013). However, this conception of 
development is problematic when applied to the phenomenon of LaSLA. This is 
because LaSLA may increase revenue of host countries, assuming it occurs in a 
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corruption-free environment; thus, we cannot be certain that it will reduce poverty 
and inequalities among members of society since land and water are not distributed 
equally. Instead, one may argue that LaSLA widens the gap between the rich 
(investors) and the poor (local people) as the process leads to accumulation of 
capital and wealth in the hands of investors and governments (D. Harvey 2005; M. 
Harvey and Pilgrim 2011).  
In the late 1980s, the focus of development shifted toward increased human 
welfare, a process of enlarging peoples’ choices to enhance their life prospects. 
Later, development was equated with the notion of modernization, a concept that 
was very much associated with the developing world. Modernization at that time was 
widely accepted as a process of change in the developing world, resulting in similar 
living standards of the industrialized world such as America and Western Europe in 
the 1950s (Martinussen 1997). Today, proponents of LaSLA argue that LaSLA will 
modernize SSA agriculture but critics claim that LaSLA disrupts local livelihoods; thus 
it does not promote peoples’ choices for a better life (Collier and Dercon 2013; 
Gironde and Golay 2015; Kaarhus et al. 2010).  
Several other conceptions of development emerged in the debate about what 
constitutes development. For the Neo-Marxists, development meant that Third World 
countries are able to grow national independence and self–centered economic growth 
(Carnoy and Castells 2001; Martinussen 1997). In 1987, a more widely accepted 
definition of development emerged, sustainable development. The Brundtland 
Report, popularly called Our Common Future, defined sustainable development as 
“the process that fulfills present human needs without endangering the opportunities 
of future generations to fulfill their needs” (Brundtland and Khalid 1987). In other 
words, it is the process of improving the quality of life while living within the limits of 
the earth’s ecosystem, such as land, water, and forest. Thus, from a sustainable 
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development or sustainability perspective, land is critical to achieving a decent 
quality of life, especially in SSA where the majority of peoples’ livelihoods are land-
based. In chapter three of this dissertation research, I investigate how LaSLA affects 
peoples’ access to different forms of capitals needed to improve their living standards 
and development goals. I find that the lack of access to specific forms of capitals 
such as land and water are detrimental to their survival. 
 
Research Questions and Methods  
 
Overall, this dissertation research addresses four main questions about 
different aspects of LaSLA in SSA. It applies both quantitative and qualitative data 
from primary and secondary sources to fill the gap between commonplace and a 
paucity of evidence on a phenomenon that has clearly fascinated scholars who are 
concerned with the sustainable development of SSA. Beyond chapter one, the 
introduction, which contextualizes LaSLA at the global and SSA level, there are 4 
substantive chapters. Chapter two addresses the research question; what specific 
characteristics of countries make them attractive for LaSLA, relative to others in 
SSA? In other words, what drives LaSLA in SSA? Research on LaSLA in SSA has 
increased since 2007 and many researchers have focused on the impacts. Yet few 
studies have explicitly reflected on what factors drive the phenomenon in countries 
(Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2011; Cotula 2012; Friis and Reenberg 2010). Some 
scholars argue that the presence of abundant natural resources, good governance, 
and conducive business environment contribute to the ease of doing business in a 
particular country (Anseeuw, Boche, et al. 2012a; Cotula 2011; Castro and Nunes 
2013; K. Deininger 2011; Kaag and Zoomers 2014). There is a need for a regional 
level analysis on how countries’ demographic, economic, agriculture, business 
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environment, and governance characteristics contribute to encouraging or 
discouraging LaSLA in SSA. Knowing the drivers of LaSLA will enable informed policy 
responses to the negative externalities of the phenomenon; Chapter two of my work 
contributes to this understanding. To answer the question above, I apply ordinary 
least square regression (OLS) to country level data averaged over a period of eight 
years. The data used come from different sources including the World Development 
Indicator (WDI) dataset from the World Bank, the Land Matrix database, and the 
International Labor Organization’s Occupational Wages Around the World (OWW) 
data. I found that country governance and the business atmosphere are critical 
drivers of LaSLA investments in SSA.  
In chapter three, I address the impacts of LaSLA projects on rural livelihoods 
in Tanzania. In particular, I examine how LaSLA has affected peoples’ access to the 
following specific livelihood assets:  
i. Natural capital– land, water, food, forest, and pasture 
ii. Financial capital– savings, loans, farm income, and off-farm income  
iii. Social capital– happiness, sense of personal security, and overall 
wellbeing.  
iv. Human capital– health, jobs, and knowledge of farming developments  
v. Physical capital–infrastructure such as irrigation schemes, markets, and 
roads. 
Despite debate, the impacts of LaSLA on the livelihood of surrounding communities 
are unclear, partly due to the lack of systematic and concrete evidence (Liu 2014). 
As such, Borras Jr et al. (2011) and Castro Vargas et al. (2013) have called for 
empirical analysis considering livelihoods before and after LaSLA. Similarly, K. 
Deininger and Byerlee (2011) have suggested the need for local case studies to 
assess the impacts of LaSLA given that Tanzania has adopted the World Bank and 
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the FAO’s standard guidelines and principles of responsible investment. To broaden 
our understanding in this area, I carried out a fieldwork in Tanzania, a country 
considered among the top 10 LaSLA target countries in SSA. At the national level, I 
interviewed government officials, NGOs, and civil societal organizations in Dar es 
Salam to inquire about the government’s motivation in LaSLA and how LaSLA is 
playing out on the ground, i.e., LaSLA processes and outcomes. At the local level, I 
conducted household and key informant interviews as well as focus group discussions 
(FGD) to investigate the impacts of LaSLA on people’s livelihoods in the Kilombero 
and Mbarali district of Morogoro and Mbeya regions of Tanzania, respectively. 
Additionally, I interviewed two representatives of the investors and academic experts 
on agriculture development to get an idea of the challenges facing the agriculture 
sector as well as the investment climate in the country.  
In this chapter, I applied one-way ANOVA and a paired sample t-test to 
compare the impacts of LaSLA on livelihoods between a treatment and village and 
between before and after LaSLA, respectively. The results showed that LaSLA has a 
slight positive impact on a few livelihood assets, but severe negative impacts on the 
majority of peoples’ livelihood assets (though some measures of livelihood are 
unaffected by LaSLA). This led to asking a second question, i.e., given two similar 
(contract farming) LaSLA investment projects, what explains the differences in 
livelihood outcomes? This study identified the following as the determinants of LaSLA 
outcomes: (1) the LaSLA contract and negotiations, (2) local institutional context, 
and (3) the investor’s origin and management style. Further, the impacts of LaSLA 
are not homogeneous, even within the local context.  
In chapter four of my dissertation, I place the findings of my case study in 
chapter three into a philosophical context. Here, I examine the processes and 
outcomes of LaSLA in my case study from the theoretical frameworks of John Rawls, 
  12 
“The Theory of Justice” and “Justice as Fairness”. Thus, the research question I ask 
is, what empirical conditions are necessary for LaSLA to achieve just processes and 
fair outcomes? In other words, how should LaSLA investment deals be designed to 
allow the participation of local people and what would a fair and just distribution of 
the benefits and burdens of LaSLA look like? The media typically condemns LaSLA 
and focuses on the downside risks rather than the benefits. Some critics perceive the 
phenomenon as ruthlessly exploitative and reminiscent of colonialism (Liberti 2013; 
Veldman and Lankhorst 2011). Many scholars frame LaSLA as unethical and unjust, 
focusing on the human rights violations (Olivier De Schutter 2009; Künnemann and 
Monsalve Suárez 2013; Millar 2015; Toft 2012; Wisborg 2013b). I apply John 
Rawls’s theory of justice to LaSLA and contrast the results with empirical insights 
gained from fieldwork in Tanzania. My findings show that LaSLA lacks basic 
procedural and distributive principles to be considered just and fair. More specifically, 
I suggest granting local people equal access in resource distribution, paying fair 
compensation for displacement, and including local land users in LaSLA decisions at 
all levels.  
Chapter five concludes my dissertation by examining how we can improve the 
positive outcomes of LaSLA and reduce the harmful impacts across SSA. Drawing on 
these multiple research methods, this dissertation makes three key arguments. First, 
in chapter 2, I argue that contrary to the mainstream view that the abundance of 
land and water in SSA drives LaSLA deals, I found that country governance, 
specifically, corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness 
are key drivers of LaSLA in Africa. From a broader perspective, my work illuminates 
an important interface between country characteristics and FDI particularly in the 
land sector. Second, drawing on my findings in chapter 2, I recommend that 
governments should undertake a more comprehensive environmental and social 
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impact assessment (ESIA) and also build the capacity of local people to enable them 
to diversify their livelihood strategies. Third, drawing on my findings in chapter 4, I 
suggest that host governments should adhere to the principle of free, prior, and 
informed consent (FPIC). Moreover, I also recommend that governments should 
allow independent parties, NGOs, and human rights groups to represent local people 
in LaSLA negotiations. Additionally, governments should build the capacity of local 
people to strengthen their customary rights of access to land. Capacity building is 
equally important to equip local people with the skill needed to negotiate better 
contract-farming terms with investors. The international community, particularly, the 
World Bank and FAO, also has a responsibility of equipping SSA governments with 
the skills and tools needed to negotiate better LaSLA deals and oversight of those 
deals after signing the contract. Finally, this dissertation emphasizes the key roles 
that African governments and investors can play to ensure equitable and sustainable 
outcomes.  
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The phenomenon of LaSLA can be viewed as driven by market mechanisms—
that is, it occurs when it is cheaper for a country to invest in land or water outside of 
its domestic borders (Brüntrup et al. 2016; K. Deininger and Byerlee 2012; M. 
Morris, Binswanger-Mikhize, and Byerlee 2009). The surge in the demand for land is 
a result of the 2007-2008 global food crisis, which caused food prices to increase to 
an all time peak (FoEE 2010; Sasson 2012). Eventually, major food producing 
countries imposed restrictions on food exports (Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2011; 
Borras Jr, Franco, et al. 2011; Cotula 2012). Countries in Asia and the Gulf States 
with high populations and financial capital but limited arable land began to secure 
food and agricultural commodities through investment in LaSLA in SSA (Joachim Von 
Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Allan 2012; FAO 2012b; von Grebmer et al. 2012). 
Additionally, key global food security initiatives launched at the World Economic 
Forum in 2010 promoted foreign investment in LaSLA (Oram 2014). These initiatives 
include: Grow Africa, the New Vision for Agriculture, as well as the New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition among others.  
The surge in demand for land can also be attributed to the 2007 global fuel 
and financial crisis which deepened uncertainties around global oil prices and the 
cost of curbing carbon emissions to mitigate climate change (UNCTAD 2009; FoEE 
2010). In 2009, the European Union set a target of 10% of their transport fuel to 
come from biofuels by 2020 (Vlerken, Van der Wal, and Van Westen 2012). This led 
to an unprecedented demand for land to produce biofuels, which makes up 44% of 
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LaSLA (Cotula et al. 2008; Amigun et al. 2010; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010b; 
Thompson 2012). 
The financial crisis led to a collapse in equity and bond markets, and triggered 
a chain of speculative investment in alternative assets, including land.  With 
expectations of high returns on anticipated increases in world food and commodity 
prices, investors increased investment in global agriculture (Cotula et al. 2009; K. 
Deininger and Songwe 2009; Cotula and Leonard 2010). According to Moulat et al. 
(2012) and Nassirou Ba (2012), since the crisis, investors who previously had no 
interest in LaSLA began considering land as a source of wealth and a means to 
diversify their investment risk (K. Deininger and Songwe 2009; Smaller and Mann 
2009; J. Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). SSA governments have a high 
motivation to bridge the investment gap in agriculture to increase their economy’s 
GDP by attracting investment in LaSLA. For many countries in SSA, the agriculture 
sector is often underdeveloped due to lack of technology, well-functioning markets, 
human capital, and infrastructure (Aryeetey et al. 2011; Byamugisha 2013; IFPRI 
2004; FAO 2012b; UNCTAD 2013). According to the World Bank, SSA has 
experienced declining rates of investment per worker in agriculture over the last 
three decades (Deininger et al. 2011; World Bank 2012). In fact, in 2009, the FAO 
estimated that a gross annual investment of USD 209 billion was needed to bring the 
agriculture sector in SSA to a sustainable level in the previous decade (FAO 2009). 
The organization claims that this deficit is expected to increase by 50% in the next 
decade. 
To meet investment targets, national governments have established 
conducive business environments and investor-friendly treaties to attract investors 
(Cotula and Leonard 2010; Gironde and Golay 2015 Oya 2012; Smalley 2013). For 
example, Mali, Mozambique, and Tanzania offer cheap labor and land prices, 
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business tax holidays, export tariff exemptions, low-interest finance, as well as 
relaxation of investment laws and repatriation of profits to investors (UNCTAD 
2008b; Cotula and Vermeulen 2009; Mousseau and Mittal 2011; Allan 2012). To 
streamline land acquisition processes, some governments have also created ‘one-
stop shop’ offices. 
A close review of the literature points to obvious weaknesses and institutional 
gaps in many countries’ land governance. As Anseeuw, Boche, et al. (2012b), Cotula 
(2012), K. Deininger (2011), and Kaag and Zoomers (2014) note, investors often 
deliberately target countries with weak land tenure where investment policies are 
skewed in favor of opaque, top-down, and politically negotiated transactions. Such 
countries are characterized by (1) unclear and overlapping land rights (K. Deininger 
and Ali 2008), (2) corruption, i.e., where negotiations of LaSLA deals occur outside 
the public realm (Anseeuw et al. 2013a; MacInnes 2012), (3) lack of legal 
recognition of customary land tenure (K. Deininger and Ali 2008; Toulmin 2009), and 
(4) undocumented and poor record keeping (Ali, Dercon, and Ghautam 2007). 
Additionally, Byamugisha (2013) reports that because of the high registration cost 
and bureaucratic processes only, approximately 10% of rural land in SSA is officially 
or formally registered under private ownership. 
The majority of the literature reviewed for this dissertation research likewise 
highlights the claims of international financial and development institutions that 
LaSLA is a win-win phenomenon for investors and host countries (FAO 2009), and 
that LaSLA policies have helped promote the privatization of land in SSA (Cotula et 
al. 2009; Moulat et al. 2012; Nsouli 2001). In 2009, the World Bank and FAO stated 
that SSA needs to leverage its 202 million hectares (ha) of fertile land to attract 
agriculture investment to reduce poverty (Cotula et al. 2009; Deininger et al. 2011; 
Morris et al. 2009). Although these organizations have expressed the need for 
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improved land governance and natural resources management, they have 
strategically encouraged LaSLA for commercial agriculture by providing technical 
support for investors and by influencing countries’ investment policies (Daniel and 
Mittal 2010). Similarly, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), provides financial 
grants to Mozambique, South Sudan and other countries that support LaSLA for 
market-based strategies for global food security (McMichael 2011). The World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have progressively pursued 
multilateral trade and investment agreements to facilitate land-based foreign 
investments (Cotula et al. 2009; Nsouli 2001; Oram 2014). For example, the Mali, 
Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Malawi governments have committed to LaSLA investment 
under the New Alliance framework (J. Baxter, Mousseau, and Bergdolt 2011; 
Mousseau and Mittal 2011; Horne 2011a).  
Although recent studies have focused extensively on the impacts of LaSLA, 
few publications document how countries’ demographic, economic, agriculture, 
business environment, and governance characteristics encourage or discourage 
LaSLA in particular countries within SSA. Some scholars argue that the largest land 
acquisition deals are not only concentrated in countries with weak governance and 
lower cost of doing business but also with high population and high food insecurity 
(Anseeuw, Boche, et al. 2012b; Cotula 2012; K. Deininger 2011; Kaag and Zoomers 
2014). Castro and Nunes (2013) conclude that countries with lower levels of 
corruption have higher foreign direct investment (FDI). Nolte and Väth (2015) found 
that in Ghana and Kenya, discrepancies in property rights promote LaSLA projects. 
In terms of natural resources, some studies claim that a country’s attractiveness to 
foreign investors directly correlates with the abundance of fertile lands and water (K. 
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Deininger, Selod, and Burns 2012; FAO 2012b; Liu 2014). No prior studies exist that 
have investigated the relative influence of all of these potential drivers of LaSLA. In 
this study, I ask what specific characteristics of a country make it attractive to land 
investors. In other words, what drives LaSLA in SSA?  
Organization of chapter: This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section 
puts LaSLA into a broader context, highlighting the motivations of investors and host 
nations for engaging in LaSLA identified in the wider literature. It discusses the 
problems with the definition of LaSLA, data limitations, LaSLA’s intensity in SSA, as 
well as investor and target countries involved in SSA. Additionally, it draws on the 
broader literature to justify the selection of LaSLA explanatory variables for statistical 
analysis, i.e., country characteristics driving LaSLA. A third section outlines the data 
used, including the dependent and independent variables, as well as the statistical 
model used in the analysis. A fourth section proceeds with a discussion of key 
results. A fifth section highlights the extent to which country characteristics seem to 
encourage rather than discourage LaSLA investment. The final section draws lessons 
for the implementation and outcome of LaSLA investments in SSA.  
 
Understanding How LaSLA Plays Out in SSA 
 
Some scholars refer to LaSLA as ‘commercial pressures on land’, ‘foreign or 
international investment in agriculture’, ‘global land rush’, and ‘transnational or 
corporate land deals’ (Anseeuw et al. 2012; Cotula et al. 2011; Aguilar-Støen 2016; 
De Schutter 2011; Hall et al. 2015). Others take a more critical view and describe 
the phenomenon as ‘land-grabbing’, referring to the exploitation reminiscent of 
colonialism (Borras Jr, Franco, et al. 2011; Costantino 2016; Hall et al. 2015; Liberti 
2013; Oram 2014; Pearce 2012). Although LaSLA is not an entirely new 
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phenomenon, the existence of competing definitions premised on specific ideologies 
is an indication of its complexity, multidimensionality, and relative novelty (Moulat et 
al. 2012). Adding to this complexity is the issue about how much land can be 
considered large enough to be classified as LaSLA. As a matter of fact, there is no 
clear bound on what size of land qualifies as LaSLA. The literature shows that any 
single land acquisition between 200–500,000 ha can be considered LaSLA (Anseeuw 
et al. 2013b; Borras and Franco 2010; Cotula et al. 2009; K. Deininger, Nizalov, and 
Singh 2013). Country-level reports show that wealthy domestic citizens are also 
engaged in LaSLA by independently acquiring land or by joining with foreign 
investors (K. Deininger and Songwe 2009; Cotula and Leonard 2010; Lahiff, Davis, 
and Manenzhe 2012; McIndoe-Calder 2012). 
The Land Matrix, a joint independent LaSLA-monitoring initiative of research 
institutions, NGOs, and think tanks, has made substantial efforts to systematically 
collect and verify LaSLA transactions.  Nonetheless, there are methodological 
problems regarding their data collection and compilation (Cotula et al. 2009; Polack, 
Cotula, and Côte 2013). In many countries, LaSLA deals are shrouded in secrecy and 
the information available may be exaggerated, anecdotal, and sometimes 
contradictory (Anseeuw, Lay, et al. 2012; Edelman 2013; FAO 2009; Locher and 
Sulle 2013). Despite data limitations, it is nevertheless clear that LaSLA is 
widespread in SSA. As of 2012, there were over 754 LaSLA deals covering 56.2 
million ha (Anseeuw, Boche, et al. 2012a; Cotula et al. 2009; K. Deininger and 
Byerlee 2011). To put this in context, LaSLA corresponds to 4.8% of SSA’s total 
agriculture land - the equivalent of the land area of Kenya. This is in stark contrast 
with Asia and Latin America, where LaSLA corresponds to 1.1%  (17.7 million ha) 
and 1.2% (7 million ha) of land area, respectively (Anseeuw, Boche, et al. 2012a; 
Cotula et al. 2009; K. Deininger and Byerlee 2011) (Figure 1). Yet, given the 
  20 
difficulties in tracking and verifying LaSLA, and numerous classifications of what land 
size counts as LaSLA, it is not surprising to see different estimates regarding the 
intensity of LaSLA in SSA (Table 1).  
 
Figure 1.  Global distribution of LaSLA between 2000 and 2016 (Land Matrix 2016). 
 
 
Table 1: The Extent of LaSLA in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Year  Amount of LaSLA 
(million ha) 
Data sources 
2008-2010 63 Friis and Reenberg (2010) 
2007- 2010 47 (K. Deininger and Byerlee 2011) 
2008-2009 40 (K. Deininger et al. 2008) 
2000-2011 80 OXFAM (2011) 
2009 39.7 (K. Deininger et al. 2008) 
 
 
Several reasons account for why the pace of LaSLA has slowed down since 
2009. Many LaSLA projects have been abandoned by investors as unprofitable due to 
inexperience, unfavorable agro-climate, and unrealistic assumptions regarding the 
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target crops and location (Smaller, Wei, and Yalan 2012; Polack et al. 2013). Local 
resistance to LaSLA has also created problems, including social unrest (Oram 2014), 
and in some cases, such as Madagascar, political instability (Borras and Franco 2010; 
Ratsialonana et al. 2011). Investors have become more realistic and wary about the 
risks involved in difficult socio-political conditions (entanglement in legal battles), 
and more sensitive to harsh criticism from the media (Cotula 2012). Although LaSLA 
is widespread in SSA, it is more intensive in some countries than others (Figures 2), 
and there is heterogeneity among investors in SSA (Figure 3). Investors can be 
broken down into three broad categories: (1) foreign national governments, (2) 
private investors who are normally backed by their governments providing direct 
financial support, technical assistance, and policy guidance, and (3) multi-national 
corporations (MNCs), i.e., multilateral investment (joint ventures). An example of 
multilateral investment is the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF), a USD 244 
million multilateral fund supported by the Denmark, Australia, Sweden, UK and 
Dutch governments to provide investors with financial support to do business in 
Africa (Limited 2016).  
Moreover, investors can also be classified based on their country of origin. 
They come from emerging economies such as China and India, Gulf State countries 
such as United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and the Global North such as USA 
and UK (Figure 3) (Joachim Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; German, 
Schoneveld, and Mwangi 2011; Hall 2011). Further, Anseeuw et al. (2012) observe 
that investors from the Gulf States tend to target countries in the North and the Horn 
of Africa with cultural and religious affinity and relatively low cost of doing business. 
On the other hand, investors from emerging economies, constrained by fertile land 
and water for food production, focus on land-rich areas (Cheru and Obi 2010).  
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Figure 2: Top 20 LaSLA target countries in SSA from 2000 to 2016.  Data are based 
on Land Matrix data (Land Matrix 2016)  
           
Figure 3: Top 10 LaSLA investor countries in SSA from 2000 to 2016.  Data are 
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Methods  
 
Variable Selection: Dependent Variables 
 
Given the difficulties of acquiring consistent and credible data on land 
acquisitions from official sources, I selected 20 countries in SSA with available data 
to identify the broader country-level characteristics that drive LaSLA in SSA. My 
dataset on LaSLA comes from the Land Matrix, and contains panel (time-series) data 
published between 2005 and 2013. The Land Matrix (an independent body collating 
and aggregating information on LaSLA) database reports LaSLA deals that involve 
transfer of use rights, ownership through sale and lease or concession, that cover 
200 ha or larger, and that have been concluded since the year 2000 (Land Matrix 
2016).  
I use two dependent variables for my analysis: average annual land 
acquisitions by area (ha), and the sum of all individual LaSLA contract deals for a 
particular year (Land Matrix 2016; GRAIN 2013). Only LaSLA for food and biofuels 
(agriculture-oriented acquisitions) with a reliability rank of 2 or 3 were used in the 
analysis because these are LaSLA deals reported by the Land Matrix as verified on 
the ground in countries, and are publicly available (Land Matrix 2016). For a 
particular country with missing data on LaSLA deal size, an investor’s current 
average farm size was used. To adjust or control for the differences in land size 
between countries, I use the yearly amount of LaSLA as a percent of a country’s land 
area (LaSLA intensity). 
Two comments are worth making about the dependent variables. First, 
because media coverage tends to focus more attention on some countries or 
investors than others (Edelman 2013; Scoones et al. 2013), there is a potential for 
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overrepresentation or underrepresentation of LaSLA deals in the database (Oya 
2013). Second, due to differences in levels of transparency, certain countries (e.g., 
Congo Basin states) may report fewer LaSLA deals simply because freedom of the 
press is more limited (Anseeuw et al. 2013; Cotula 2012). These limitations are 
dissused in detail in Section 5. 
 
Variable Selection: Independent Variables (country characteristics) 
 
The broad categories of independent variables used include: demographic 
conditions, economic conditions, natural resource availability, business practices, and 
governance. Refer to appendix A for a detailed description of explanatory variables 
and their sources.  Anseeuw et al. (2012), contend that investors target areas with 
high population. Since access to labor is considered important by investors, I include 
the countries’ total population.  
The economic conditions category contains five variables: hourly wages 
(USD), agriculture value added as a share of GDP, FDI net inflows as a share of GDP, 
GDP per capita (USD), and the percentage of roads paved. Some scholars contend 
that investors target places with available cheap labor to reduction produce cost and 
increase the return on investment. To investigate whether cheap labor has any effect 
on investors’ decisions, I include data on hourly wages (USD) (Anseeuw et al. 
2013a). Many SSA countries are motivated to increase FDI in agriculture to boost 
their GDP (Hall 2011; Kachika 2010; Murphy 2013; World Bank 2016). This is likely 
to affect the intensity of LaSLA, thus I  include data on FDI inflows and GDP per 
capita in my analysis. Moreover, SSA countries view LaSLA as a pathway to extract 
more value from agricultural commodities (Aryeetey et al. 2011; Borras Jr and 
Franco 2010). Hence, I also include agriculture value added as a share of GDP to my 
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dataset. Countries with easy access to roads for transporting commodities appeal to 
investors (World Bank 2016). As a result, I use percentage of total roads paved as a 
proxy for access to transportation. The variable, hourly wage (USD) captures the 
effect of investors targeting countries with cheap labor (Oostendorp 2012).  
To empirically investigate the role of natural resources in attracting investors, 
I use four specific variables as proxies. These include total freshwater per capita 
(m3/cap/yr), agriculture land  (%), total land area (sq. km), and land price per ha 
(USD). Mehta, et al. (2012), Morris, et al. (2009), and (FAO 2012b) conclude that 
countries with abundant land and water resources are attractive to investors. Battaile 
et al. (2005) add that investors are influenced by cheap land prices in target 
countries. 
The literature also highlights the importance of a conducive business 
atmosphere for attracting investors (Arezki et al. 2011; World Bank 2013). Thus, I 
add to my data set four specific variables that measure the “ease of doing business” 
in foreign countries. These are: cost of business startup, time required to start a 
business, investor protection (the extent to which investors are protected through 
disclosure of ownership and financial information to the public), and the CPIA 
business regulatory environment (the extent to which the legal, regulatory, and the 
policy environment help or hinder private businesses to invest, create jobs, and 
become more productive) (World Bank 2013, 2016).  
The last set of explanatory variables focus on country governance. Whereas 
some studies claim that investors specifically target countries with weak governance 
(Anseeuw et al. 2012b; Cotula 2012; Deininger 2011; Kaag and Zoomers 2014), 
others contend that countries with poor governance attract limited FDI (Arezki, 
Deininger, and Selod 2011; Castro and Nunes 2013). To account for the impact of 
governance on LaSLA, I include five dimensions of governance from the world 
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governance indicator (WGI) dataset (Kraay et al. 2008). I refer to governance as the 
broad traditions and institutions used in exercising authority in a country (Kraay et 
al. 2008; Zakout et al. 2006). The five dimensions of governance that I examine 
come from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) and Kraay, Mastruzzi, and 
Kaufmann (2008). 
1. Political stability and absence of violence – measures the possibility of 
overthrowing a government by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
2. Government effectiveness – measures the quality of public and civil services, 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
3.  Regulatory quality – measures the ability of government to implement sound 
policies and regulations that promote private sector development. 
4. Rule of Law – measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
5. Control of Corruption – measures the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Although I use both LaSLA extent and LaSLA intensity as dependent variables, I 
present summary statistics for only LaSLA extent to demonstrate how the 
independent variables impact LaSLA (Table 2). Nonetheless, both dependent 
variables produced similar results.  
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variables  Population total (million) 35. 12 29.44 + 
Hourly wage (USD) 0.53 0.51 – 
Agriculture value added (% of 
GDP) 24.59 32.36 + 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 2.62 11.97 + 
GDP per capita (USD) 1,248.62 794.11 + 
Economy 
variables 
Percent of roads paved 61.49 64.09 + 
Total freshwater/capita 
(m3/cap/yr) 5,451.20 31,560.10 + 
Agriculture land of land area (%)  47.40 47.73 + 




Land price per ha (USD) 2.90 2.30 – 
Cost of business startup (USD) 103.42 187.92 – 
Days required to start a business 34.79 41.74 – 
Investor protection  4.60 4.13 + 
Doing business 
variables 
CPIA business reg. environment  3.27 3.19 +/– 
Political stability -0.02 -0.88 – 
Government effectiveness  0.76 -0.91 + 
Rule of law index 0.56 -0.84 + 
Voice and accountability  2.27 -0.69 +/– 
Control of corruption  0.67 -0.76 +/– 
Governance 
variables 
Regulatory quality  1.91 -0.80 +/– 
 
Values are in the table are the standardized averages of pooled LaSLA extent 
from 2005 to 2013 for 20 SSA countries. Investor protection measures the extent 
to which investors are protected through disclosure of ownership and financial 
information (0=less disclosure to 10=more disclosure). The table presents 
summary statistics of the independent variables for all countries categorized by 
percentile of LaSLA. Countries below the 50th percentile group are Angola, 
Nigeria, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Senegal, Cameroon, Mali, Cote d’ Ivoire, and 
Kenya. Countries above the 50th percentile group include Uganda, Madagascar 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Sudan, Mozambique, Congo Republic, and 
Congo Democratic Republic 
 
 
  Average country-level statistics (rather than full fledged statistical analysis) 
suggest that LaSLA is higher in countries with: lower wages (e.g., cheap labor), 
lower GDP per capita, cheap land price per ha, and lower investor protection but 
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higher percentage of roads paved. Countries with weak governance (i.e., low political 
stability, low government effectiveness, poor rule of law, high corruption, and low 
regulatory quality) have, on average, higher LaSLA investment than countries with 
strong governance. Surprisingly, LaSLA is also higher in countries with higher 
agriculture value added, cost of business startup, and time required to start a 
business. LaSLA investment is also higher in countries with lower population 
densities, poor legal, and regulatory conditions, and policies that promote businesses 
and jobs. No significant difference exists in agriculture land between countries with 
high and low LaSLA deals. These preliminary observations are tested more 
thoroughly below. 
 
Model Specification  
 
Because the dataset contained different units of measurement, I standardize 
the data to bring all country characteristics into proportion with one another (Sales, 
et al. 1997). This compensates for the disparity in the variable measurement, and 
permits direct and fair comparison. As a result, the coefficients can be used to 
compare the strength of the relationship (positive and negative) between country 
characteristics and LaSLA. The independent variables used in my analysis are 
reported annual estimates of country characteristics from 2005 to 2013.  Since there 
is little inter-annual variation (the data are temporally invariant), and since my 
objective is to investigate how country characteristics explain the extent and 
intensity of LaSLA, I averaged country characteristics over the eight-year period for 
which data were available and conducted a pooled OLS regression instead of a panel 
analysis. Though this may violate the standard OLS assumptions, a pooled ‘time 
series cross-section’ (TSCS) analysis or regression, according to Podestà (2002), has 
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been shown to capture the variation in characteristics of national systems such as 
institutions and economic variables across time and space.  
Additionally, due to my small sample size, i.e., 20 countries or spatial units 
and limited number of available data over time (8 years of annual data), using TSCS 
helps avoid violating basic assumptions of standard regression analysis suffered by 
both time series analysis and cross-sectional analysis (Podestà 2002). More 
specifically, a small sample size leads to potential imbalance between a large number 
of independent variables and a small number of cases. The total number of potential 
independent variables exceeds the degree of freedom (DF) required to model the 
relationship between LaSLA and country characteristics. Thus, I use OLS regression 
following Janoski and Hicks (1994) and Podestà (2002) to deal with the issues of lack 
of temporal variation within countries, and the problems of serial and 
contemporaneous correlation. I select the variables in the final models by trying 
different models and using their R-squared to determine the "best" model. To 
achieve full rank for all models, I alternate similar variables in the same category in 
the model. The ones with higher effect were retained while others were dropped.  
 
The estimated OLS regression equation is presented as follows: 
  
Where:  
LaSLA = LASLA extent or number (dependent variable) 
α = Constant or intercept 




LaSLA = β0 + β1POP + βi
i=2
6
∑ ECONi + β j
j=7
10
∑ RES j + βk
k=11
14
∑ BUSk + βl
l=15
20
∑ GOVl + ε
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Results  
 
The results of my analyses are divided into two sections. The first section 
presents a broader picture of the determinants (drivers) of LaSLA, categorized as 
LASLA extent and LaSLA intensity, for the suite of 20 countries examined in SSA 
(Table 3). The second section compares determinants of both LaSLA extent and 
LaSLA intensity in countries with low LaSLA (i.e., LaSLA less than the 50th percentile) 
and also countries with high LaSLA (i.e., LaSLA above the 50th percentile) (Table 4). 
The rationale for this comparison is to identify if the determinants of LaSLA vary 
between categories. Although the standard or conventional level of significance (α) 
used to justify a claim of a statistically significant effect is 0.05, Fisher (1955) argues 
that the level of significance has to be chosen based on the particular context and 
practical significance of the study. Thus, given the practical and complex natures of 
LaSLA social, economic, political, environmental and cultural dimension, I consider a 
significance level of 0.2 (α = 0.2) and a parameter estimate (coefficient) greater 
than 0.5 as significant in this study in order to examine a wide range of country 
characteristics and how they affect LaSLA. Consequently, I focus more of my 
discussion on significant country characteristics in the models.  
Overall, my results suggest (1) that governance is indeed a critical factor for 
both LaSLA extent and intensity in SSA, (2) surprisingly, that the availability of 
natural resources, water and land, are not major determinants of LaSLA, and (3) 
that the business environment in host countries and the size of their population are 
both strongly associated with LaSLA. The results from both regression models 
indicate that host country’s population size is an important determinant of LaSLA 
(Table 3). It suggests that countries with large populations are less likely to engage 
in LaSLA deals or be attractive to investors. This can potentially be interpreted that 
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investors target countries with small population but large land area in order to have 
the opportunity to bring along employees, both skilled and unskilled, from their 
home countries.  
 
Determinants of LaSLA Extent and LaSLA Intensity in SSA 
 
Results of OLS regressions for LaSLA Extent and LaSLA intensity are reported 
in Table 4. The results show that country characteristics explain 94% and 96% of the 
variation in LaSLA extent and LaSLA intensity models, respectively (Table 3). Where 
the results from both models are the same, I discuss the results together. 
Nonetheless, I point out where the two diverge from each other and give different 
interpretations. I find that governance is the most significant country characteristic 
that drives LaSLA extent and LaSLA intensity in SSA. In both models, three 
conventional governance variables, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
and rule of law were found to have the highest regression coefficients at the 
specified significance level, p < 0.2 (Table 3). However, whereas corruption is 
significant in the LaSLA intensity model, it appears insignificant in the LaSLA extent 
model. Similarly, the results for political stability show that a more stable country 
with less violence is less likely to attract LaSLA investments, but this result is 
insignificant in both models. Moreover, the results reveal that FDI net inflows (% 
GDP) is significant in both models.  
Governance has mixed effects on LaSLA and this is of interest in two respects. 
Government effectiveness is most strongly related to LaSLA. As expected, the high 
positive coefficient of government effectiveness suggest that LaSLA investments are 
more likely to be attracted to countries with better public and civil services (Table 3). 
This means investors would potentially look for countries where there is a reasonably 
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efficient government to successfully negotiate a deal but perhaps with relatively 
weak oversight and enforcement of LaSLA deals afterwards. Nonetheless, investors 
would consider places where governments broad policy frameworks are relatively 
stable, making the business environment more conducive (World Bank 2013). This 
includes countries with lax employment or environmental regulations; easy access to 
telecommunications and transportation, stable electricity supplies, more investor 
friendly policies such as tax breaks or simply limited direct interference into 
investors’ operations and decisions (UNCTAD 2008b).  
Surprisingly, regulatory quality is negatively correlated with LaSLA, though at 
a low level of significance (Table 3). For regulatory quality, this implies that LaSLA 
would be higher in countries where governments are willing to negotiate deals but 
have limited capacity to follow through land deals, and formulate sound policies and 
regulations to promote LaSLA developments (Kraay et al. 2008). According to the 
World Bank (2016), poor regulatory quality also translates as greater freedom for 
investors to acquire and control businesses in host countries. Moreover, countries 
with poor regulatory quality are characterized by weak labor, tax, customs, and 
trade regulations; thus such countries may seem attractive to investors (Cotula 
2011). Poor regulatory quality also captures the notion that public sector contracts 
such as LaSLA are open to foreign investors behind close doors (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2011). 
Rule of law and corruption have high coefficients and they are negatively and 
significantly correlated with LaSLA (Table 3). In the context of rule of law, the 
inverse relationship with LaSLA means that it is predominant in countries with weak 
accountability under the law and poor land governance. In other words, these are 
countries where customary land rights are undermined and land investment policies 
are structured in favor of foreign investors (K. Deininger, Selod, and Burns 2012). 
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Hewko (2002) notes that most foreign investors, when presented with real and 
attractive business opportunities, ignore the gaps in legislation and the legal system 
of host countries, which potentially increases production costs but instead focus their 
visceral perception of host countries. Thus, LaSLA investors are not averse to 
investing in countries with inadequate and inefficient legal regimes (Thomas 2007). 
Although more in-depth investigation at the local level is needed to establish a causal 
link, this correlation suggests that the notion of LaSLA not recognizing local land 
rights may not be entirely misplaced. In terms of corruption, the negative coefficient 
in the LaSLA intensity model might suggest corrupt countries are less efficient for 
LaSLA investments, i.e., although they are attractive destinations to do business, 
nonetheless governments cannot extend their reach to a large portion of the land 
within their borders. Moreover, investors may avoid engaging with corrupt countries 
not only because it is considered wrong but also corruption can create extra costs 
and operational inefficiencies (Castro and Nunes 2013). 
The conduciveness of the investment climate in host countries has a critical 
impact on countries’ attractiveness to LaSLA investments. The results from both 
LaSLA extent and LaSLA intensity model indicate that there is a significant, negative 
correlation between LaSLA and the cost of business startup and the number of days 
needed to complete legal procedures to operate a business in a country (Table 3). 
Generally, investors usually decide to invest abroad due to opportunities to maximize 
profit such as lower-cost inputs and labor. Thus, investors are more likely to target 
countries with low cost of opening new business. In other words, countries offering 
investor-friendly treaties such as low price of land, business tax holidays, and export 
tariff exemptions would appear opportunistic to investors. Although time and cost are 
important considerations for investors, the results of the models also reveal that 
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investor protection and CPIA business regulatory environment do not affect LaSLA 
investments.  
My two models diverge somewhat in their results. Interestingly, whereas 
certain country characteristics, agric value added (% GDP), and land price per ha 
turned out to be somewhat significant in the LaSLA extent model; they appeared 
totally insignificant in the LaSLA intensity model (Table 3). As expected, the positive 
coefficients for agric value added and FDI net inflows mean they increase with LaSLA 
investments (Table 3). This would imply that SSA governments perceive FDI in 
LaSLA as a way to improve the value of their raw materials since LaSLA is expected 
to bring in infrastructure and technology. Similarly, cheap land price would look 
attractive to investors because of the profits to be made. Additionally, the LaSLA 
intensity model shows that total water per capita is an important driver of LaSLA. 
Access to water is always critical for LaSLA projects, thus investors are attracted to 
countries with abundant water resources. Contrary to my expectations that land or 
agriculture land, GDP per capita, and percent of roads paved are critical factors 
driving LaSLA investments in SSA. The factors turned out to be insignificant in both 
the LaSLA extent and LaSLA intensity models (Table 3). I note that there are no sign 
reversals among significant variables, but more variables are significant in the LaSLA 
intensity model than the LaSLA extent model.  Furthermore, land prices, political 
stability, income levels, and infrastructure (paved roads) turn out to be much weaker 
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Table 3: OLS regression for LaSLA extent and LaSLA intensity in all 20 SSA countries  
 
 LaSLA extent model LaSLA intensity model 
Country characteristic  Coefficients Pr (>|t|) Coefficients Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept 0.0001 0.9992 0.0001 0.9987 
Government effectiveness 32.969 0.115 15.491 0.067 
Regulatory quality -18.186 0.168 -7.448 0.169 
Rule of law -15.683 0.178 -3.924 0.195 
Cost of business start up -2.134 0.147 -1.257 0.032 
Population total -1.754 0.246 -1.528 0.099 
Day required to start a business -0.969 0.193 -0.824 0.049 
FDI net inflows (% GDP) 1.227 0.137 0.499 0.079 
Agric value added (% GDP) 2.014 0.220 0.093 0.778 
Land price per ha  -1.772 0.268 -0.095 0.737 
Investor protection 0.614 0.311 0.314 0.139 
Political stability -1.249 0.301 -0.169 0.637 
GDP per capita (USD) 0.395 0.443 0.040 0.809 
Agric land (% land area) 0.168 0.691 0.384 0.047 
Percent of roads paved 0.158 0.714 -0.151 0.486 
CPIA business reg. environment  -0.141 0.541 -0.027 0.839 
Control of corruption 3.211 0.550 -2.837 0.188 
Total water per capita 0.449 0.285 0.647 0.019 
Land area 0.576 0.333 –– –– 
LaSLA extent model: R2 = 0.9969, Adjusted R2 
= 0.9412, MSE = 0.0588 
LaSLA intensity model: R2 = 
0.9967, Adjusted R2 = 0.9682, 
MSE= 0.0318 
 
* Note: in the table, country characteristics that are significant at the 20% 
level (variables with p < 0.2) are highlighted as bold.   
 
 
LaSLA Extent and LaSLA Intensity in Low and High LaSLA Countries  
 
To develop a deeper understanding of the economic drivers of LaSLA at the 
country level, I grouped the 20 countries into two categories, high LaSLA (i.e., LaSLA 
less than the 50th percentile) and low LaSLA (i.e., LaSLA above the 50th percentile). 
Unlike the models in Table 3, which put all 20 countries together, the groupings in 
table 4 categorizes countries based on the amount of LaSLA driven by economic 
forces. High LaSLA countries are those with low hourly wage where investors can get 
access to cheap labor and also have low GDP profiles in comparison with low LaSLA 
countries (Table 2). Due to low GDP, governments will have stronger motivation to 
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increase their FDI in LaSLA and agriculture value added (Table 3). Given that such 
countries have higher infrastructure, i.e., percent paved roads, they are more likely 
to attracted investors. I constructed LaSLA extent and LaSLA intensity models for 
low and high LaSLA countries to investigate if the same variables drive LaSLA. 
 The OLS regression for the LaSLA extent model in low LaSLA countries 
surprisingly returned a low adjusted R2 of 0.2543, indicating that country 
characteristics barely explain the variation in LaSLA; therefore this result will not be 
discussed (Table 4). However, the OLS regression for LaSLA extent in high LaSLA 
countries reveals that economic and business conditions explain 89.3% of the 
variation in LaSLA. With the exception of GDP per capita (USD), and CPIA business 
regulatory environment, all variables were significant at the 20% level except total 
water per capita, and the cost of business start-up. Additionally, FDI net inflows, 
were positively correlated with LASLA extent, while agric value added and population 
were negatively correlated.  
 
Table 4: OLS regression for LaSLA extent in low LaSLA and high LaSLA countries 
 
 Low LaSLA Countries High LaSLA Countries 
Country characteristic  Coefficients Pr (>|t|) Coefficients Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept -1.009 0.248 -0.443 0.417 
Total water per capita 0.683 0.671 6.876 0.134 
Cost of business start up -0.629 0.365 5.892 0.137 
FDI net inflows (% GDP) 0.593 0.324 4.034 0.125 
Agric value added (% GDP) 0.146 0.479 3.618 0.133 
Population total -0.114 0.414 -2.719 0.133 
Agric land (% land area) 0.106 0.572 -1.577 0.108 
CPIA business reg. environment -0.017 0.927 0.553 0.250 
GDP per capita (USD) -0.006 0.968 0.085 0.717 
Low LaSLA countries, R2 = 0.9171, Adjust R2 = 
0.2543, MSE= 0.019ed 
High LaSLA countries, R2 = 0.9882, 
Adjusted R2 = 0.8934, MSE = 
0.071 
 
Notes: countries in the LaSLA << 50th percentile category  (countries with low 
investors’ interest) include Angola, Nigeria, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, 
Senegal, Cameroon, Mali, Cote d Ivoire, and Kenya. Countries in the LaSLA 
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>> 50th percentile category (countries with high investors’ interest) includes 
Uganda, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Sudan, 
Mozambique, Congo Republic, and Congo DR.  
 
  The results of OLS regression for LaSLA intensity for countries with low LaSLA 
and those with high LaSLA is presented in table 5. In low LaSLA countries (Adjusted 
R2 = 0.9824), LaSLA is positively associated with the abundance of water resources 
in host countries, with FDI inflows, and with the area of land under agriculture. The 
cost of setting up business and population are both negatively correlated with LaSLA. 
Surprisingly, in high LaSLA intensity countries (Adjusted R2 = 0.9929), land 
acquisitions are negatively related to the availability of water resources, and 
positively related to the cost of business start-up and, FDI net inflows, and the 
abundance of agriculture land. The fact that water constraints in host countries do 
not hinder LaSLA investments contradicts the notion that investors securing land also 
seek access to water (Allan 2012; Borras Jr, Suárez, and Fig 2011; Mehta, 
Veldwisch, and Franco 2012).  
 
Table 5: OLS regression for LaSLA intensity in low LaSLA and high LaSLA countries   
 
 Low LaSLA Countries High LaSLA Countries 
Country characteristic  Coefficients Pr (>|t|) Coefficients Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept -0.7653 0.0834 0.48088 0.2577 
Total water per capita 2.2345 0.1084 -2.03839 0.1466 
FDI net inflows (% GDP) 0.5479 0.0608 0.9118 0.2234 
Cost of business start up -0.5149 0.1422 0.79597 0.2416 
Agric land (% land area) 0.4198 0.1698 0.73244 0.0892 
Population total -0.3016 0.1309 0.24504 0.557 
CPIA business reg. environment 0.1910 0.2552 0.03342 0.9405 
Agric value added (% GDP) 0.1345 0.4152 -0.0675 0.4669 
GDP per capita (USD) 0.1292 0.3114 0.00873 0.9793 
Low LaSLA countries, R2 = 0.998, Adj R2 = 
0.9824, MSE = 0.0124 
High LaSLA countries, R2 =0.9992, 
Adj R2 =0.9929, MSE = 0.0095 
 
Notes: countries in the << 50th percentile (countries with low LaSLA 
intensity) category include: Angola, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Congo DR, Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, Malawi, and Senegal. Countries in the >> 
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50th percentile (countries with high LaSLA intensity) category include: Kenya, 
Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Uganda, Congo Republic, Cameroon, 





While the impacts of LaSLA on the development of SSA and the well-being of 
its local communities has led to contentious debates, there have been few 
explorations of the factors determining which countries have been most targeted by 
LaSLA investors. This dissertation has examined the conditions in SSA countries that 
appear to make them attractive to foreign investors, and international financial and 
development institutions to engage in LaSLA. Using country-level data on 
demographic and economic conditions, governance, natural resources, and the 
business environment of countries in SSA, I identify the factors associated with the 
recent surge in demand for land. To this end, I use country characteristics to 
estimate two models, LaSLA extent and LaSLA intensity, to identify the determinants 
of LaSLA. Although both are different measures of LaSLA, overall, they produce 
somewhat similar results that serve to reinforce each other.  
From the results of the two full models (models using all 20 countries), I did 
not find a consistent and systematic relationship between LaSLA and several 
variables hypothesized to be significant: investor protection, political stability, GDP 
per capita (USD), agriculture land (% land area), percent of roads paved, CPIA 
business regulatory environment, and land area (Table 4). I did, however, find that 
governance variables emerge as the strongest drivers of LaSLA investments. 
Government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption all 
significantly impact LaSLA. Contrary to the predominant narrative in the literature 
that weak governance increases a country‘s attractiveness for land-related 
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investment (Anseeuw et al. 2012b; Cotula 2012; Deininger 2011; Kaag and Zoomers 
2014), I found a mixed impact of governance on LaSLA investments, i.e., two 
countervailing directions of effect (Arezki et al. 2011).  
In addition, I show that improved government effectiveness, i.e., improved 
quality of public and civil services independent of political pressures, and a strong 
government commitment to investment policies are positively related to the scale 
and intensity of LaSLA (Kraay et al. 2008; Santiso 2001). These findings are 
consistent with Jadhav and Katti (2012) who found a positive correlation between 
government effectiveness and FDI inflow in emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa. However, my results contradict the authors’ findings 
that regulatory quality increases with FDI inflow.  
My findings also support the empirical conclusion drawn by Arezki, Deininger, 
and Selod (2011), Cotula et al. (2011), and K. Deininger, Selod, and Burns (2012) 
that LaSLA is typically higher in countries with less transparency and poor 
accountability in the land sector, widespread injustice, and where rule of law and 
fundamental human rights are undermined. According to Asperen et.al (2011), 
Deininger et al. (2012), and Zakout et al. (2006),  these countries are characterized 
by weak judiciary systems, ineffective land governance, and inadequate regulatory 
and policy frameworks required to promote private investment. Consequently, such 
countries rely on technical support and policy recommendation via multilateral 
investment agreements and structural adjustment programs provided by 
international financial and development institutions including the World Bank, FAO, 
IMF, and the WTO (Daniel and Mittal 2010; Flores and Mousseau 2013; McMichael 
2011; Santiso 2001).  
My analysis also examines the effect of corruption on LaSLA investment. 
Consistent with the popular view that corruption encourages FDI, my analysis shows 
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that controlling corruption discourages LaSLA investments. In other words, my 
results support the conclusion of other studies, that increasing levels of corruption 
increases LaSLA investments (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006). The impact of corruption on 
economic development, particularly on FDI, has come under intense debate. My 
findings agree with arguments made by some economists that bribery helps speed 
up procedures and avoid bureaucratic inefficiencies in governance (Cuervo-Cazurra 
2006). LaSLA investment procedures can be complicated and bureaucratic, requiring 
a long period of time to obtain clearance and legitimate documents to establish a 
business. For instance, the Tanzanian government has established the Tanzania 
Investment Center (TIC) to streamline and speed up investment procedures for 
LaSLA investors. Additionally, corruption is perceived as beneficial because it has 
been associated with the term “greasing the wheel” (Transparency International 
2016). In other words, corruption facilitates and provides alternative ways for LaSLA 
investors to do business in countries where governments are inefficient. Some 
empirical studies suggest that investors, familiar with corruption in their home 
countries, navigate and secure property rights by exploiting their familiarity in similar 
corrupt countries where governments have weak enforcement capacity and 
institutions (Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra 2006; Henisz 2000).  
However, my findings for corruption having an influence are somewhat weak, 
and corruption appears to be insignificant in the LaSLA extent model. Kraay et.al 
(2008) argue that corrupt countries in SSA experience low FDI in LaSLA because 
investors from countries that have signed the “Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions” are deterred from engaging in 
bribery in foreign countries. Furthermore, given the long-term nature of LaSLA 
investments, investors are disincentivized to invest in countries with high levels of 
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corruption where land tenure security is undermined (Arial, Fagan, and Zimmermann 
2011; MacInnes 2012; Transparency International 2016). In such corrupt countries, 
many LaSLA deals are negotiated outside the public realm and are shrouded in 
secrecy, which may adversely impact the business climate. According to Schnitzer 
(1999) and Zakout, Wehrmann, and Törhönen (2006), this creates uncertainty and 
the risk of expropriation for investors due to inadequate security of property rights in 
the event that LaSLA projects collapse. Some scholars have contended that 
corruption by opportunistic governments in host countries increases the costs of 
operation due to bribery or informal payments (Kraay, Mastruzzi, and Kaufmann 
2008; Wei and Shleifer 2000).  
Overall, the findings on corruption imply that countries with high corruption 
attract LaSLA deals from investors coming from similar corrupt countries. These 
findings are consistent with the conclusion of Anseeuw, Boche, et al. (2012a) and 
Kaag and Zoomers (2014). Scholars should recognize that corruption in host-country 
influences investors from different origins differently and does not necessarily block 
FDI inflows.  
The results on political stability are inconclusive, but are at least consistent 
with the idea that stability does influence investors’ decision of where to invest in 
LaSLA projects (Table 4). One would expect investors to go to countries that are 
relatively safe, stable, and conducive for business, but to the extent that there is any 
signal in the data it is in the opposite direction.  Thaler (2013) reports that there is 
no significant correlation between LaSLA and political stability. Kaag and Zoomers 
(2014) and Mabikke (2011) argue that investors deliberately target post-conflict 
areas with weak governance, relatively abundant land, and small populations due to 
displacement from conflicts.  
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The results on the availability of labor are less ambiguous. Approximately 
20% of LaSLA deals are concentrated in densely-populated regions dominated by 
small-scale farmers (Anseeuw et al. 2012). Yet, Arezki et al. (2011) state that food 
import-dependent countries with large populations tend to target countries for LaSLA 
without consideration of the host countries’ population size. I find that population is 
negatively correlated with LaSLA, indicating that sparsely populated land rich areas 
may be preferred. Regardless, whether investors are targeting cheap labor or not, or 
whether there is an increasing trend of urbanization, I can reasonably assume that 
countries with larger populations are likely to have adequate labor force, especially in 
rural areas to meet labor demands of investors.  
There are limitations to this study that should be addressed in the future. 
First, my data are limited to only 20 SSA countries and are also aggregated for each 
country. Future research can examine how differences among investor origins drive 
LaSLA. Second, my analysis focuses on the general determinants of LaSLA in SSA 
and does not take into account region-specific differences between countries. This is 
left for future work. Third, governance variables measure perception in each country, 
which are subjective rather than objective. Each governance variable has several 
dimensions, and these may have a differential impact on LaSLA (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2011). Fourth, I analyzed determinants of LaSLA for only agriculture 
commodities, i.e., food and biofuel. Insights from this analysis may not translate to 
other types of LaSLA such as mineral extraction, tourism, and conservation. Future 
studies can compare differences in the effect of country characteristics on specific 
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Conclusion  
 
Broadly speaking, good governance is conducive to foreign direct investment 
(Asperen et al. 2011; Deininger et al. 2012; Margulis et al. Jr 2013). Although I 
cannot generalize my findings from SSA, they suggest that LaSLA is a type of 
investment that diverges from this notion. The literature suggests inconsistencies in 
the expected and documented effects of governance on LaSLA investments due to: 
high levels of corruption, weak rule of law, poor transparency and accountability as 
well as low government effectiveness. A starting point for correcting the 
inconsistencies between expected and actual impacts of governance and other 
country characteristics on LaSLA is for SSA governments to observe a number of 
best practices, already identified in the literature, including the following: 
1. Simplifying the procedures for investment in agriculture by investors, by 
eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic steps, and reducing opportunities for 
bribery by elites and government officials.  
2. Improving transparency and accountability in LaSLA transactions by 
implementing uniform procedures and standards that are well monitored 
as well as building the capacity of land officers (Zakout et al. 2006).  
3. Applying consistent and coherent regulatory, legal, and institutional 
framework that enforces the rule of law to secure local peoples’ land rights 
to protect vulnerable groups against displacement and loss of livelihood, 
and to minimize land conflicts between locals and investors.  
4. Encouraging public participation in decision-making by providing easy 
access to information and procedures for reporting corruption and 
misconduct while at the same time ensuring equity, fairness and 
impartiality in service delivery. 
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In the next chapter, I connect my findings from this regional level analysis to infer 
how governance variables and the business climate affect the outcomes, i.e. positive 
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LaSLA has attracted considerable attention in global development circles due 
to its potential positive and negative impacts. The current LaSLA debate between 
proponents and critics has been shaped by different conceptualizations drawn from 
two competing narratives: ‘responsible agricultural investment’ and ‘land grabbing’ 
(Borras Jr et al. 2011; McCarthy et al. 2012). Proponents of LaSLA include 
policymakers, recipient governments, and development institutions like the World 
Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). These proponents claim that LaSLA has a ‘win-win’ outcome 
because investors secure commodities they seek for their home countries or 
international market whereas host countries (normally with poor investment profiles) 
harness development benefits for their economies (Cotula et al. 2009; Vermeulen 
and Cotula 2010b; Deininger and Songwe 2009).  
The win-win narrative is premised on the assumption that LaSLA promises a 
way for SSA countries, including Tanzania, to achieve their development goals such 
as increasing GDP, creating employment, and transferring technology (Aryeetey et 
al. 2011; Cotula et al. 2009; Franco and Borras Jr 2012; Hall 2011; Murphy 2013). 
Some countries see an important role for LaSLA investments to make up for their 
limited domestic budget and for transitioning smallholder farming into modernized 
agriculture to improve food security (Lavers 2013; Asperen, Goldfarb, and 
Minderhoud 2011; K. W. Deininger 2003; Liversage 2011; FAO 2012b; Baier 2010). 
Indeed, SSA governments make considerable efforts to attract investors in the hope 
that LaSLA will open access to the global markets, build their infrastructure, diversify 
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rural economies, and reduce poverty (Murray Li 2011; Nassirou Ba 2012; Nmehielle 
et al. 2014; Woodhouse 2012). Additionally, governments are looking to fill the gap 
left by dwindling official foreign aid with revenue from LaSLA investments (Alesina 
and Dollar 2000; Wouterse et al. 2011).  
Although proponents of LaSLA are optimistic, critics have dubbed the 
phenomenon as ‘land grabbing’, criticizing the process as ruthlessly exploitative and 
reminiscent of colonialism (Liberti 2013; Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 2010; 
Veldman and Lankhorst 2011). Critics include the media, environmental and human 
rights organizations, and think tanks. They argue that LaSLA escalates the 
competition for land and water between powerful multinational corporations (MNC) 
and smallholders (Allan 2012; Woodhouse 2012; Breu et al. 2016; Bues and 
Theesfeld 2012; M. Harvey and Pilgrim 2011). This competition increases social 
tension in local communities by pitting poor smallholders against wealthy investors 
and potentially leading to the displacement and loss of livelihoods (Gironde and 
Golay 2015; Millar 2015; Oram 2014; Rantala et al. 2013; Sharlene 2016; Toft 
2012). For the poor in SSA, access to land is not only indispensable to their 
livelihoods but is also a source of identity and belonging (Amanor 2012; IFAD and 
UNEP 2013; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). Even for those whose livelihoods are not 
land based, land is often their greatest asset and safety net (Byamugisha 2013). 
Threats to these land resources can therefore have significant impacts. 
Others have claimed that LaSLA exacerbates corruption, conflict, and 
violence, especially in countries with weak governance such as Madagascar and 
Ethiopia (Arial, Fagan, and Zimmermann 2011; Nmehielle et al. 2014; Palmer, 
Fricska, and Wehrmann 2009). There are also debates about the impact on food 
insecurity in countries where the bulk of food produced is exported by investors 
(Baier 2010; FAO 2015; Murphy 2013). Environmental groups criticize LaSLA for its 
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affects on deforestation and biodiversity loss (Costantino 2016; Sean 2012; Voget-
Kleschin and Ott 2013). Moreover, Vreyer and Roubaud (2013) and De Schutter 
(2011) claim that it is difficult to see how LaSLA contributes to poverty reduction, 
employment development, and local capacity building given that investors have the 
freedom to hire their employees from their home countries. Gingembre (2015), Hall 
et al. (2015), and Kaag and Zoomers (2014) add that, even when jobs are created, 
they may often be short-lived or low-paid. Therefore, the win-win narrative is rather 
a win-lose discourse.  
Despite debate, the impacts of LaSLA on the livelihood of surrounding 
communities are unclear, partly due to the lack of systematic and concrete evidence 
(Liu 2014). As such, Borras Jr et al. (2011) and Castro Vargas et al. (2013) have 
called for empirical analysis considering livelihoods before and after LaSLA. Similarly, 
Deininger and Byerlee (2011) have suggested the need for local case studies to 
assess the effectiveness of the World Bank and FAO’s standard guidelines and 
principles adopted by Tanzania. My studies will contribute in this direction by 
investigating whether these guidelines have been useful on the ground. 
Although a number of studies on contract farming have contributed to our 
broader understanding on the trends, processes, and impacts of LaSLA at local 
levels, they do not address how LaSLA affects capital assets, i.e., natural, physical, 
financial, social, and human capital which, according to the Department for 
International Development (DFID), are the building blocks of livelihood. Studies by 
Castro Vargas et al. (2013) and Liu (2014) suggest that contract farming has the 
potential to yield development benefits to local people. Yet, these claims require 
further investigation. In contrast, Cotula et al. (2011) notes that lack of impact 
assessment and consultation of local people are both major threats to equitable 
outcomes. Veldman and Lankhorst (2011) study the socio-economic impacts of 
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LaSLA sugarcane farming in Rwanda and find that contract farmers’ livelihoods 
became dependent on the investor. However, the authors limit their assessment of 
impacts to only two measures of livelihood assets, i.e., land and water. (Bernasconi-
Osterwalder et al. (2014), Oya (2012), and Smalley (2013) assess the processes 
involved in LaSLA contract farming and find that contract negotiations, crop 
characteristics, and the legal institutions determined whether LaSLA outcomes would 
be positive or negative for local people. Even though evaluation of LaSLA impacts on 
local peoples’ access to land and water is critical (Knight 2010; Millar 2015; Mehta et 
al. 2012), such analysis is insufficient to produce a holistic view of the varied 
livelihood outcomes. If we are to move forward, a rigorous statistical assessment of 
changes in all five forms of livelihood assets (Bebbington 1999; Morse and 
McNamara 2013) is critical to the understanding of how LaSLA affects rural people.  
My study will extend their work by examining a wide range of assets critical to the 
development and wellbeing of local rural people.  
This Study’s Approach: In my study, I assess the impacts of LaSLA by using 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches to compare treatment villages (affected 
by LaSLA) and control village (that provides a baseline measure). The assumption is 
that the control village indicates what would have happened in the treatment village 
in the absence of LaSLA, and thus “controls” for broader phenomena (e.g., changes 
in national policy, global economic recession) that would affect livelihoods. 
Deviations from these control trajectories are attributed to LaSLA. By implementing a 
pretest-posttest design, we may evaluate the effect of LaSLA projects on the well-
being of local villages. Since villages were chosen after LaSLA was implemented, the 
“pretest” portion derives from the memory of the participants. This study aims to 
investigate how LaSLA projects have improved local livelihoods through in-depth 
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household interviews, and focus group discussions. The aim is to understand the key 
determinants of livelihood outcomes. My primary research questions are: 
 
1. What are the impacts on rural livelihoods of LaSLA projects? In other words, 
how has LaSLA affected peoples’ access to the following specific livelihood 
assets:   
a. Natural capital– land, water, food, forest, and pasture. 
b. Financial capital– savings, loans, farm income, and off-farm income. 
c. Social capital– happiness, sense of personal security, and overall 
wellbeing. 
d. Human capital– health, jobs, and knowledge of farming 
developments.  
e. Physical capital–infrastructure such as irrigation schemes, markets, 
roads, and etc. 
2. Given two similar (contract farming) LaSLA investment projects, are there 
differences in outcomes, and if so, what explains these differences?  
 
Organization of chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The 
next section gives a brief background of Tanzania, the country of study. It also 
introduces theoretical and conceptual frameworks that underpin this study. Section 
two is devoted to the methodology including the study design, description and 
selection of study country, LaSLA projects and villages, and data collection and 
analysis. In Section three, I present my findings, which compare livelihoods in 
treatment and control villages and explore the underlying reasons for the similarities 
and differences in livelihood outcomes between the villages. Section 4 discusses the 
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results. Section 5 concludes the study by proposing options for policy-makers and 
national governments to improve livelihood outcomes.  
 
Background of Tanzania: Economy, Agriculture Development, and LaSLA 
 
I present a case study of two LaSLA projects in Tanzania: the Kilombero 
Plantation Limited and the Mbarali Rice Farm. First, a brief background to Tanzanian 
economy, agriculture development, and LaSLA investment is in order. The United 
Republic of Tanzania is a low-income country considered stable with a democratic 
government. Located in East Africa and with a total land area of 94.5 million ha of 
which 44 million ha is considered arable, Tanzania is one of Africa’s sleeping giants 
(Coulson 1993). Endowed with Lake Victoria  (34.9, 000 sq.km) and Lake 
Tanganyika (13.4, 000 sq.km), the country is considered abundant in water 
resources (Sarwatt and Mollel 2006). Given that only 23% (10.2 million ha) of the 
land is presently under cultivation, there is a prevailing perception that land is 
underutilized to serve its 52 million people (Sulle and Nelson 2009; Kaarhus et al. 
2010). In 2014, the share of the population living below the poverty line was 46%, 
earning $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (TNBS 2015; TMAFC 2015). Small-scale farming 
remains the backbone of Tanzania’s economy and accounts for 45% of the overall 
GDP, 60% of export earnings, and 75% of employment (TNBS 2015; World Bank 
2012). Agriculture development faces challenges including low productivity, low 
producer prices, lack of well-functioning markets, poor infrastructure, poor extension 
services, corruption, and unfavorable agricultural policies (Byamugisha 2013; M. 
Morris, Binswanger-Mikhize, and Byerlee 2009; IFPRI 2004; FAO 2012b).  
As in other SSA countries, LaSLA for agriculture investments and 
modernization in Tanzania have been triggered by a number of drivers. These 
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include: concerns for high unemployment rates, environmental protection (through 
REDD1 programs), food insecurity, climate change initiatives, and the government’s 
Kilimo Kwanza (‘Agriculture First’) initiative to transform smallholder farming into 
modernized agricultural (Bräutigam and Tang 2012; Brekke and Theting 2010; 
Coulson 1993; Kaarhus et al. 2010; Mbeyale et al. 2012). After Tanzania’s 
independence in 1962, the government followed the World Bank’s advice to 
transform subsistence farming into modernized agriculture. Although agricultural 
exports increased at that time, smallholders experienced land appropriation (Mbelle 
et al. 2002). This initiative led to the establishment of the Arusha Declaration of 
February 1967, which was called the Ujamaa Strategy. This strategy resulted in 
forced village resettlement of approximately 70% of rural Tanzanians (Kaag and 
Zoomers 2014). The objective was to boost agricultural productivity. However, the 
unfavorable agro-ecological conditions in the mid 1970s severely affected Tanzania’s 
agriculture, leading to economic, social, and political crises (Havnevik et al. 2003). At 
the same time, foreign aid was channeled to the industrial sector while smallholders 
were taxed heavily (Ellis 1983).  
In 1986, Tanzania entered into agreements with the IMF and the World Bank 
to stabilize and recover the economy through structural reform programs (Brunger 
1990). The aim was to protect and promote private investment in agriculture; thus 
Tanzania became a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
in 1992. Nonetheless, corruption in the government impeded these policy reforms, 
deteriorating the economic relationships between Tanzania, IMF and the World Bank 
(Kaag and Zoomers 2014). However, the relationship was mended and in 1997, 
Tanzania renewed its interest in foreign investments by establishing the Tanzania 
Investment Act of 1997. Through this Act, the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), a 
‘one-stop agency’ for investors was established with the sole objective of providing a 
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Certificate of Incentive, streamlining LaSLA procedures, and allocating land to foreign 
investors within a period of 30 days (Kaag and Zoomers 2014). In 2009, the 
government launched a nationwide initiative to establish local investment promotion 
agencies to help foreign investors with local problems. This was to promote the 
Kilimo Kwanza initiative to further strengthen FDI in commercial agriculture.  
Land laws and LaSLA processes on the ground in Tanzania are complex. 
Although all land in Tanzania is under the custody of the president, it can be 
categorized into three groups: reserved (30%), village land (68%), and general land 
(2%) (Kaarhus et al. 2010; TNBS 2015). Since villages own most of Tanzania’s land, 
investors mostly receive land within the village land category. However, according to 
the Tanzanian land laws of 1999, the land must first be transferred into general land 
status after which it will not revert to village land again. Although TIC is mandated 
with identifying and making land available to investors, TIC recommends that 
investors search and visit villages with land potentially available for LaSLA projects. 
Such informal visits to inquire about land availability normally lead to the negotiation 
of LaSLA (Matondi et al. 2011). According to Kaag and Zoomers (2014), the cultural 
and knowledge gap (e.g., gaps in laws, land, and investment regulations and access 
to information) between investors and villagers have mostly resulted in a lack of 
understanding about what the land lease entails, such as rights and responsibilities, 
compensations, and payment scheme among others.  
Does LaSLA actually exist in Tanzania? According to Locher and Sulle (2013), 
the weakness in methodology of data collection and the lack of transparency in 
LaSLA deals have painted a blurred picture of LaSLA intensity in Tanzania, and as 
such have created a misleading starting point for academic research. In addition, 
Kaag and Zoomers (2014) claim that weak land governance is due to overlapping 
roles of various land administration agencies and inconsistent land tenure 
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framework. This has increasingly made access to information from Tanzanian 
authorities on LaSLA difficult. This was confirmed during my fieldwork in Tanzania. 
Thus, I depend on Kaag and Zoomers (2014) to highlight the trends in LaSLA over 
the last decade. The number of foreign and domestic LaSLA agricultural projects 
registered by the TIC has increased from 2001 to 2012 (Figure 1). The decline in 
LaSLA from 2005 to 2007 resulted from uncertainties regarding the impacts of a 
change in government, i.e., transitioning from President Benjamin William to 
President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, whereas the decline between 2008 and 2010 is 
potentially due to the global financial crisis (Kaag and Zoomers 2014). However, the 
increase in 2011 and 2012 is attributed to LaSLA investments under the Kilimo 
Kwanza initiative.  
 
 
Figure 4: The number of foreign and domestic LaSLA agriculture projects registered 
by the TIC between 2001 and 2012 (source: TIC Research and Information Division, 
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 LaSLA Under the Sustainable Livelihood Framework 
 
The Department for International Development’s (DFID) sustainable livelihood 
framework (SLF) in figure 2 is useful for conceptualizing how LaSLA affects different 
components of rural livelihood. This study uses the SLF as a tool for understanding 
how LaSLA affects communities’ local assets (e.g., increase in employment, income, 
and capacity) and development constraints (e.g., food insecurity, loss of livelihood 
and lack of access to resources) (Scoones 1998). The SLF also serves as a ‘process’ 
tool to identify the role of the state, non-state actors, and institutions (e.g., rules, 
rights, and norms) that control, distribute, and transform peoples’ assets (Morse and 
McNamara 2013; OECD 2001). The overall emphasis of the SLF is on livelihood, 
which comprises local assets (capital), access, and activities that are required for a 
means of living by an individual and are mediated by institutions and policies (DFID 
1999; Allison and Horemans 2005; Elasha et al. 2005). A livelihood is 'sustainable' 
when people are able to maintain or improve their living standards and reduce their 
vulnerability to external shocks without degrading the environment (Solesbury 
2003). This study primarily draws on two components of the SLF, livelihood assets as 
well as transforming structures and processes which, is two of the five components 
of the SLF. Livelihood assets may be owned, controlled or claimed by a household. 
Although there are trade-offs between different assets, each is relatively easy to 
measure and serves as proxy for the development goals this study seeks to 
investigate. 
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Figure 5. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) adapted from DFID (1999). 
 
Livelihood assets identify five core asset categories or types of capital. First, 
human capital assets include a household’s skills, knowledge, labor, and good 
health. Second, natural capital includes natural resource stocks and environmental 
services such as fish stocks, land, forest, pasture, freshwater, and crops. Third, 
physical capital consists of basic infrastructure and inputs such as machinery, 
technologies, transport systems, energy, and access to information. Fourth, 
financial capital denotes stocks such as savings, credits, loans, income, livestock, 
and inflows of money. Lastly, social capital refers to the networks, connections, 
group membership, rules, norms, and relationships of trust. In addition, this 
dissertation research also uses the transforming structures and processes of the 
SLF. The transforming structures and processes component refers to the spheres of 
organizations, both private and public, operating from local to multinational scales 
with varying degrees of autonomy and authority. Processes are the ways in which 
these structures function by setting and implementing policies (i.e., macro, sectoral, 
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redistributive, regulatory, etc.), legislation (i.e., international and domestic 
agreements), and institutions (i.e., rules, practices, conventions, customs, etc.) that 
directly shape people’s livelihoods. These structures and processes influence 
relationships between rural people, investors, state actors, and non-state actors. 





Study Design: Selection of Country, LaSLA Projects, and Villages 
 
This study uses a pretest-posttest approach (hereafter before-and-after) 
(Chan et al. 1998; Dimitrov and Rumrill Jr 2003) and a quasi-experimental design. 
This quasi-experimental design describes a comparative case study of a treatment 
village and a control village (Creswell et al. 2010; Dion 2003; Yin 2009) of two 
LaSLA projects, the Kilombero Plantation Limited (KPL) and the Mbarali Rice Farm 
(MRF). I selected Tanzania from the average group of the top 20 LaSLA target 
countries in SSA according to the Land Matrix data (Land Matrix 2016). Within the 
average group, which is comprised of Madagascar, Zambia, and Nigeria, Tanzania 
was selected purposefully because it was logistically convenient to collaborate with 
the Tanzania’s Sokoine University of Agriculture. I chose KPL and MRF with regard to 
similarities in investment models (contract farming), years of operation, and the 
type of crop produced (rice) (Creswell et al. 2010). According to the Tanzania 
Investment Center (TIC) and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania 
(SAGCOT), KPL and MRF LaSLA projects are among the top 5 commercial rice 
producers in Tanzania established long enough (i.e., started operations in 2007) to
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measure impacts at the local level (Bill Gates Found 2012; Mittal 2012; TMAFC 
2014). Table 1 provides details on the two LaSLA projects.  
In order to evaluate the impacts of LaSLA on peoples’ livelihood, a treatment 
village and a control village that had existed in each district in 2005, before the 
implementation of the LaSLA projects in 2007, were needed. I define a treatment 
village as one surrounding and directly linked to the LaSLA project and whose 
residents’ livelihoods are likely to have been strongly influenced by project. I 
selected Mkangawalo and Nyeregete as treatment villages among the villages 
surrounding the LaSLA projects in Kilombero and Mbarali Districts, respectively, 
because the government allocated about 70% of their land to the investors (Figure 
3). This government allocated 70% of the villages’ land because the land was 
considered underutilized by the village residents. 
A control village is one with similar characteristics as the treatment village in 
the same district but that is not influenced or linked to the LaSLA project in any 
direct way. I did not have access to data (village profiles) from 2005 to establish 
whether control villages were truly similar to treatment villages in 2005. I depended 
on the expert opinion of district officials to select control villages in the same district 
that they considered to be comparable with the treatment villages. Because the 
control villages selected are close and are in the same district with treatment 
villages, they were broadly exposed to similar socioeconomic shocks and policies. 
Similarly, the control villages have broadly similar agro-ecological conditions as well 
as the same district level regulatory, investment policies and political forces. 
Moreover, I aimed for close similarity with the treatment villages in terms of 
contextual factors that may influence households’ sensitivity and responsivess to 
external shocks such as: household structure, level of education, livelihood activities, 
average landholdings (ha) and years of existence in the district. Two villages that 
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met these criteria were Chita and Isunula in the Kilombero and Mbarali district, 
respectively (Figure 3). These two villages provided reliable baseline data and served 
as a comparative base to tease out changes in treatment villages that can be 
attributed to LaSLA, and which changes may be caused by broader trends in the 
district. 
Overall, this study design enables an exploration of the differences and 
similarities within and between cases to obtain a comprehensive insight on LaSLA’s 
impacts. This then provides a basis for conjecturing LaSLA’s impacts in other 
countries like Kenya and Ethiopia with comparable LaSLA investment typologies 
(contract farming) and local characteristics (Baxter and Jack 2008; Maxwell 2013). A 
case study methodology allows for the investigation of real-life contextual experience 
of affected local people to uncover the deeper meaning of a phenomenon with 
contradictory beliefs and impacts (Creswell et al. 2010; Yin 2003).  
 
Table 6. Details of KPL and MRF LaSLA investment projects 
 
 Kilombero Plantation 
Limited (KPL) 
Mbarali Rice Farms 
(MRF) 
Ownership  Joint ventures between 
RUBADA (Tanzanian 
government, owns 8.7%) and 
Agrica Guernsey Ltd (UK 
private firm, owns 91.3 %)  
Highland Estates Limited, 
100% privately owned by a 
Tanzanian investor  
Location  Kilombero District in Morogoro 
Region (S 8° 15' 00", E 36° 25' 
00")  
Mbarali District in Mbeya 
Region  (S 8° 50' 60", E 
33°51'00”) 
Year implemented 2007 2007 
Main crop  Rice  Rice 
Size of LaSLA farm  5,818 ha  6,070 ha  
Land price per ha US$ 438  US$ 362 
Production capacity  35,000 tons of rice per year 25,000 tons of rice per year  
Farm model  Contract farming  Contract farming  
Environmental and 
social impact 
assessment (ESIA)  
Approved  **Information not available  
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Figure 6: Map of Tanzania showing study areas: to the left, Nyeregete (treatment in 
red) and Isunula (control in blue) in Mbarali District and to the right Mkangawalo 
(treatment in red) and Chita (control in blue) in Kilombero District (Map was 
accessed and modified from the Tanzania Ministy of Agriculture Food and 
Corporatives, 2015). 
 
Data Collection and Analysis  
 
My analysis draws on three types of primary data: household surveys, focus 
group discussions, and in-depth interviews gathered from May to August 2015. To 
give a comprehensive account of LaSLA impacts, I used secondary data from peer-
reviewed journals and official or empirical reports from the Tanzanian government, 
the Land Matrix, the Oakland Institute, Genetic Resources Action International 
(GRAIN), the World Bank, and the FAO for cross verification. With regards to focus 
group discussions (FGDs), 10 to 12 people were selected in each village. Information 
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from the FGD was used to validate households’ responses and their perception of 
changes in livelihood. The FGD also helped to illuminate the difference in livelihood 
outcomes between the treatment villages (Teddlie and Yu 2007; Willig 2008). The 
FGD was comprised of the hamlet chairman, village executive officers, contract 
farmers, casual laborers, as well as male and female village residents of different 
ages. The analyses of data from the FGD comprised of systematically coding the 
FGDs transcriptions in two steps. The first step involved identifying characteristic 
concepts and themes associated with peoples’ perceptions of change in the livelihood 
measures (Garbarino and Holland 2009; Perrin, McSweeney, and Agrawal 2008; Yin 
2009). This provided a list of codes that were used in the second step of coding 
(thematic analysis) during which I focused on the core reasons supporting 
participants’ perceptions of change in livelihood outcomes OF LaSLA. 
To understand the Tanzanian government’s motivation for investment in 
LaSLA, in-depth interviews were held at the national capital with central government 
agencies including: the Tanzania Investment Center (TIC), the Southern Agricultural 
Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), the Agriculture Non-State Actors Forum 
(ANSAF), the Rufiji Basin Development Authority (RUBADA), and the Ministry for 
Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFSC). NGOs interviewed included 
HAKIARDHI, OXFAM International, and Action Aid International. Informal interviews 
were held with sub-contractors of both investment firms. Four academic experts on 
investment in agriculture from the Sokoine University of Agriculture were also 
interviewed. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval (exempt status) was obtained 
prior to data collection and survey questions were pre-tested, and the necessary 
modifications were made accordingly. I used the structured and semi-structured 
household surveys (see appendix C) to solicit households’ perception of changes in 
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livelihood. Cronbach's alpha, a test of scale reliability and internal consistency, was 
overall determined to be 0.7452, indicating a high level of reliability for the 
questionnaire (Gliem and Gliem 2003). Overall, 50 households were interviewed in 
each of the four villages. In this study, I define a household as a group of persons, 
related or unrelated, living in the same house, eating meals together, and who 
share common resources or employment together (Beaman and Dillon 2012). 
Although the sample in each village may not be representative, respondents were 
selected using stratified random sampling. The objective was to include all potential 
relevant sources of variation in the sample in order to assess whether the different 
categories (income, religion, age, hamlet, ethnicity) of households were made 
better or worse off rather than a representative household. Within each category, 
respondents were grouped into sub categories. All households were placed in a 
basket according to their subcategories and 2-3 households were chosen at random 
from the basket. The age category consisted of two respondents within each of the 
following age groups: 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, and 60-70. The religion category 
included Christians (4 selected), Muslims (3 selected), and Tradionalists (3 
selected). The ethnic group comprised of two respondents from each of the 
following: Wahehe, Wandamba or Wapogolo, Wanyakyusa, Wasukuma, and 
Wabena. Two respondents each were selected from the following income categories 
determined according to the village standards: very poor, poor, average, rich, and 
very rich. Finally, two respondents were randomly selected from each of five main 
hamlets in each village identified with the help of the village executive committee. 
However, this study did not take into account the possibility of different 
combinations among the multiple categories. To elaborate, a respondent was 
selected from one specific category. For example, in terms of religion, a Christian 
household, regardless of the respondent’s age, income, hamlet, or ethnicity. 
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Although this method of selecting (sampling) respondents ignores the different 
combinations among the five categories, this method of sampling is helpful when 
the target population is highly heterogeneous and there is interest in adequately 
capturing the underlying diversity. For this study, the strata were based on 
ethnicity, hamlet, age, and wealth status according to each village’s standards Table 
7 summarizes key background information on households interviewed in each 
village.  
Table 7. Averages of background information of households interviewed  
 




















Avg household assets 









Average age 54 42 40 52 
Average household size 5.2 5.6 5.0 7.0 
Avg land holdings (ha) 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Average years of residence 42 27 32 47 
Male 37 34 29 33 Gender 
Female 13 16 21 17 
Married 45 41 45 45 Marital 
status Single 5 9 5 5 
Head 33 33 37 43 Household 
status Member 17 17 13 5 
None 5 5 5 12 
Primary 39 32 41 37 
 
Education 
level Secondary 6 13 4 1 
Before 47 45 50 48 Farming as 
livelihood After 49 43 49 50 
Rice 50 45 48 39 Crops grown 
in last 10 yrs Maize 0 5 2 11 
 
 
Notice the differences in average income and household assets between the 
treatment and control villages in each district. This could potentially be due to either 
bias in sampling methodology or because of real differences in the villages. It is also 
known that estimating household income in subsistence farming households and 
rural communities in SSA in general could be complicated, challenging, and costly 
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(Benin and Randriamamonjy 2008). Morris et al. (2000) also note that reported 
measures of total income by rural households are unlikely to be reliable, due to 
reluctance of households to reveal such information to the researcher who is 
normally considered a stranger by the respondent. Morris et al. (2000) further argue 
that the myriad transactions including economic activities undertaken by households 
make it questionable that respondents know this datum. However, my field 
observation of treatment and control villages in each district did not show observable 
significant differences in wealth and asset holdings. In other words, outwardly both 
treatment and control villages are very similar.  Nonetheless, the fact that control 
and treatment villages are similar in other background variables potentially indicate 
that the villages can serve as true treatment and control villages (Table 7). Yet, this 
cannot be definitively proven. 
To measure changes in livelihood (see questionnaire in appendix A), I 
collected data for respondents’ livelihood in 2005 (hereafter, “before LaSLA”) as well 
as their livelihoods in 2015 (“after LaSLA”). Without referencing LaSLA projects to 
respondents, I asked them to simply recall their livelihoods in both 2005 and 2015 
and then indicate whether it was better or worse. My analysis compares these two 
time periods between treatment and control villages to evaluate changes; that is, 
whether livelihood is better or worse. Specifically, I asked respondents to indicate 
their perception of change on a 5-point numerical rating scale (NRS-5) where 5 
represents much better (50% more) and 1 represents much worse (50% less). In 
order to evaluate the claim that LaSLA builds physical capital, i.e., new infrastructure 
or improves existing ones, I asked respondents in the treatment village about 
changes in access to the following: agriculture subsidies, building materials, potable 
water, toilet facilities, grain storage and processing equipments, irrigation schemes, 
markets, electricity, schools (primary and secondary), primary health facilities, 
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technology (phones, internet, etc.), roads, loans (credit schemes), transport 
vehicles, and job creation.  
The main statistical analyses were performed in two steps to evaluate the 
impacts of LaSLA on households’ livelihood assets (i.e., natural, human, financial, 
and social capital). In the first step, a set of one-way ANOVA with Tukey's honest 
significant difference (HSD) tests compared the changes (difference between 2015 
and 2005) in livelihood between treatment and control villages. In the second step, a 
percent change calculation was used to evaluate the significance of the changes 
(better or worse) in livelihood between treatment and control villages. A positive 
change (% increase) and a negative change (% decrease) represent improvement 
and deterioration in livelihood, respectively.   
I hypothesize that LaSLA would improve livelihoods in treatment villages 
compared to control villages. For hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis states that 
all means of treatment and control villages and before and after measures are equal 
(H0: µd = 0), whereas the alternative hypothesis states that at least one mean is 
different (Ha: µd ≠ 0). All assumptions underlying the one-way ANOVA were 
satisfied. The results are presented in two sections. The first section presents the 
perceived changes in peoples’ livelihood between the treatment and control village in 
each district and whether these changes were statistically significant within each 
village. The second section uses information from the household interviews, focus 
group discussion, and in-depth interviews with government officials, NGO 
representatives, sub contractors of the investors, and key informants to outline 
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Results 
 
As stated in the methods, due to the lack of data available to compare 
livelihood between treatments and controls, I depended on the expert opinion of 
district authorities to select the control villages. However, treatment and control 
villages experience, and are buffered by, the same regulatory, socioeconomic, 
political, institutional, and agro-climatic conditions in the district. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume the significant changes or differences in livelihood (how much 
better or worse) in treatment villages can be attributed to LaSLA. In other words, 
even if control and treatment started from different points or position, the relative 
change is what matters. Similarly, if they started from different points but the 
treatment became worse much faster than the control, it still became worse and that 
can be attributed to the effect of LaSLA. Nonetheless, I cannot assert that control 
and treatment started from same position but because they experienced largely the 
same forces besides LaSLA that would impact livelihood, I will take the differences 
(between 2015 and 2005) as meaningful. 
In the results, using a p < 0.05, we can be highly certain that the difference 
in livelihood between villages is influenced by LaSLA. However, with 0.05<p<0.3, we 
can be reasonably certain that the changes are the result of LaSLA. For grouping 
information using the Tukey method, means (averages) of livelihood measures of 
villages in each district that do not share the same letter are significantly different, 
i.e. ‘A’ for one village and B for the other. Averages of livelihood measures of villages 
that are similar share the same letter, ‘A.’ Notice also that in the table ‘A’ always has 
a higher mean than ‘B’. In Tables 8 and 9, M represents the mean and SD, the 
standard deviation. As a reminder, a 5-point numerical rating scale (NRS-5) was 
used, where 5 represents much better (50% more) and 1 represents much worse 
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(50% less). 
 
Perceived Changes in Villagers’ Livelihoods from 2005-2015 in Kilombero District 
 
In Kilombero, the one-way ANOVA (Table 8) comparing changes or difference 
(between 2015 and 2005) in livelihood between Mkangawalo (treatment) and Chita 
(control) indicates that the two villages are statistically similar in some measures of 
livelihoods, i.e. they belong to the same group (group A). Specifically, the differences 
between the means of the following measures of livelihood are not statistically 
significant: average off-farm income, savings, access to loans, asset holdings, 
health, education, and overall wellbeing. Even when both Mkangawalo and Chita are 
in the same group (group A), every measure with the exception of access to loans 
deteriorated more in Mkangawalo than Chita. However, these deteriorations cannot 
be attributed to the effect of the KPL LaSLA project. Similarly, the slight 
improvement in access to loans in Mkangawalo cannot also be attributed to LaSLA as 
well. The fact that both villages group together (both belong to group A) is 
somewhat an indication the villages responded to similar forces, in other words, 
other economic forces might be implicated. 
 Furthermore, the analysis shows that the two villages diverge from each other 
in some livelihood measures. The differences between Mkangawalo (group B in Table 
8) and Chita (group A in Table 8) are seen in the following measures of livelihoods 
and these differences or changes are statistically significant: average farm income, 
happiness, job and security (land, food, and personal), as well as access to land, 
water, forest, and pasture (Table 8). These changes suggest that in comparison to 
Chita, Mkangawalo’s livelihood deteriorated significantly in the measures above. 
These deteriorations were statistically significant as shown by the p values in the 
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table and large in magnitude (the range of percent decrease is from 11.98 for jobs to 
54.19 for land security), suggesting that all things taken into account, we can be 
highly certain that LaSLA worsened the livelihoods of Mkangawalo in these measures 
(Table 8).  
In terms of LaSLA’s impacts on physical capital in Mkangawalo, all 
respondents indicated that the KPL investor contributed to infrastructure 
development in four ways. These included building a new village clinic, creating 
employment for approximately 15% of residents (contract farmers, casual laborers, 
and wage workers), contributing cement to build the village primary school, and 
providing school children with study desks. However, during the focus group 
discussion participants complained about the investor’s failure to pay the annual 
village development fund of TSH 50,000,000 (USD 22,800). They also reported the 
investor failed to honor agreements to: (1) offer more than 50% of villagers 
employment; (2) improve roads to Ifakara (district center); and (3) provide a 
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Table 8: Summary of one-way ANOVA comparing changes in livelihood from 2005-
2015 in the Kilombero district. 
 




Chita (control) P 
value 




 M SD  M SD    
Natural Capital  
Access to land 2.000   1.355   B 3.080   1.066 A 0.000 -35.06 
Access to water 2.040 0.879 B 2.460  1.073 A 0.035 -17.07 
Access to forest 1.440  0.674 B 2.420  1.179 A 0.000 -40.5 
Access to pasture 1.500 0.886 B 2.580 0.949 A 0.000 -41.86 
Financial Capital 
Avg farm income 2.680 1.019 B 3.400 0.903 A 0.000 -21.18 
Avg off-farm income 3.080   1.209 A 3.360   1.005 A 0.211 -8.33 
Savings 2.480   1.249 A 2.700   1.216 A 0.374 -8.15 
Access to loans 2.500   1.015 A 2.200   1.107 A 0.161 +13.64 
Assets holdings 2.980   1.317   A 3.420   0.950   A 0.058 -12.87 
Human Capital 
Health 3.060   1.406   A 3.360   1.083   A 0.235 -15.00 
Education 3.180   1.304 A 3.280   1.089 A 0.678 -3.05 
Job 2.940 1.150 B 3.340 0.626 A 0.033 -11.98 
Livelihood Outcomes 
Land security 1.420 0.784 B 3.100 0.839 A 0.000 -54.19 
Food security 2.680   1.301 B 3.540   0.930   A 0.000 -24.29 
Personal security 2.600 0.968   B 3.560 0.732 A 0.000 -26.97 
Happiness 2.940 1.057   B 3.680  0.740 A 0.000 -20.11 
Overall wellbeing 3.260  0.899 A 3.600  0.880 A 0.059 -9.44 
 
Note: Significant (p<0.05) measures of livelihood are highlighted in bold and 
0.05<p<0.3 in italics in the table. 
 
 
Perceived Changes in Villagers’ Livelihoods from 2005-2015 in Mbarali District 
 
In Mbarali, comparing changes in livelihood between Nyeregete (treatment) 
and Isunula (control) reveals that the differences between all measures of livelihood 
of the two villages are not statistically significant with the exception of access to 
water and pasture (Table 9). In other words, both villages diverge only in access to 
water and pasture. Nyeregete’s access to water and access to pasture improved 
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significantly by 24% and 16% respectively in comparison with Isunula (Table 9). 
These findings suggest that LaSLA had a positive impact only on Nyeregete’s water 
and pasture (Table 9). Generally, while some measures of livelihood improved, 
others deteriorated in Nyeregete, though these changes were not statistically 
significant. Further, the results reveal that both Nyeregete and Isunula fall in the 
same group (group A) with similar means for all measures of livelihood except access 
to water and pasture as mentioned above. Thus, we cannot attribute any of the 
other slight changes in livelihood (except access to water and pasture) to LaSLA. 
Moreover, from Table 9, we can be reasonably certain that LaSLA slightly improved 
Nyeregete’s food security and overall well-being, whereas it decreased jobs. 
In terms of LaSLA’s impact on Nyeregete’s physical capital, all respondents 
indicated that the LaSLA project did not implemented any new infrastructure or 
improved their existing social services. In the focus group discussion, participants 
agreed that an irrigation scheme provided by the MRF investor has improved 
villagers’ access to water by 9.5%, enabling them to cultivate crops throughout the 
year. Some households stated that this has improved their food security and income 
to pay for their children’s school expenses. Participants added that the investor 
employed approximately 7% and 20% casual employees and contract farmers 
respectively. Others complained about the investor hired immigrant workers. In 
effect, the hypothesis that LaSLA would improve livelihoods in Nyeregete (treatment 
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Table 9: Summary of one-way ANOVA comparing changes in livelihood from 2005-
2015 in the Mbarali district. 
 






Isunula (control) P 
value 




 M SD  M SD    
Natural Capital 
Access to land 3.040   1.068   A 3.020   1.020 A 0.924 +0.66 
Access to water 3.460   1.129   A 2.780   0.764   B 0.001 +24.46 
Access to forest 2.620  0.696 A 2.580    0.883   A 0.802 1.55 
Access to pasture 2.880   0.479 A 2.480    0.839   B 0.004 16.13 
Financial Capital 
Avg farm income 3.260   0.751  A 3.340   1.239 A 0.697 - 2.4 
Avg off-farm inc 3.380   0.725 A 3.200   1.125 A 0.344 + 5.63 
Savings 3.320  0.652 A 3.000    1.050   A 0.070 + 10.67 
Access to loans 2.920  0.395   A 2.880  0.689 A 0.723 + 1.39 
Assets 3.560   0.929   A 3.680   1.168   A 0.571 - 3.26 
Human Capital 
Health 3.440   1.053 A 3.320   1.316   A 0.616 + 3.61 
Education 3.180  0.595   A 3.460    0.952   A 0.081 - 8.09 
Job 3.020   0.377  A 3.160 0.650 A 0.191 - 4.43 
Livelihood Outcomes 
Land security 2.480   0.931   A 2.580   0.928   A 0.592 - 3.88 
Food security 3.580   0.950   A 3.240   1.153 A 0.111 + 10.49 
Personal security 3.120  0.328 A 3.140  0.639 A 0.844 - 0.64 
Happiness 3.380   0.945 A 3.360   1.102   A 0.923 - 6.11 
Overall wellbeing 3.800   1.195 A 3.480   1.297   A 0.203 + 9.2 
 
Note: Significant (p<0.05) measures of livelihood are highlighted in bold and 
0.05<p<0.3 in italics in the table. 
 
 
Summary of Results: Cross Comparison of Treatment Villages  
 
Overall, the results of the multiple pairwise comparisons of households’ 
perceptions of change in livelihood in the two districts suggest two key findings. 
First, in the Kilombero district, although Mkangawalo and Chita are statistically 
incomparable to some extent, it is clear that LaSLA negatively affected 
Mkangawalo’s: average farm income, happiness, job and security (land, food, and 
personal) as well as access to land, water, forest, and pasture (Table 8).  Overall, 
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these findings indicate that LaSLA worsened Mkangawalo’s livelihoods even after 
correcting for other longitudinal trends, economic impacts and policies in the 
Kilombero district. Two potential explanations for these findings in Mkangawalo are 
that either people were truly better off in Mkangawalo before LaSLA or the impact of 
LaSLA has been such that people remember their livelihoods as being better off 
before LaSLA. Second, in the Mbarali District, Nyeregete is not statistically different 
from Isunula. With the exception of access to water and pasture, there is no 
evidence that LaSLA positively or negatively affected villagers’ livelihood in 
Nyeregete even after correcting for other longitudinal trends indicated by changes in 
Isunula. In other words, both villages became better off or worse off to the same 
degree. The fact that both villages group together is perhaps an indication that the 
control and treatment village responded in similar ways to external shocks and 
policies in the district. 
In brief, Mkangawalo and Nyeregete have clearly different livelihood 
outcomes. The foregoing analysis based on these two case studies certainly proves 
that LaSLA in Tanzania doesn’t seem to be improving rural livelihoods. In the next 
section, I explore reasons why KPL and MRF LaSLA projects, both with similar 
investment conditions and characteristics, produce different outcomes in Mkangawalo 
and Nyeregete. This study found two potential factors accounting for the decline of 
livelihood in Mkangawalo and LaSLA’s slight positive impact in Nyeregete. These are 
(1) the LaSLA contract, negotiation process and the local context and (2) the 
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Factors Contributing to Livelihood Outcomes in Treatment Villages 
 
The LaSLA Contract, Negotiation and Local Context 
 
 
In Tanzania, LaSLA investment negotiations involve multiple stages including 
screening of investors’ proposals, conducting environmental and social impact 
assessments (ESIA), and consultation and engagement with the local people. These 
are among the measures the Tanzanian government must undertake to secure better 
outcomes, both for the country and for investors. In an interview, the Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) and the Tanzania Investment 
Center (TIC) stated that the Kilombero District is designated as a high priority zone 
for agricultural investment in Tanzania. Thus, to attract investors they streamline 
investment procedures. However, an informant from HAKIARDHI, a national NGO, 
disclosed that the SAGCOT and TIC relaxed investment laws and assessment of the 
KPL project. The officer claimed that the project was approved without effective 
scrutiny of the contract, nor due evaluation of the investor’s technical expertise and 
experience working with local people. In contrast, the Mbarali district authorities 
stated that the negotiation of the MRF project was more thorough and less hasty, 
because the district is not considered an investment priority zone by the government 
and there were no investment targets to achieve.  
Consultation and engagement of local people prior to project implementation 
can potentially influence outcomes of LaSLA projects. In Mkangawalo, I found that 
the principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) was not adhered to. 
Approximately 75% of interviewees reported that they were unaware of KPL’s project 
until the investor started clearing the land acquired, adding that only the village 
leaders were consulted in the pre-investment procedures. During the focus group 
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discussion (FGD), participants mentioned that the government identified the portion 
of Mkangawalo’s, land available for acquisition without consulting the affected 
farmers. In addition, the government officials did not hold village meetings to discuss 
compensation for affected farmers or the location and size of land set aside for the 
investor, nor did the officials explain potential negative impacts on their livelihood. 
Most farmers expressed strong dissatisfaction in being forced and intimidated to 
surrender their land and to be relocated.  
In contrast, the MRF project in Nyeregete was a local government-led 
process, and implemented in an organized and inclusive way. Over 90% of farmers 
mentioned that meetings were organized in Nyeregete and all surrounding villages to 
announce the MRF project, location, intended size of land available for acquisition, 
and the financial terms of the contract. Nonetheless, participants of the FGD 
expressed that the meetings were held in order to minimize potential resistance from 
villagers and sell the positive impacts of the MRF project. However, the villagers 
expected more explanations of the details of the project. More importantly, 
compared to Mkangawalo, Nyeregete did better because the Mbarali District 
authorities conducted a systematic stakeholder mapping to identify potential farmers 
who would be affected by the LaSLA project and allocated enough time for the 
farmers to harvest their crops. Unlike Mkangawalo where farmers complained about 
substantial reduction in landholdings after being relocated, affected farmers in 
Nyeregete were given the same size of fertile land.    
Contract terms and their acceptance by investors, host government and local 
people play an important role in LaSLA outcomes. Although I could not obtain copies 
of the LaSLA contracts for both KPL and MRF projects, information regarding the 
contracts was obtained from the Tanzania Investment Center, HAKIARDHI, and local 
district authorities. In both Mkangawalo and Nyeregete, none of the interviewed 
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farmers had seen the LaSLA contract, nor were they able to negotiate the terms. 
Several farmers reported that because they are illiterate, the village leaders signed 
such contracts. The KPL contract was lacking details of KPL’s responsibilities to 
Mkangawalo including specifics about compensation, approximate number of jobs to 
be created, health and safety measures for employees, and dispute resolution 
mechanisms. However, according to the informant from HAKIARDHI, the MRF 
contract did not only capture these, but they were actually enforced by the Mbarali 
District Council. During the FGD in Mkangawalo, the villagers stated that for the past 
few years, the investor has failed to honor this obligation of paying TSH 50,000,000 
(USD 22,800) annually to the development fund established for Mkangawalo and its 
two surrounding villages.  
Within Tanzania, the local policy environment plays a role in shaping LaSLA 
outcomes. In Mkangawalo, farmers expressed dissatisfaction and frustration with the 
compulsory nature of KPL LaSLA. An interviewee from HAKIARDHI mentioned that all 
levels of the local government supported the LaSLA deal. This confirms villagers’ 
claims of receiving virtually no support from the district authorities because the 
authorities always advocated for the investor. According to the opinion leaders in the 
village, the district authorities were the prime force in LaSLA on behalf of KPL. 
District authorities responded in an interview that they were instructed by the central 
government to support investors in order to meet the investment target for the 
district. This is in contrast to Mbarali, where villagers indicated that district 
authorities maintained regular visits to the farm to inspect and enforce health and 
safety standards. I also found no evidence that farmers’ associations provided an 
appropriate platform for collective bargaining in Mkangawalo, unlike Nyeregete 
where farmers were organized and were able to mobilize resources for training and 
extension services.  
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Investor’s Origin and Management Objectives 
 
 
The background, whether foreign or domestic, of an investor, their 
management objectives and experience dealing with local people certainly affect 
LaSLA outcomes. Both the investor of the KPL project (foreign investor) and the 
investor of MRF (domestic investor) reached an agreement with the local farmers to 
purchase their harvests for a guaranteed price provided the quality of rice met the 
required standards. Farmers interviewed in both treatment villages had complaints 
about payments, poor safety and health standards, and post harvesting losses. 
However, in the Kilombero district, even before I asked questions regarding farmers’ 
satisfaction working for the investor (foreign), all farmers interviewed in Mkangawalo 
conveyed a strong discontent with the rigidity of KPL’s contract. According to 
farmers, the investor selectively chose farmers with a higher economic status and 
deprived others of joining the scheme though their plots were already allocated to 
the investor. The FGD pointed out that the investor did not always purchase all bags 
of rice produced by contract farmers at the agreed price during peak rice seasons. 
Most farmers indicated that they felt confined to the investor due to mandatory 
deductions for savings and advance payment of wages.   
On the contrary, Nyeregete farmers reported that the flexibility to enter and 
exit contract farming at any time enhanced their bargaining power on the price of 
rice especially during poor seasons. Farmers said this improved their food security 
because they were able to grow other crops like maize, vegetables, and cassava 
without any restrictions. During the FGD, farmers with extra labor but limited land 
holdings stated they are able engage in other livelihood activities to diversify their 
income sources. According to the village leaders, the investor (domestic citizen) was 
committed to local procurement and also internalized part of the production cost for 
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Using a pretest-posttest approach and a quasi-experimental design, this study 
evaluates the impacts of LaSLA on local livelihoods by systematically comparing 
treatment and control villages in two separate districts, the Kilombero and Mbarali 
District of Tanzania. Specifically, I test a series of hypotheses regarding how LaSLA 
affects five types of assets that underpin rural livelihood: natural, human, financial, 
social, and physical capital. I show that in Kilombero, LaSLA negatively affected 
Mkangawalo (treatment) compared to Chita (control). In the Mbarali district, it was 
found that LaSLA did not negatively affect Nyeregete (treatment). In other words, 
both Nyeregete and Isunula were not statistically different. These findings are 
discussed in the following sections.  
Like other countries in SSA, the majority of people in Tanzania are 
smallholders. Thus, access to capital, particularly land and water, are critical for 
livelihood. In this context, relocating approximately 25% of smallholders in 
Mkangawalo without any reasonable compensation constitutes violation of basic 
human rights (Human Rights Watch 2012; Toft 2012; Olivier De Schutter 2009). In 
theory, contract farming should not deteriorate Mkangawalo’s access to land, water, 
forest, or pasture because farmers are generally expected to cultivate their own 
land. However, in Mkangawalo, the relocation led to a reduction in land holdings and 
subsequently farm yields, especially due to increased travel time to farms and poor 
soil fertility of the new land allocated to farmers. The deterioration of Mkangawalo’s 
access to natural capital is consistent with the findings of other studies done in 
Tanzania (Kaarhus et al. 2010; Mwami and Kamata 2011; Mittal 2012). Moreover, 
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Oya (2012), and Smalley (2013) find that in Zambia contract farming has resulted in 
the expropriation of smallholders. This has triggered a wider pool of infringements 
including lack of access to food, forest resources, and game meat. Nonetheless, 
LaSLA has boosted local food security in SSA countries with relatively good land 
governance (Allan 2012; Hallam 2011; Woodhouse 2012).  
In terms of financial capital, Murray Li (2011) and Smalley and Corbera 
(2012) report that in countries such as Mozambique, smallholders have been used as 
a source of cheap labor by investors. I found similar discontent in Mkangawalo 
households regarding long work hours for substandard wages. In Kenya and Mali, 
research indicates that LaSLA contract farming plays a key role in integrating 
smallholders into agribusiness chains and thereby increasing their income and local 
spending (Oya 2012; Smalley 2013). This is somewhat similar to the case of 
Nyeregete where farmers’ financial capital improved slightly. The impacts of LaSLA 
on social capital have been studied by the Oakland Institute (2013) and Ratsialonana 
et al. (2011). They note that social unrest and violence are not exceptions but rather 
constitute systemic features of LaSLA domains lacking approval of local people. 
Mkangawalo’s decline in social capital reflects the intense and pervasive conflict 
between smallholders and the KPL investor. Other studies further highlight such 
impacts of LaSLA in local communities (Fenske 2011; Lavers 2012; Moreda 2015; 
Peters 2004; Polack, Cotula, and Côte 2013; Kaag and Zoomers 2014; Oram 2014).  
The debate on the potential of LaSLA to develop human capital by transferring 
knowledge and technology in rural Africa is still ongoing. Contrary to my findings in 
Mkangawalo, Asenso-Okyere (2009) and Wilhemina et al. (2010) find that LaSLA 
improved access to information, market opportunities, and farming methods in 
Ghana. However, Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009) and Murray Li (2011) cite 
examples of cases where investors have brought labor from their home countries, 
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thus limiting opportunities for employment and skill development of locals. Similar to 
Mkangawalo, Cotula et al. (2009) and Deininger (2011) have also drawn attention to 
the health implications of LaSLA plantation farms, concluding that exposure to 
chemicals used on these farms has degraded the health of local people in rural 
Tanzania and Kenya.  
In general, livelihood outcomes of LaSLA investments depend on a number of 
factors including the following: land tenure (property rights), involvement and 
participation of local people in the process, fair distribution of benefits, enforcement 
of contractual agreements, and the policy and institutional context. Depending on 
the country, these factors play out in different ways to influence LaSLA outcomes. 
Overall, in Nyeregete, there is no effect of LaSLA on livelihood compared to the 
control village, Isunula. In Mkangawalo, this study found that the majority of 
villagers who were relocated had no land titles or legal documentation of their 
individual holdings of the village land. Several studies further document how weak 
land tenure facilitates the displacement and dispossession of smallholders in rural 
Africa (Anseeuw, Wily, et al. 2012; K. Deininger and Ali 2008; IIED 2006; Knight 
2010). Specifically, in terms of LaSLA contracts, the same story of broken promises 
is frequently cited in Tanzania (Cotula and Leonard 2010; Kaarhus et al. 2010; 
Polack et al. 2013; Sulle and Nelson 2009) and across SSA (Cotula et al. 2009; FoEE 
2010). This brings into question the capacity of host governments, especially local 
authorities to negotiate and enforce contract terms. Vermeulen and Cotula (2010b) 
and Oliver De Schutter (2011) observe that where there is free, prior, and informed 
consultation, LaSLA has mostly led to better outcomes or at least has prevented 
social tension and conflicts.   
A comment is in order regarding the origin of the two investors. The different 
origin of both the KPL (foreign) and MRF (domestic) investor was identified to be a 
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critical factor that contributed to different livelihood outcomes in the two treatment 
villages, Mkangawalo in the Kilombero district and Nyeregete in the Mbarali district. 
During the fieldwork, it was discovered that the lack of local experience, culture, and 
understanding of the complexities on the ground by the KPL investor contributed to 
poor outcomes in Mkangawalo. In contrast, the domestic investor of MRF had a 
significant long-term and on-the-ground experience in Tanzania and also understood 
the local context, thus, this contributed to the slight improvement in Nyeregete’s 
livelihoods.  
Finally, although Mkangawalo’s livelihoods degraded in the case of the foreign 
investor, Nyeregete’s livelihoods slightly improved due to LaSLA. This study does not 
claim that domestic LaSLA projects will always produce better outcomes. However, it 
can be argued that when domestic investors have political motivations, or strong 
social capital, and when that reputation is tied to good outcomes, it can potentially 
lead to better outcomes or at least reduce the negative impacts of LaSLA on local 
livelihoods. Similarly, domestic investors are more likely to have strong social capital 
and so are better able than foreign investors to take advantage of local familiarity, 
relationships, and networks, or even corrupt government system. On the other hand, 
domestic investors may also be involved in local corruption, or have ties to local or 
national officials, which may allow them to exploit local people or avoid 
compensating them.  
This study has some potential limitations. Although I controlled for 
demographic effects including, factors such as respondents’ social status, education 
level, and personality may have influenced their perceptions of impact. Additionally, 
participants’ ability to recall past experiences about LaSLA accurately is questionable 
(though this should be equally true in treatment and control villages). Increasing my 
sample size to cover different typologies of LaSLA in different parts of Tanzania could 
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strengthen my analysis and make my conclusions more generalizable. Regardless of 
these potential limitations, my use of different data sources, the sustainable 
livelihood framework (SLF), a quasi-experimental design, and a pretest-posttest 
approach should help to address the inherent weaknesses of retrospective memory. 
This research opens new doors for public policy and investment guidelines for 
national governments on the critical role of LaSLA in meeting development priorities. 
Currently, the dominant policy vision for agriculture in SSA is to transition from 
smallholder to modern LaSLA farms (Asperen et al. 2011; Deininger et al. 2012; 




The recent interest in LaSLA deals in SSA offers an opportunity to shape old 
debates with new evidence and address some empirical blind spots that have been 
overlooked in the literature. I contextualize LaSLA as two competing narratives: 
responsible agricultural investment and land grabbing. Whereas proponents of LaSLA 
argue the need for foreign investments to meet development goals, opponents 
evaluate LaSLA as detrimental to the well-being of local people. I analyzed the 
claims in two districts in rural Tanzania and led a discussion on sustainable livelihood 
of smallholders in SSA at large. The analysis yields two important conclusions. First, 
my results point to both positive and negative outcomes on rural villages livelihoods. 
In Mkangawalo, I found that poor wages, limited employment, lack of compensation, 
as well as monopolistic tendencies of the investor blocked positive spillovers. In 
Nyeregete, LaSLA somewhat improved villagers’ assets, food security and overall 
well-being.  
Second, my analysis points to several contextual factors that determine the 
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livelihood outcomes of LaSLA projects: the LaSLA contract, negotiation and local 
context, and the investor’s background and management objectives. The main 
conclusion of this study is that LaSLA outcomes of LaSLA deals are highly variable, 
context specific, and dependent on key determining factors that are not always fully 
explored in research. It is difficult to distinguish changes in livelihood as a result of 
LaSLA from the wider processes. Based on villagers’ perceptions of LaSLA impacts, 
this study concludes that there are potential benefits if LaSLA is implemented 
correctly. For LaSLA projects to promote development: (1) they should be built upon 
fair distribution of cost and benefits where local customary rights are respected; (2) 
compensations must paid and promises should be fulfilled; (3) thorough 
environmental and social impact assessments (ESIA) should be conducted; (4) 
LaSLA contracts should be skillfully screened and negotiated; and (5) local voices 
should be included in decision-making.  
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In 2009, Olivier De Schutter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
commented on the phenomenon of large-scale land acquisitions (LaSLA), also 
popularly called “land grabbing.” Agreements between host countries to lease 
farmlands to foreign investors, he warned, should not be allowed to violate the 
human rights of the local people in such countries (De Schutter 2009). LaSLA refers 
here broadly to the investment or acquisition by leasing or purchasing large tracts of 
farmland in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by foreign 
investors to produce food or biofuel and other agricultural commodities. However, 
LaSLA also involves local investors acquiring communal lands. These commodities 
are mostly intended for export to investors’ homelands or to the international or 
global market for profit (Borras Jr, Hall, et al. 2011; Cotula et al. 2011; K. Deininger 
et al. 2008; Locher, Steimann, and Raj Upreti 2012; Messerli et al. 2014; Polack et 
al. 2013; Rantala et al. 2013; Scoones et al. 2013). Access to water is critical for 
LaSLA projects, thus investors also seek water rights in host countries (Borras Jr, 
Hall, et al. 2011; Cotula et al. 2011; K. Deininger et al. 2008; Locher, Steimann, and 
Raj Upreti 2012; Messerli et al. 2014; Polack et al. 2013; Rantala et al. 2013; 
Scoones et al. 2013).  
In general, investors including national governments, multi-national 
corporations, sovereign wealth funds, and private entities acquire land through 
negotiations with the host government, though in some countries investors may 
consult directly with rural local communities who own the land (Hall 2011; Pearce 
2012). Typically, a single LaSLA deal encompasses 200 to 500,000 hectares (ha) of a 
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land lease from 55 to 99 years (Anseeuw et al. 2012; Hall 2011; Pearce 2012). 
Leasing rates may vary from US $0– $12.38 (and an average of US $0.54) per ha 
per month (Fernández and Schwarze 2013). 
Land acquisitions date back to between the 15th and 19th centuries during the 
era of enclosure movement. This era was characterized by the conversion of 
communal lands to private and state lands for commercial exploitation to achieve 
rapid industrialization (Carlisle Ford Runge 1986; C. Ford Runge and Defrancesco 
2006). However, the current wave of LaSLA acquisitions, which began in 2007, has 
been driven by a combination of global crises in food, fuel, finances, and climate 
(Anseeuw, Boche, et al. 2012a; Borras Jr, Hall, et al. 2011; Breu et al. 2016; K. 
Deininger, Nizalov, and Singh 2013; Messerli et al. 2014).  
In theory and if done correctly, LaSLA can be a win-win for investors and host 
countries. Investors secure commodities for their home countries or for the 
international market for profit (Brüntrup, et al. 2016; World Bank 2007). Host 
countries benefit from potential development opportunities that include creation of 
employment, transfer of technology, increase in food security, better markets, 
development of infrastructure and rural areas, as well as modernization of 
agriculture (Aryeetey et al. 2011; Borras Jr and Franco 2010; Cotula et al. 2009; 
Deininger and Byerlee 2011; Hall 2011; Kachika 2010; Murphy 2013; Murray Li 
2011; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Woodhouse 2012).  
However, LaSLA can also pose serious threats to host countries. Critics claim 
it leads to the displacement of vulnerable and marginalized groups whose livelihoods 
and identity directly depend on land (Borras Jr and Franco 2010; Liberti 2013; 
Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 2010). For instance, the UK Sun Biofuels 
Company’s 8,211 ha Jatropha project physically displaced 11 villages, with a total of 
11,277 people in the Kisarawe district of Tanzania (Sulle and Nelson 2009; Mousseau 
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and Mittal 2011). LaSLA can also lead to economic forms of displacement. Some 
scholars argue, for example, that because land that could be used to grow crops to 
feed hungry people is being used to cultivate crops for biofuel production, LaSLA is 
morally unacceptable (Graham et al. 2010; Matondi, Havnevik, and Beyene 2011; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2011).  
For these reasons, the depiction of LaSLA in media accounts is traditionally 
negative, focusing primarily on the downside risks rather than the potential benefits. 
LaSLA is often placed in an evaluative narrative characterizing the practice as 
ruthlessly exploitative and reminiscent of colonialism (Liberti 2013; Veldman and 
Lankhorst 2011).  As a result, the temptation to perceive the phenomenon as 
inherently negative is high, even among academics, who have generally accepted the 
normatively charged term ‘‘land grabbing” (Borras Jr and Franco 2010; Costantino 
2016; Olivier De Schutter 2011; Hall et al. 2015; Margulis, McKeon, and Borras Jr 
2013; Wisborg 2013a).  
LaSLA clearly raises significant ethical concerns, especially justice-oriented 
questions of fairness. However, a more analytical rather than advocacy-driven 
approach to evaluating the costs and benefits of the practice is needed.  Toward that 
end, the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics published a special issue 
examining the moral and political implications of LaSLA in 2013 (Voget-Kleschin and 
Ott 2013).  The issue gathered a diverse set of normative analyses, most of which 
concluded that LaSLA often runs afoul of core principles of justice.  For example, 
Neef, Touch, and Chiengthong (2013), in a study of the politics and ethics of LaSLA 
in Cambodia, concluded that LaSLA formalizes displacement and inequalities. But the 
contributors also explored a broader set of concerns about the conditions under 
which LaSLA may be ethically justifiable, and how we might best understand and 
evaluate these conditions from a moral and political point of view. In that vein, Toft 
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(2013) asked whether LaSLA deals in developing countries are ethical and went on to 
argue for a “human rights to land” approach that addresses adequate inclusion of 
local people in LaSLA decisions. By contrast, Wisborg (2013) offered a skeptical view 
of the human rights approach as a way to mitigate the adverse effects of LaSLA and 
called instead for stronger governance and greater fairness in LaSLA processes. 
Writing in that same special issue, Voget-Kleschin (2013) claimed LaSLA can be 
considered ethical so far as the affected people are compensated fairly.  
Although these studies contribute immensely to the debate on many of the 
primary social, ethical, and justice dimensions of LaSLA, there is a need for more 
empirical studies to improve our understanding of how LaSLA practices comport with 
core notions of social equity and fairness. Empirical studies are important to evaluate 
the moral acceptability of LaSLA because the phenomenon of land acquisition is very 
much a context-specific issue. Often subjective and limited in the extent of 
generalizability of findings, case studies nevertheless offer a way to examine how 
local people experience the impacts of LaSLA in real world settings (Creswell et al. 
2010; Voget-Kleschin and Ott 2013; Yin 2009). Moreover, case studies are 
absolutely necessary for ethical and justice-oriented analyses of LaSLA because they 
enable us to understand the complexities of LaSLA using multiple sources of 
evidence, which strengthens what we already know about the phenomenon through 
previous research (P. Baxter and Jack 2008; Teddlie and Yu 2007). Case studies also 
enable a contextual analysis of the relationships between major stakeholders 
involved, especially investors and local people (Creswell et al. 2010; Yin 2009). This 
approach also enables us to revise our theoretical understanding of LaSLA and allows 
for a greater in-depth explanation of how LaSLA plays out on the ground (Hancock 
and Algozzine 2006; Karnieli-Miller, Strier, and Pessach 2009). This understanding is 
critical in order to create practical solutions to real dilemmas of the phenomenon. 
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Accordingly, this paper contributes to the discussion on the justice and social 
dimensions of LaSLA by examining the impact of LaSLA on villagers’ livelihood 
assets, i.e., understood as different forms of capital including natural, physical, 
financial, human, and social capital. Using a pretest-posttest case study approach, I 
also contribute to the LaSLA debate by offering an assessment of not just of LaSLA’s 
impacts on livelihoods, but also an evaluation of the magnitude of such impacts in 
order to determine how cost-benefit are distributed between investors and local 
people. This assessment is important given that it will help us to draw conclusions 
about the justice and ethical concerns of the practice. 
My analysis here builds upon the work of Fernández and Schwarze (2013), 
who took a similar Rawlsian approach to the LaSLA phenomenon.  Specifically, they 
analyzed 81 LaSLA contracts from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter SSA) to 
see if LaSLA satisfies the second principle of Rawls’s theory of justice, i.e., the 
difference principle. Focusing on how LaSLA affects Rawls’s background institutions 
necessary to achieve justice (in terms of the Rawlsian categories of allocation, 
stabilization, transfer, and distribution), Fernández and Schwarze concluded that 
LaSLA fails to meet the requirements of Rawlsian justice.  
Although the authors do very well to engage Rawls’s work in order to draw 
out the apparent injustices in LaSLA, they focus primarily on how Rawls’s second 
principle of justice applies to LaSLA contracts.  However, LaSLA can also be 
examined more thoroughly from the vantage point of Rawls’s first principle of justice, 
i.e., the equal basic liberties principle. In this paper, I will therefore extend the 
earlier work of Fernández and Schwarze (2013) using Rawls’s second principle to 
examine how LaSLA affects procedural and distributive justice from a local context 
perspective, i.e., an empirical case study in Tanzania.  
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More specifically, the discussion below contributes to the debate on LaSLA by 
applying Rawls’s theory of justice, i.e., the principle of equal basic liberties and the 
difference principle as well as Rawls’s fundamental ideas of a democratic society to a 
case study involving a LaSLA project –– the Kilombero Plantation Limited (KPL) -- 
which is considered the second largest commercial rice producer in Tanzania (Bill 
Gates Found 2012; TMAFC 2014).  
My aim in this paper is to understand whether the mainstream critiques of 
LaSLA are well-founded from a Rawlsian perspective. The hope is to draw out 
insights for the LaSLA debate that will offer a more refined appreciation of future 
policy needs.  The core question driving this paper is what empirical conditions are 
necessary for LaSLA processes and outcomes to be regarded as just and fair. In 
other words, what would a fair process and just distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of LaSLA look like?  Methodologically, I address this question by applying 
Rawls’ principles of justice to LaSLA and comparing the results with empirical insights 
gained from my fieldwork in Tanzania.  
The remainder of my argument proceeds as follows: in section two, I provide 
a brief overview of Rawls’s theory of justice, focusing on Rawls’s principle of equal 
basic liberties, the difference principle, and his fundamental ideas of a democratic 
society. In section three, I present the methods and findings of my case study in 
Tanzania. In section four, I relate Rawls’s justice framework to LaSLA and examine 
whether we can regard LaSLA as just in the context of my case study in Tanzania. 
Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the possibilities for mitigating the current 
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John Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
 
A Rawlsian evaluation of LaSLA is appropriate for two main reasons. First, 
John Rawls’s justice principles (Rawls 1971) are accepted as one of the most, if not 
the most profound attempt to articulate institutional requirements that impartial 
citizens will select for a fair distribution of benefit and burdens in a modern social 
welfare state (Michelbach et al. 2003; Richardson and Weithman 2002). 
Although, Rawls formulated his theory of justice for Western liberal democracies, 
regardless of the political culture, Rawls’s theory of justice can be applied to a LaSLA 
case study in Tanzania for the following reasons. First, in “Theory of Justice,” Rawls 
conceives all persons in a democratic society (such as Tanzania) as free and equal 
persons with “moral powers.” Moral powers refer to the capacity to reason from a 
universal perspective. What follows from the definition of “moral powers,” according 
to Rawls, is that his theory of justice for a democratic society is a moral theory, 
which guides our “moral powers.” This appears to indicate Rawls’s conception of 
justice as a universal moral principle, hence, applicable to Tanzania’s case study. 
Second, Rawls focuses on the individual who is disadvantaged in society. For Rawls, 
a just society does not subsume the individual and his or her rights and liberties to 
the greater good, but rather enhances opportunities for a better life. Moreover, 
Rawls recognizes that regardless of political culture, inequalities exist in every 
society; therefore, he articulates a set of principles to ensure fair distribution of 
wealth. Given this background, I examine how LaSLA distributes capital between the 
investor who may be considered wealthier and the local person who may also be 
considered as poor. A third universal applicability of Rawlsian principles is his 
assembling of a list of basic rights and liberties from the spheres of universal and 
international of human right declaration. These include the Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights (UDHR) and the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Fourth, according to Rawls what is just and unjust 
depends on how we distribute wealth and social goods such as land (Rawls 1999). 
Since the problems associated with LaSLA, pertain to the processes involved in the 
associated negotiation, implementation, and the distribution of benefits and cost, 
Rawls’s ideas on necessary negotiation requirements to achieve procedural and 
distributive justice are most appropriate for my analysis. 
 
Rawls’s Basic Structure of a Democratic Society 
 
Rawls’s practical aim is to provide acceptable moral principles for arranging 
social institutions in a democratic society to address socioeconomic inequalities. 
These inequalities arrive from the distribution of benefits and risks in society (Rawls 
2001). Because institutions have profound effects on individuals’ circumstances and 
determine peoples’ life chances, Rawls contends that such moral principles should be 
justifiable and endorsable to rational and impartial individuals in society (Rawls 
1999). For instance, because an institution such LaSLA can foster exploitation and 
alienation in communities through forced eviction of local people from their land, in 
Rawlsian terms, there should be a generally acceptable code of conduct for LaSLA 
deals that all stakeholders will accept and endorse.  
To develop the most acceptable principles of justice, Rawls assumes that 
society is a fair system of social cooperation characterized by public recognition of 
rules and procedures. In the context of LaSLA, Rawls’s assumption of public 
recognition of rules and procedures would imply whether LaSLA negotiation 
processes are open to the public under fair conditions. In Rawls’s view, a fair system 
of social cooperation is also characterized by the principles of fair terms of 
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cooperation. Applying this to LaSLA would mean whether the terms of LaSLA 
contracts are fair and balanced. Additionally, a fair system of social cooperation 
balances the interests of parties entering into a cooperative venture. In the context 
of LaSLA, this implies whether LaSLA outcomes can balance the interest of investors 
and locals in host countries (Rawls 2001). Moreover, Rawls perceives society as well-
ordered, i.e., society is essentially regulated by a public understanding of justice. 
This provides a mutually recognized point of view from which citizens (in this 
context, the investor and the local population) can adjudicate their claims on LaSLA 
(Rawls 2001).  
Additionally, Rawls assumes citizens of a democratic society as “free and 
equal persons” (Rawls 2001). Rawls conception of citizens as free and equal persons 
has three meanings: (1) the presence of fair bargaining principles in agreements; (2) 
the absence of threats of force, coercion, deception, and fraud in agreements; and 
(3) the power of parties to make legitimate claims on their interests. He regards free 
and equal persons as having “moral power.” The first and the second meaning of free 
and equal persons in the context of LaSLA would mean that LaSLA negotiations 
should be conducted in a climate in which both investors and locals have a fair and 
equal chance of achieving their interests. In other words, investors and the locals 
should be treated on equal terms. In terms of LaSLA, to have a “moral power” 
means that investors and the locals have the capacity to pursue their goals and 
engage with others on terms that are fair. The investor secures land and water to 
produce food, biofuel and other agricultural commodities to export to their 
homelands or produce these commodities for the international market. For the locals, 
they are able to improve their living standards and or their quality of life. In this 
case, LaSLA becomes a win-win for both parties; and we regard call investors and 
locals as free and equal persons. Rawls also argues that because parties possess 
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these capacities, we should hold people accountable for their actions (e.g., failures 
on promises and responsibilities) and treat them equally in accordance with justice 
principles. 
Additionally, to specify the position from which a fair agreement can be 
reached between parties, Rawls adopts a hypothetical perspective he calls the “veil 
of ignorance.” Under the “veil of ignorance,” parties in agreement are deprived of all 
knowledge about themselves (such as their wealth, occupations, income level, and 
natural talents) as well as information about their society before entering into the 
agreement. According to Rawls, this will prevent the parties from tailoring the 
agreement in favor of their personal circumstances. Under this condition, we 
consider the parties to be situated symmetrically as well as purely free and equal 
persons. Since the parties are fairly and equally situated, i.e., since they have equal 
rights in the procedures for reaching a fair agreement, they will unquestioningly 
accept the outcome of the agreement as fair. In general, the implication of Rawls’s 
“veil of ignorance” for LaSLA is that investors and host governments or locals should 
be situated equally going into LaSLA negotiations. For instance, the implementation 
of LaSLA projects should adhere to the principle of free, prior, and informed consent 
(FPIC) by seeking the approval of local land users. FPIC is an important procedural 
principle regarding the consultation and involvement of major stakeholders in LaSLA 
implementation.  
Likewise, for agreements between parties to be considered procedurally just, 
Rawls further adopts a method called “reflective equilibrium” (Rawls 2001). Rawls 
defines this method as the process of mutual adjustment of competing moral and 
non-moral judgments and beliefs to arrive at an optimal decision. In the context of 
LaSLA, this means host governments should take into account all voices including 
those of marginalized groups in decision-making on LaSLA projects. This kind of 
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approach is what Rawls refers to as “pure procedural justice” (Rawls 2001). To put it 
into Rawlsian terms, the investor and the local people should have equal bargaining 
powers; the LaSLA negotiation should be free of threats of force, coercion, 
deception, and fraud (Rawls 2001). More importantly, the parties should have the 
equal power to make legitimate claims on their rights and liberties.  
 
Rawls’ Principles of Justice: The Equal Liberties Principle and the Difference Principle 
 
Rawls realizes that inequalities in society are inevitable; hence, he seeks to 
construct acceptable principles of justice most appropriate to define basic rights and 
liberties. To address this concern, Rawls proposed two main principles of justice: 
1. “Each person has the same and indefeasible (permanent) claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with 
the same scheme of liberties for all;” and  
2. “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:  
a. First, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and  
b. Second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the Difference Principle)” (Rawls 
2001; p 42). 
 According to Rawls, justice requires rights and liberties to be assigned to individuals 
equally. This implies, local peoples’ rights cannot be traded off against other social 
goods such as land. In addition, their rights must supersede host governments’ 
investment and economic policies. In other words, host governments should 
prioritize the interest of local people in LaSLA developments. Rawls further states 
that the first principle, the equal liberties principle, is premised on “fair value of the 
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political liberties” (Rawls 2001; p 43). This means that citizens, who are similarly 
talented and enthusiastic, should have a fair chance to influence government’s 
policies and hold offices or positions of authority, regardless of their economic 
circumstance and social background. 
Rawls's second principle comes in two parts. The first part, fair equality of 
opportunity, argues that citizens with similar endowments, who are willing to use 
them, should have the same economic prospects regardless of their economic status. 
In the context of LaSLA, this principle would require that LaSLA concession bids 
should also be opened to domestic investors who may have the required capital 
(e.g., skills and finance) like foreign investors to establish LaSLA projects. The 
second part, the difference principle, redistributes wealth and income to correct for 
inequalities in society, i.e., the inequalities between the investor and the local 
people. 
Rawls thus introduces the principle of reciprocity, the idea that individuals 
who are better endowed (i.e., investor, the more fortunate but do not morally 
deserve to be) can further use their endowments to acquire more fortunes. However, 
this is contingent on the assumption that the investor contributes to the good and 
well-being of the less endowed (local people who are less fortunate, but do not 
morally deserve to be) (Rawls 2001). In other words, the difference principle does 
not permit investors to become wealthier through LaSLA at the expense of the local 
poor. Finally, Rawls talks about the concept of legitimate expectations and 
entitlement. This is the notion that, if investors or locals have followed the rules and 
procedures of the LaSLA contract, or the agreed-upon standards, they are entitled to 
what those contractual agreements promised them.  
Overall, the implication of Rawls’s theory of justice for LaSLA can be 
summarized as follows. First, Rawls’s conception of society as a fair system of social 
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cooperation characterized by public recognition of rules and procedures, fair terms of 
agreement, and parties’ interest would translate to transparent and inclusive LaSLA 
negotiation processes. Second, Rawls’s conception of free and equal persons applies 
to LaSLA in the context of (1) fair bargaining principles in negotiations, (2) free, 
prior, and informed consent, and (3) complying with LaSLA contractual terms. Third, 
Rawls’s adoption of the veil of ignorance translates to creating an atmosphere in 
which both investors and locals have a fair and equal chance of influencing or 
benefiting from LaSLA outcomes. Finally, Rawls’ difference principle would suggest 
that LaSLA should be to the greatest advantage of local people.  
This dissertation research aims to explore how Rawls conception of justice in 
a democratic society applies to the processes and outcomes of a LaSLA case study in 
Tanzania. To deepen our understanding of the social and justice concerns of LaSLA, 
it is critical to explore Rawls’s ideas through empirical studies. Thus, I apply Rawls’s 
principles to LaSLA and contrast the results with empirical insights gained from a 
case study that I conducted on LaSLA’s impacts on local livelihoods in Tanzania. In 
the next section, I present the findings of the impacts of the KPL LaSLA project in 
Mkangawalo village in the Kilombero district of Tanzania.   
 




Tanzania is a low-income country in SSA with a total land area of 94.5 million 
ha of which 44 million ha is considered arable (Coulson 1993). Given that only 23% 
(10.2 million ha) of the land is presently under cultivation, there is a prevailing 
perception that land is underutilized to serve its 52 million people (Sulle and Nelson 
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2009; Kaarhus et al. 2010). The country is endowed with abundant water resources; 
Lake Victoria  (34.9, 000 sq.km) and Lake Tanganyika (13.4, 000 sq.km) (Sarwatt 
and Mollel 2006). Small-scale farming remains the backbone of Tanzania’s economy 
and accounts for 45% of the overall GDP, 60% of export earnings, and 75% of 
employment (TNBS 2015; World Bank 2012). However, the country’s agriculture 
sector faces challenges, among them: low productivity, low producer prices, lack of 
well-functioning markets, poor infrastructure, and poor agriculture policies 
(Byamugisha 2013; IFPRI 2004; FAO 2012).  
In 2009, the government launched the Kilimo Kwanza initiative (‘Agriculture 
First’) to transform small-scale farming into modernized commercial agriculture 
(Bräutigam and Tang 2012; Kaarhus et al. 2010; Mbeyale et al. 2012). To improve 
the underperforming agriculture sector and harness the development opportunities 
associated with LaSLA, Tanzania implemented investor friendly policies to attract 
investments. The government opened its doors to foreign investors for LaSLA and 
established the TIC as an investment promotion agency to help foreign investors 
with land acquisitions (Kaag and Zoomers 2014). One of such LaSLA investment 
projects, a case that informs my analysis here, is the Kilombero Plantation Limited 
(KPL) in the Kilombero district of the Morogoro region in south-western Tanzania. 
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Figure 7: Map of case study area, Kilombero district (lower left) project from 
Morogoro region on the map of Tanzania, project from the map of Africa. 
 
 
KPL is 5,818 hectares of rice farm located in the fertile Kilombero district of 
the Morogoro region, about 450km to the west of the country’s capital, Dar es 
Salaam. In Kilombero, the farm is located within the southwest bank of the Mngeta 
River of the Kilombero Valley Floodplain, one of the five designated Ramsar 
Convention Sites in Tanzania. The project is a public-private partnership between the 
Tanzanian government (share of 8.7%) and the British based Agrica Guernsey 
Company (share of 91.3 %) (Diaz-Chavez 2009; Bräutigam and Tang 2012). When 
Tanzania on 
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in full operation, the farm produces 35,000 tons of milled rice. The British firm 
contracts local famers including those of Mkangawalo (case study village), to produce 




My study examines LaSLA from a Rawlsian justice framework by employing a 
case study to investigate real-life contextual experience of LaSLA by local people, 
which I consider absolutely necessary for a moral and political evaluation of this form 
of land acquisition (Creswell et al. 2010; Voget-Kleschin and Ott 2013; Yin 2009). In 
2015, I conducted a study of the socioeconomic impacts of the KPL project on 
peoples’ livelihoods in Mkangawalo, a village surrounding the project. KPL is a 5,818-
hectare of rice farm established in 2007 as a joint venture between the Tanzanian 
government that owns 8.7% and Agrica Guernsey Limited, a UK private firm that 
owns 91.3% of the investment. The giant rice farm contracts small-scale farmers 
and it produces about 35,000 tons of rice per year. This rice produced is intended for 
export to other parts of Tanzania and neighboring countries.  
I conducted 50 household interviews and a focus group discussion (FGD), 
comprised of 10 to 12 people (men, women, farmers, young adults, and village 
leaders) from the village of Mkangawalo. Mkangawalo is a village surrounding the 
KPL farm that is directly impacted by the operations of the farm. The interviews with 
villagers allowed for an interpretative analysis of peoples’ experience of the project. 
To assess villagers’ perception of justice and the impacts of the KPL project without 
bias, I avoided leading questions and instead asked open-ended questions that gave 
respondents the chance to express their own experiences regarding the project.  
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Procedural Justice and the Mkangawalo Case 
 
Justice in LaSLA depends not only on outcomes, but also on the processes 
leading to such outcomes. In terms of the process regarding the implementation of 
the KPL project, my findings suggest that there was no free, prior, and informed 
consent (FPIC) among local people impacted by the transaction. Approximately 96% 
of villagers interviewed reported that they were unaware of the project and that the 
transfer of Mkangawalo’s land to the investor came as a total surprise to them. The 
first time they learned about the project was when the investor arrived to prepare 
the land allocated to the company by the government. During the FGD, participants 
unanimously agreed that there was no initial meeting with the investor or 
government officials to discuss how the project would affect villagers and how those 
affected would be compensated or allocated a different parcel of land. In brief, the 
discussion revealed that the village was neither consulted nor involved in the 
negotiation process that occurred between the Tanzanian government and the 
investor.  
Almost all villagers (about 95%) interviewed expressed anger and 
dissatisfaction with the lack of clarity and openness about the project. All 
interviewees reported that although the land they had cultivated for generations 
belonged to the entire village, they were required to pay taxes, fees, or rent to the 
Kilombero district authorities. According to villagers, they were coerced and 
intimidated by central government officials from the TIC and the Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) to surrender their land for the 
project. Most villagers (90%) resisted, but their resistance was met with threats of 
arrest so they eventually complied. Furthermore, it was reported in the FGD that 
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officials from the central government emphasized only the potential benefits of 
transferring their land to the LaSLA project for the long-term benefit for Tanzania 
and the local economy. Participants mentioned that officials cited development 
opportunities such as the following: provision of loans, creation of jobs, 
establishment of rice storage and processing equipment, building of a primary school 
and a health facility as well as better access to markets and roads to transport their 
produce to the district capital, Ifakara. All participants of the FGD (12 in total) 
expressed the lack of information about the negative impacts on their livelihoods and 
the feeling of being deceived about the benefits of the project. 
The village leaders mentioned that after the investor began operations, they 
were invited to a meeting with the investor and the local government. However, at 
the meeting, the government officials did not take their views and concerns about 
displacement, livelihood impacts, and access to resources seriously. Rather, the 
government promised the allocation of different parcels of land to affected villagers, 
but that promise was not fulfilled. The villagers regarded the meeting as a one-sided 
affair intended to convince them to cooperate and stop their resistance to the 
project’s implementation. As part of the meeting, it was agreed that the investor 
would pay an annual fee of TSH 50,000,000 (USD 22,800) into a development fund 
to improve Mkangawalo’s socioeconomic conditions. However, at the time of my 
fieldwork, I learned from the village leaders that the investor had failed to fulfill this 
obligation for the past five years. The Tanzanian central government had remained 
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Distributive Justice  
 
In terms of the distribution of benefits and burdens of the KPL project, I found 
some adverse impacts on villagers’ livelihoods. The most significant impact was the 
physical displacement of villagers, which led to many losing their farms. This in turn 
created severe economic hardship for farmers who depended on farming for a living. 
The household interviews revealed that villagers were not given sufficient time to 
harvest their crops before the investor took over the land. Fifteen percent of those 
displaced were compensated for the value of their unharvested crops, but not for the 
value of their land. All farmers interviewed on this matter complained that their 
compensation was insufficient compared to the value of their land. Although some 
villagers were left with smaller plots of land to farm, the land was too small to 
produce enough food for their families. Moreover, most villagers lost access to the 
traditional forestlands for firewood, wild foods, and hunting. Some cattle owners 
mentioned that they lost access to pasture land, which led to the death of ten calves. 
The FGD also revealed that the investor had fenced the main path leading to the 
village stream. This affected farmers’ access to water for their farms, which led to 
poor farm yields all year round.  An opinion leader in the village stated that due to 
the economic hardship, some families had no other option but to leave Mkangawalo 
to settle in other villages in the district. 
Both the FGD and household interviews revealed several failed promises 
made by the investor including job creation. The FGD revealed that the investor 
hired laborers from outside of Mkangawalo. Approximately 75% of contract farmers 
said the prices that the investor paid were non-negotiable, although they had agreed 
on a set price before beginning the contract farming. They stated that the investor 
frequently did not buy all of the harvested rice they harvested at the initial agreed 
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upon price. They had no means of market transport and were forced to leave the 
rest of their produce on the farm to rot. In addition, the investor failed to deliver on 
his promise to provide loans to farmers and to train them regarding improved 
farming methods such as pest and disease control and reduction of post harvest 
losses to boost their rice production.  
Furthermore, all the contract farmers interviewed complained that only the 
investor’s interests were protected by the contract. They claim, for instance, that the 
rigidity of the contract prevented them from growing other crops like maize, 
vegetables, and cassava to improve their food security. Moreover, several villagers 
interviewed (41%) added that the shift to rice production in the village had 
significantly reduced the variety of their diet options because the crops that they had 
previously cultivated were too expensive on the market. They also reported not 
being able to engage in other livelihood activities to diversify their income sources. 
According to farmers, the contract did not guarantee any form of compensation for 
farmers who lost their entire harvest due to flooding during the rainy season. The 
casual and wage laborers (10 in total) interviewed complained that since the labor 
was hard, the wages the investor paid were considered to be very low (TSH 3,800 or 
US$ 2.25/day). Women in the FGD mentioned health problems such as skin rashes 
due to exposure to pesticides while working on the investor’s farm. It is therefore not 
all surprising that 95% of Mkangawalo villagers considered themselves to be worse 
off in their livelihoods and living standards at the time of the study than they were 
before the takeover of their land by KPL.  
In order to better understand the motivation of the Tanzanian government 
and investment policies on LaSLA, I conducted in-depth interviews with officials from 
the TIC, the SAGCOT, and the Agriculture and Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF).  
TIC is a ‘one-stop shop,’ an investment promotion agency whose main responsibility 
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is to streamline LaSLA procedures and allocate land to foreign investors. I learned 
from the interviews that the government offers a suite of incentives to investors to 
boost rice production for the local market: full tax exemptions, export tariff 
exemptions, low-interest financing, flexible investment laws, and repatriation of 
profits to the investors. Although I could not access a copy of the KPL project 
contract, a discussion with a key informant from HAKIARDHI, a national NGO that 
works to secure local farmers’ land rights, showed that the negotiation of the KPL 
project was conducted in a short time frame with unequal negotiating power of the 
investor over the officials from TIC. 
 
Applying Rawls’s Theory of Justice to Mkangawalo Case Findings  
 
I began this paper by asking the question, what empirical conditions would be 
necessary for LaSLA processes and outcomes to be regarded as just and fair in a 
Rawlsian sense. In other words, how might LaSLA be designed to maximize its 
potential benefits and minimize its negative impacts, especially on local people. By 
asking this question, I do not aim to bring any resolution to the broader LaSLA 
debate but rather I seek to illustrate the procedural and distributive justice issues 
associated with LaSLA and how these play out in a particular case. The application of 
a philosophical theory such as Rawls’s to the LaSLA example is challenging given the 
abstract and hypothetical nature of his project (Fernández and Schwarze 2013). 
Furthermore, several criticisms have been leveled against Rawls’s assumptions and 
arguments in the justice literature (Jaggar 2010; Sandel 1998; Sen 1992, 2011). 
Nevertheless, Rawls’s principles of bargaining in negotiation, his idea of free and 
equal persons in a democratic society and his principle of equal basic liberties are 
very appropriate for analyzing the social concerns and impacts of LaSLA. 
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Additionally, Rawls’s views are particularly important because they provide insights 
into the how cost and benefits are distributed between investors and local people.  
 
LaSLA and Procedural Justice: Fairness of LaSLA Process  
 
Rawls’s Principle of Equal Basic Liberties 
 First, in Rawls’s principle of equal basic liberties, he argues “fair value of the 
political liberties” (Rawls 1999, 2001). Fair value of the political liberties implies that 
Mkangawalo should have roughly equal opportunity like everyone else, such as the 
KPL investors and government officials to influence the Tanzania government’s 
decisions and policies on LaSLA investments projects, such as the KPL project, 
irrespective of their poor economic background. This principle requires LaSLA 
negotiation and implementation processes to be transparent, open, and inclusive. 
LaSLA projects should be based on effective and meaningful consultation as well as 
involvement of local people in any decision on LaSLA investment projects that affect 
their access rights to land and subsistence. Thus, LaSLA should adhere to the 
principles of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) not only before projects are 
implemented but also in the event that local people are to be displaced or relocated 
(Vermeulen and Cotula 2010b). The findings from the Mkangawalo case study in 
Tanzania show that the KPL project does not meet the FPIC requirement. However, 
FPIC stands out as a clear procedural principle necessary for LaSLA investments to 
achieve equitable and sustainable outcomes. In fact, the negotiations of the project 
were conducted behind closed doors only between the Tanzanian government and 
the investor to the exclusion of Mkangawalo village. Analyzing LaSLA deals and 
contracts from several countries in SSA, Fernández and Schwarze (2013), Anseeuw 
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et al. (2013), Cotula (2011), Edelman (2013), and Scoones et al. (2013) similarly 
note that most LaSLA deals are shrouded in secrecy.  
Second, there was no legal or formal representation of the village in the 
negotiation procession. The village also was not given a copy of the contract. 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2014) and Cotula (2011) contend that LaSLA 
contracts are rarely publicly available. Arguably, the lack of transparency and 
accessibility of LaSLA contracts creates breeding ground for corruption and also 
makes it difficult for local people, such as in Mkangawalo, to hold governments and 
investors accountable. For LaSLA to be considered procedurally just, it must adopt 
Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” (Rawls 2001), a process of mutual adjustment of 
moral or non-moral judgments that also includes the voices of marginalized groups 
in government decision-making. Moreover, article 18 of the United Nations’ 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) states that “indigenous 
peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters, which would 
affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with 
their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous 
decision-making institutions ” (United Nations 2008). Similarly, article 10 also directs 
that  “indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories 
and that no relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent 
of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair 
compensation and, where possible, with the option of return” (United Nations 2008). 
In short, because LaSLA fails to involve and displaces local people without 
reasonable compensation, it violates both the tenets of Rawlsian justice and articles 
18 and 10 of the UNDRIP.  
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Society as a Fair System of Social Cooperation 
Typically, LaSLA investors are characterized by strong financial, technical, and 
infrastructural resources, whereas host countries in SSA are predominantly low-
income countries (World Bank 2012). The interview with the Tanzania Investment 
Center (TIC) revealed that due to the potential development opportunities associated 
with LaSLA, the Tanzanian government offers a number of incentives including tax 
exemptions on imports and exports to LaSLA investors to attract investments in 
agriculture. In contrast, local farmers of Mkangawalo are required to pay rents their 
theirland and taxes on farming equipments. Although TIC officials did not specifically 
refer to KPL in the interview, we can assume the investor, too, receives those tax 
exemptions. However, the officials mentioned that because land and water is the 
only leverage the country possesses in LaSLA negotiations, TIC tries as much as 
possible to please investors and to meet their demands. These findings are similar to 
those found by Cotula et al. (2009), Deininger and Songwe (2009), and Von Braun 
and Meinzen-Dick (2009). Given that governments offer incentives and try to meet 
investors’ demands, Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2014), Cotula (2011), and 
Wouterse et al. (2011) have raised concerns about host governments’ bargaining 
power and their capacity to enforce contract terms or even negotiate better LaSLA 
deals. Liu (2014) also argues that developed countries tend to dominate trade 
negotiations with their less powerful counterparts.  
Clearly, Rawls does not permit tax exemptions to investors, because it leads 
to taking over local peoples’ land without paying them compensation, which 
eventually makes them worse off. More importantly, Rawls contends that we should 
impose taxes on investors because such taxes are not intended to generate revenue 
for the government. Rather, they are to ensure equitable distribution of wealth and 
to prevent concentrations of wealth and power in the hands of the few, normally the 
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rich (Rawls 1999). Although questions about whether governments distribute the 
revenue generated from LaSLA to benefit local people remain, following a Rawlsian 
approach, a society that meets the requirements of the basic equal liberties principle 
will redistribute at least part of the revenue from LaSLA and to the point where the 
wealth of the poorest individual is maximized (Fernández and Schwarze 2013). Tax 
exemption for investors can only be morally justified on the basis that it improves 
the well-being of local population directly or indirectly. For instance, the under 
Rawls’s difference principle, tax exemptions on machinery imported by investors are 
supportable if they would provide irrigation schemes for local farmers to increase 
their production. Nonetheless, Fernández and Schwarze (2013) in their analysis of 
LaSLA under the allocative branch of Rawls’s background institution argue that 
regulatory frameworks for oversight of LaSLA deals and legal incentives to enable 
government to prioritize the needs of local people are mostly missing in SSA. In 
short, LaSLA processes contradict Rawls’s difference principle because it worsens the 
economic situation of local people. 
Second, Rawls further asserts that for parties in an agreement to be 
considered as free and equal persons, and for outcomes of negotiation to be 
considered as just, the processes for reaching those outcomes should be free of 
threats of force, coercion, deception, and fraud (Rawls 1999, 2001). This means the 
transfer of land from local people to investors should be based on local peoples’ 
approval without intimidation or forced evictions. Equally important, LaSLA processes 
must also be conducted in a climate of trust, taking into account existing power 
imbalances. It must seek the support of local land users under the conditions of local 
peoples’ free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).  
The local people in Mkangawalo, however, were forced to give up their land 
for the KPL project. Villagers also felt that the government and the investor deceived 
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them to give up their land in return for better living standards but these promises 
were never delivered.  LaSLA in the Mkangawalo case therefore fails to satisfy the 
necessary conditions for investors and local people to be considered free and equal 
persons; hence, it fails Rawls’s principle of equal basic liberties. These findings 
confirm other case studies in Madagascar (Gingembre 2015), Tanzania (Mousseau 
and Mittal 2011), Ethiopia (Moreda 2015), and Mozambique (Hanlon 2011), of forced 
evictions that led to conflict among local people, investors, and the government.  
 
LaSLA and Distributive Justice: Fairness of LaSLA Outcomes 
 
 Under the difference principle, Rawls contends that social and economic 
inequalities are inevitable in society; however, they are to be of the greatest benefit 
to the least-advantaged (the poor) in society (Rawls 1999, 2001). The first part of 
this principle, fair equality of opportunity, argues that citizens with similar 
endowments, who are willing to use them, should have the same economic prospects 
regardless of their economic status. This would imply that LaSLA concession bids 
should be opened to all, both domestic and foreign investors, under fair conditions. 
To elaborate, the Tanzanian government’s investment policies should not be skewed 
in favor of foreign investors (Daniel and Mittal 2010; Murphy 2013; UNCTAD 2008a).  
Specifically, domestic citizens who have similar entrepreneurial skills, capital, 
and are willing to invest in LaSLA should have roughly the chance as foreign 
investors to compete for LaSLA concessions. Yet, in interviews, officials from the 
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), and the Agriculture 
and Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF) stated that the government offers generous 
incentives to foreign investors as a strategy to attract outside investment. A 
Rawlsian approach would be for the government to implement policies that build the 
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capacity of local people to enable them compete fairly with foreign investors for 
LaSLA concessions. Rawls would argue that giving domestic investors similar tax 
holidays to reduce their production cost without also providing similar benefits to 
local people is morally unacceptable. Here, we can see that LaSLA compromises 
Rawls’s fair equality of opportunity principle. 
Moreover, for Rawls, public understanding of justice essentially regulates a 
democratic society. He asserts that citizens have moral powers, the capacity to make 
rational decisions. Since citizens possess these capacities, we should hold them 
accountable for their actions in accordance with justice principles. Applying Rawls’s 
principles of fair terms of cooperation to the KPL LaSLA, both the KPL investor and 
the Tanzanian government should be accountable for the failure to fulfill their 
responsibilities to Mkangawalo. Particularly, the investor should be legally held 
responsible for failing to establish proper health and safety standards for workers on 
the farm. The investor also breached the contract, which required the purchase of all 
farmers’ harvested rice and at the initially agreed price, which caused farmers to 
leave their rice to rot on the farm.  
Yet, international investment laws in the form of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) not only protect investors from such legal battles; they also provide a number 
of rights and remedies to protect investors from host governments’ policies (Mann 
and Smaller 2010; Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Cosbey, and Johnson 2000). Whereas 
BITs in general include few obligations for investors, host governments are required 
to meet the demands of investors. In addition, BITs limit the ability of host 
governments to enact new investment laws and regulations once the contract with 
the investor is signed and endorsed (Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. 2014). In this 
context, local people have no means to legally fight expropriation or to avoid the 
harmful impacts of LaSLA.  
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Along the lines of LaSLA creating jobs for the local population, Rawls states 
“what men want is meaningful work in free association with others, these 
associations regulating their relations to one another within a framework of just basic 
institutions” (Rawls 1999, p 257). For Rawls, those willing to work to earn a living 
should have a free choice of occupation (Vallier 2015). Yet, in Mkangawalo most 
farmers felt trapped and confined to the investor because of mandatory deductions 
for savings and advance payment of wages. The promise by the investor and the 
government to create adequate employment for the villagers was not fully realized. 
Gingembre (2015), Hall et al. (2015) and Kaag and Zoomers (2014) claim even 
when jobs are created, they are often short-lived or low-paid.  Fernández and 
Schwarze (2013) conclude from their analysis of LaSLA contracts in SSA that 
empirical evidence suggesting job creation has led to significant improvement in local 
livelihoods is limited. My field research in Mkangawalo suggests that the KPL project 
has in fact deteriorated villagers’ livelihood. 
Rawls’s understanding of distributive justice also takes into account legitimate 
expectations and earned entitlements. Legitimate expectations are promises that 
incentivize people to do their fair share in society. These promises must be honored 
when people have actually done their fair share (Rawls 1999, 2001). He writes: 
Suppose, for example, that these rules include provisions for agreements 
about wages and salaries, or for workers’ compensation based on an index of 
the firm’s performance, as in a share economy, then those who make and 
honor these agreements have, by definition, a legitimate expectation and are 
entitled to receive the agreed amounts at the agreed times. What individuals 
do depends on what the rules and agreements say they would be entitled to; 
what individuals are entitled to depends on what they do. Rawls further states 
that “agreements fulfilling the difference principle compensate individuals, not 
for their endowments per se, but for using their endowments to contribute to 
others’ good as well as their own” (Rawls 2001). 
 
Relating Rawls’s principles regarding legitimate expectations and earned 
entitlements to LaSLA, if contract farmers working for the KPL investor have followed 
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the terms of the contract farming agreement, then they are entitled to what the 
contract promises them. For instance, if farmers have produced rice meeting the 
required quality and quantity standards and at the time agreed, then they must be 
paid the right price for their labor.   I found otherwise in Mkangawalo, however.  
Moreover, article 28 of the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ (UNDRIP) states that, “indigenous peoples have the right to 
redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair 
and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, 
taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent” 
(United Nations 2008). In my case study, I found that local people (Mkangawalo) 
were in fact not compensated for transferring their land to the investor. Those who 
were compensated did not receive the actual market value of their lands. Casual and 
wage laborers complained about low payments for assiduous work for the investor.  
Rawls further contends that in a democratic society, free and equal citizens 
have the power to make legitimate claims on their interest provided the claims fall 
within public recognized and acceptable rules and standards. Contrarily, in the 
Mkangawalo case the district authorities overlooked the village’s complaints about 
low wages, poor working conditions, and the monopolistic character of the investor. 
Villagers also had no alternative means of redressing the situation. Equally 
important, the difference principle requires investors to build the human capacity of 
local people to enable them to brighten their prospects in life. Yet, in Mkangawalo, 
farmers did not receive any form of extension service or training from the investor. 
In this case, Rawls idea of reciprocity was not fulfilled. Only few empirical studies in 
SSA have reported that LaSLA has transferred agriculture knowledge from investors 
to local farmers (Asenso-Okyere 2009; Wilhemina et al. 2010).  
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Analyzing over 90 LaSLA contracts in more than a dozen countries in SSA, 
Fernández and Schwarze (2013) and Cotula (2011) found that there are no specific 
regulations in contracts that could be relied upon as political tools committing 
investors and host governments to their express commitments made to local people 
before signing the contracts. Some studies have also highlighted the failure of 
investors to honor their promises of providing infrastructure to local people (Galaty 
2012; Cotula 2011). To summarize, not only does LaSLA violate article 28 of the 
UNDRIP; LaSLA also fails to satisfy Rawls’s fair value of the political liberties, 
reciprocity as well as legitimate expectations and earned entitlements.  
Additionally, Rawls notes that the market, a competitive price system, is not 
suited to solve inequalities in the distribution wealth, goods and service (Rawls 
1999). Thus, he argues for the need for a separate arrangement or mechanism to 
ensure equitable distribution of resources in society. My discussion with Tanzania 
government officials, TIC, revealed that the government is interested in LaSLA for its 
potential to improve the country’s food security. However, in Mkangawalo I found 
that transferring land to the investor and the shift from growing local food crops like 
beans, cassava, and maize to growing rice for the investor significantly deteriorated 
villagers’ food security. Although rice is produced in Mkangawalo, villagers still 
complained about high rice price on the local market. This study found that there 
was no provision or agreement requiring the KPL investor to sell a specific 
percentage of his production to the local district market. While it may be true that 
Tanzania’s food security may have generally improved, the notion that LaSLA boosts 
local food security is difficult to endorse. The lack of an alternative arrangement to 
ensure Mkangawalo’s food security means that LaSLA violates Rawls’s distributive 
principles. This argument is supported by other scholars (Gamborg et al. 2012; Toft 
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2013; Wisborg 2013a) who have studied the ethical implication of LaSLA on food 
security, including in SSA (Fernández and Schwarze 2013). 
 
The Injustices of Exploitation in LaSLA 
 
Finally, moving beyond the Rawlsian frame, exploitation in LaSLA can also be 
viewed as a form of oppression in a structural sense. Iris Marion Young defines 
structural oppression as the disadvantages and injustices particular group of people 
(here, Mkangawalo), experiences as a result of the decisions of well-intentioned 
people (investors and governments in this case), bureaucratic processes, and market 
mechanisms (Young 2011). As mentioned earlier, critics of LaSLA perceive the 
phenomenon as ruthlessly exploitative. Yet, the question is whether LaSLA is truly 
exploitative if local people freely contract with investors and receive wages without 
being legally forced into such contracts. According to Young, “the injustice of 
capitalist society consists in the fact that some people exercise their capacities under 
the control, according to the purposes, and for the benefit of other people” (Young 
2011, p 49). This would imply that the injustices in LaSLA and its exploitative nature 
are due to the fact that investors take advantage of local people by using them to 
accumulate wealth and power. We see this in Mkangawalo as contract farmers work 
long hours for very little pay. It is also true that in Mkangawalo, villagers felt trapped 
in the contract-farming scheme with the investor due to forced wage deduction for 
savings. Thus, we can argue that the local people exercised their rights and liberties 
under the control of the KPL investor to advance the investor’s agenda.  
By transferring land and labor, the means of production, from local people to 
the investor, LaSLA systematically transfers local peoples’ powers to the investor, 
thereby augmenting investors’ powers. Consequently, the investor acquires the 
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ability to manipulate and also take local people for granted. For instance, 
Mkangawalo suffered material deprivation for a decent life as well as deprivation of 
essential elements of self-respect (Young 2011). The impression I gathered from the 
household interviews and the focus group discussion is that many of the villagers felt 
very displeased with the investor. Putting this in Young’s perspective, we can say 
that the injustices of exploitation in LaSLA not only arise from low wages for hard 
labor but also in the social process that transfers capital to investors, leading to the 





The issue of LaSLA remains very contentious, particularly regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of the practice for local people in Tanzania and 
elsewhere in SSA. From this analysis, it is evident that LaSLA often leads to the 
displacement of the poor, which significantly affects their livelihoods. At the same 
time, LaSLA potentially offers genuine opportunities to improve local livelihoods and 
living standards. This makes LaSLA a complex practice. The media and many 
academic accounts adopt a categorically negative view of LaSLA deals. To draw 
conclusions on the fairness and social desirability of the practice, empirical studies 
supported by theoretical justice frameworks such as John Rawls’s Justice as Fairness 
is needed. Even though my case study in Tanzania suggests that LaSLA has a great 
potential for positive impacts, the basic institutions required for LaSLA to improve 
the livelihoods of the poor in Tanzania, and perhaps in many other countries in SSA, 
appear to be missing. Yet, there is a possibility for LaSLA to produce better outcomes 
with well functioning institutions (Fernández and Schwarze 2013). 
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LaSLA cannot be considered as procedurally just because: (1) it violates the 
principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), hence dubbed “land grabbing” 
(Gingembre 2015; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010b; Wisborg 2013a), (2) it is shrouded 
in secrecy and lacks transparency, and (3) it excludes local people from decisions on 
LaSLA projects that affect their very livelihoods. My analyses on distributive justice 
reveal four findings. First, instead of making the poor better off, LaSLA deepens the 
socioeconomic inequalities between investors and local people by facilitating the 
accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of investors and the state through 
dispossession of the poor. Second, LaSLA displaces local people without providing 
alternative forms of employment. Third, LaSLA endangers food security of local 
people in host countries by exporting food from rural areas to market centers in host 
countries or to investors’ homelands and the international market for profit. Finally, 
LaSLA offers tax exemptions to investors that perhaps we can consider as already 
wealthy at the expense of local people who lose access to land without 
compensation. Local people may also be less likely to benefit from revenue 
generated from LaSLA or capacity building by investors. Even so, offering tax 
exemptions to investors seems problematic. It tends to encourage opportunities for 
corruption, particularly where governments have wide discretion in selecting which 
investors receive favorable treatment.  
A final important comment is in order at this point before I discuss my 
recommendations for stakeholders in LaSLA. The central argument of Rawls’s basic 
equal liberties principle is that LaSLA negotiations and implementation should be 
conducted on level playing field to give especially local people a fair and equal 
chance of influencing LaSLA outcomes. In other words, to create an environment in 
which there is a win-win situation for investors and local people in host countries. 
However, it is almost impossible to create a level playing field for reasons including 
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corruption, nepotism, local familiarity, and political motivation of investors being 
domestic or foreign. Although Rawls’s conception of free and equal persons as well 
as fair bargaining principles require both investors and locals to comply with the 
terms of LaSLA deals. Yet, while investors can bribe government officials to tailor the 
contract in investors’ favor, local people can depend on their familiarity with local 
conditions to manipulate the LaSLA contract terms or negotiation. Hence, it is almost 
impossible to create a playing field that is level—it is certainly possible to make the 




After applying John Rawls’s theory of justice to LaSLA processes and 
outcomes and contrasting the results with empirical insights from my case study in 
Tanzania, I believe that LaSLA has an enormous potential to produce positive results. 
In fact, there are many opportunities for host countries including Tanzania to take 
advantage of. At the same time, I found only few positive spillovers from LaSLA to 
the local people in the Kilombero district, e.g., a sparse mix of job opportunities and 
the provision of a health clinic by the investor. It is clear from my analysis that under 
the current governance regime in Tanzania, LaSLA and in particular the KPL project 
poses many threats and few opportunities for local people. In what follows, I put 
forward for consideration a set of policy recommendations that could potentially 
achieve more sustainable and equitable outcomes in LaSLA deals in Tanzania and in 
countries across SSA.  
My first recommendation encompasses a list that targets Tanzania and host 
country governments in SSA. As shown in this study, a significant part of the 
negative impacts of LaSLA comes from unjust institutions. In order to tackle these 
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challenges, the Tanzanian government must undertake institutional changes and 
strengthen regulatory frameworks in land governance. In fact, LaSLA presents an 
opportunity for Tanzania to modernize and fortify land tenure regimes. My analyses 
of procedural and distributive implications of LaSLA suggest it is particularly critical 
to clearly define LaSLA procedures and enforce policies and regulations, especially 
with regard to the following: 
i. Investor responsibilities and commitments to local communities in 
which LaSLA projects are embedded.  Governments need to scrutinize 
and pay serious attention to investors’ business models, proposals, and 
experience working with local population. Often overlooked but an 
important part of the impact assessment is a systematic approach to 
identify major land users and other stakeholders who will be directly or 
indirectly affected by the LaSLA project. Additionally, governments should 
ensure that investors adhere to labor, health and safety standards and 
regulations to protect the local population employed by the investor. 
ii. Stakeholder involvement.  Governments must make conscious efforts 
to work in partnership with local people and effectively engage local 
people in decision making at every stage of the LaSLA implementation. To 
reduce excessive power imbalances and ensure a win-win outcome, 
especially in negotiations in which local people are illiterates and cannot 
understand LaSLA contracts, a skilled and competent facilitator or 
coordinator is critical to a successful negotiation and to maintaining an 
overall participatory process. Where applicable, local activist groups and 
NGOs can negotiate on behalf of local people. It is critical to involve local 
communities at the onset of LaSLA projects, particularly when: (1) access 
to the land is vital for local livelihood, identity, and cultural heritage, (2) 
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land is the greatest asset and safety net even for local people whose 
livelihoods are not land based, (3) local people have historically owned, 
used or have customary rights over the land, and (4) local interests are 
significantly affected by the environmental impacts of LaSLA projects.  
iii. Human rights.  Avoiding or minimizing adverse social impacts of LaSLA 
for the local communities goes beyond inclusion in the decision-making 
process. To ensure that LaSLA does not violate human rights, host 
governments must ensure that: (1) LaSLA projects adhere to the principle 
of free, prior, and informed consent, (2) LaSLA should (as far as possible) 
avoid displacement of local people and loss of access to land for their 
livelihood, (3) where displacements are unavoidable, affected people must 
be adequately compensated, making sure that compensations are closely 
monitored and paid in a transparent process, and (4) employment offered 
by investors comply with workers’ rights, as established in the codes of 
the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
iv. Empowerment of local people. Governments must build the capacity of 
local people to be able to negotiate LaSLA contracts, especially contract 
farming with investors. This can be done through a series of education 
programs and workshops on their basic rights. In particular, local 
government authorities must be incentivized to support local land users 
and advocate their interest. 
My second recommendation is directed at the international community, 
especially the World Bank, the FAO, and the UNDP. Although the primary 
responsibility for establishing effective legal, institutional, and regulatory policies in 
place rests with the Tanzanian government and similarly host governments in SSA 
countries, the international financial and development institutions including those 
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mentioned above should support local efforts where needed. For example, they can 
provide technical and legal advice and strengthen the capacity of SSA governments 
through training and skill development to that can help them negotiate better LaSLA 
deals for their countries.  
My third recommendation specifically targets foreign investors. There is a 
potential that LaSLA will negatively affect local populations, especially in countries 
like Tanzania where the national government has not put in place effective and 
adequate regulatory measures to enhance win-win outcomes for the country and 
investors. This does not mean investors cannot and should not be held accountable 
for their actions. Although investors are not responsible for the weaknesses in a 
country’s governance or land tenure, investors should look for ways to ensure that 
their investment projects result in positive outcomes for the local populations. 
Investors should not take advantage of the weak regulatory environment to serve 
their own economic interests. The research presented in this paper is a single case 
study that is necessarily limited in its degree of generalizability. Still, I believe the 
positive and negative impacts of LaSLA discovered in this case study are playing out 
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The phenomenon of LaSLA remains highly contested, particularly with regards 
to its implications for the sustainable development of countries in SSA. The recent 
interest in LaSLA in SSA offers an opportunity to shape old debates with new 
evidence and address some empirical blind spots that have been overlooked in the 
literature. There is empirical evidence that LaSLA often degrades the quality of life 
and livelihoods of local people in host countries (Gironde and Golay 2015; Kaarhus et 
al. 2010; Sulle and Nelson 2009). This is especially true when people are displaced 
from their land and left with no alternative forms of livelihood, which then threatens 
their well-being. The findings of this dissertation are consistent with this evidence. 
Nonetheless, LaSLA potentially offers genuine opportunities for economic growth and 
development of host countries in SSA. The positive and negative impacts associated 
with the practice make it a complex issue. Thus, in order to draw conclusions on the 
opportunities and threats LaSLA presents for the development of SSA economies, 
statistical analysis of what drives LaSLA, empirical studies on its impacts, and a 
philosophical analysis of the social justice issues raised by those concerned are 
critically needed. In this dissertation, I have statistically analyzed the drivers of 
LaSLA (using OLS regression) as well as the impacts of LaSLA (using a pretest-
posttest and a quasi experimental design) and have placed the results in a 
philosophical discussion (using John Rawls’s theory of justice).  
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Based on these different analyses, my overall conclusion is that LaSLA has 
the potential to produce better outcomes given the right institutional and regulatory 
frameworks. Under current practices, however, the threats of LaSLA far outweigh the 
opportunities it presents for Tanzania and other host countries in SSA. This broad 
conclusion leads me to further draw two specific conclusions about LaSLA in terms of 
processes and outcomes. First, I conclude that weak governance, including lack of 
capacity to negotiate LaSLA contracts, effective consultation and meaningful 
involvement of local population in LaSLA processes, and poor institutional and 
regulatory frameworks lead to poor outcomes and makes LaSLA procedurally unjust. 
Therefore, there is a need for effective monitoring of LaSLA and capacity building of 
host governments and local people to negotiate better deals that align with their 
development agenda. Second, examining the distribution of benefits and burdens of 
LaSLA, this dissertation research concludes that in terms of outcomes, LaSLA 
facilitates the accumulation of wealth, capital, and power in the hands of investors 
and the government while deteriorating local livelihoods and living standards. This 
makes local population worse off, thus LaSLA is unjust in a distributive sense. Below, 
I provide evidence from my dissertation research to support these conclusions.   
 
Poor Outcomes of LaSLA is Due to Lack of Strong Governance, Capacity to 
Negotiate Contracts, and Meaning Involvement of Local People in Decisions 
 
First, I will discuss the impact of governance on LaSLA outcomes. A critical 
assessment of the institutional and regulatory context for conducting LaSLA 
transactions reveals obvious weaknesses in Tanzania’s land governance system. It 
was clear from interviews with government officials and the local population that the 
Tanzanian government has a strong desire to attract investors for LaSLA 
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developments. Nevertheless, the government was less committed to enforcing 
contractual agreements after negotiating and concluding LaSLA investment deals. 
The findings from my case study in Tanzania are consistent with the findings of my 
regional analysis, which showed that LaSLA investments gravitate towards countries 
with weak regulatory institutions. The analysis revealed that although governments 
are willing to negotiate land deals, they lack the necessary capacity to monitor deals 
or formulate sound regulations to keep investors in check. As the World Bank notes, 
poor regulatory quality give greater freedom for investors to acquire and control 
businesses in host countries (World Bank 2016). The conclusion that weak 
governance drives LaSLA stems from the regional level analysis, which showed that 
poor regulatory quality encourages public sector contracts such as LaSLA to be 
negotiated outside the public realm, in other words, behind close doors (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011). The Mkangawalo case study (chapter 3) in which the 
KPL land acquisition transaction was carried out secretly between the Tanzanian 
government and the investor provides evidence to support this assertion.  
Similarly, weak rule of law promotes LaSLA transactions in SSA countries. In 
chapter two, the analysis indicates that weak rule of law, i.e., poor transparency and 
accountability under the law leads to poor land governance that in turn facilitates 
LaSLA investments. This is because governments undermine traditional or customary 
land tenure while promoting policies that favor LaSLA investors. My case study in 
Tanzania corroborates this finding. Interview with local people and government 
agencies including the Tanzania Investment Center (TIC), the Southern Agriculture 
Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), and the Rufiji Basin Development Authority 
(RUBADA) as well as a review of Tanzania’s regulatory framework, policies, and 
practices regarding land governance reveal important key findings supporting the 
conclusion that weak governance in general promote LaSLA deals but results in poor 
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outcomes especially for local people. The interviews revealed the following. First, 
there is ineffective land-related public sector management due to unclear 
responsibilities and overlapping mandates of institutions of the TIC, the Southern 
SAGCOT, and the RUBADA. Second, there is poor documentation and enforcement of 
LaSLA regulations due to the high cost involved. Third, there is a lack of transparent 
and fair processes regarding land expropriation and compensation of those who lose 
rights. Fourth, there is lack of access by local people to legal procedures and 
effective judicial systems. Fifth, there is lack of clearly defined procedures and 
mechanisms for resolving land disputes and conflicts with investors. Moreover, a 
review of Tanzania’s Land Act shows lack of legal recognition of customary tenure 
regimes and overlapping land laws among the three categories of land in the 
country; village land, general land, and reserved land.  
Here, I briefly elaborate on the first and second point I mentioned above in 
regards to poor regulatory mechanism and oversight of LaSLA deals in Tanzania. In 
fact, I discovered through my interviews that some LaSLA projects have been 
abandoned due to resistances from local people but TIC was unaware because of 
poor tracking of LaSLA projects and coordination between government agencies. 
Based on a conversation with TIC, the government’s agency responsible for 
monitoring LaSLA, is that there is actually poor oversight of LaSLA deals after 
negotiations are completed. For example, a government official informed me that 
one LaSLA project by a UK company has provided jobs to the people of Bagamoyo, a 
district in the Pwani Region of Tanzania. However, I arrived at Bagamoyo only to find 
that the investor had just acquired the land and that there was no work in progress. 
I also found that although some LaSLA projects were abandoned for years, officials, 
unaware of the project status, kept referring prospective investors to the project as 
an example of a successful LaSLA project. Several Tanzania government agencies 
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told me that LaSLA has improved food security and rural livelihoods. However, when 
I asked them to tell me exactly where these LaSLA projects are and who the 
investors are, only a few were able to mention concrete example. The agencies 
mostly cited the same LaSLA project, the Kilombero Plantation Limited. As a 
recommendation, researchers need to spend enough time to dig deeply into how 
LaSLA plays out on the ground in SSA countries.  
Furthermore, the findings from the regional level analysis of LaSLA drivers 
indicate that corruption promotes LaSLA investments. Recent findings by some 
scholars and Transparency International show strong correlation between overall 
public sector corruption and corruption in the land sector of many countries (Arial, 
Fagan, and Zimmermann 2011; Transparency International 2016). Of course, the 
temptation exists for one to agree with some economists who think that bribery and 
corruption help speed up procedures and avoid bureaucratic inefficiencies in 
governance (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006). In Tanzania, the TIC has been established to 
streamline and speed up investment procedures for investors, however, interviews 
with investors’ representatives and sub-contractors revealed that it is difficult to 
secure ‘Certificate of Incentive’ and investment permits without having to bribe an 
official or make informal payments. A critical setback to LaSLA investment in 
Tanzania according to the investors’ representative is bureaucracies that turn to 
prolong investment procedures. Although corruption promotes LaSLA, it is a strong 
constraint on economic growth and development due to rent seeking, increased 
investment costs and uncertainties, and mismanagement of natural resources (Arial, 
Fagan, and Zimmermann 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra 2006; Rose-Ackerman 1998; 
Transparency International 2016). Thus, the potential for LaSLA to achieve the 
development benefits it promises cannot be realized because revenue generated 
from LaSLA investments goes into the pocket of the few. In short, under this 
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circumstance, LaSLA has little to offer the local population of host countries including 
Tanzania. 
The conclusion that LaSLA is procedurally unjust is further supported by this 
study’s findings both from the Tanzania case studies (chapter 3) and philosophical 
analysis of the social and justice concerns of LaSLA (chapter 4). First, the study finds 
that LaSLA violates Rawls’s principle of equal basic liberties requiring local people to 
have roughly equal opportunity to influence government’s decisions and policies on 
LaSLA. Yet, the question remains whether local people have the necessary capacity 
and how they can affect governments’ policies. I address these issues in my 
recommendations. In short, the findings reveal lack of legal or formal representation, 
i.e., consultation and involvement of local people (Mkangawalo people) in LaSLA 
negotiations. The negotiation of the KPL project in Mkangawalo was conducted 
between the investor and the Tanzanian government outside the public realm. 
Moreover, LaSLA processes fail to adhere to the principles of free, prior and informed 
consent (FPIC). Arguably, the Lack of transparency and accessibility of LaSLA 
contracts also create breeding grounds for corruption, which was found to 
significantly drive LaSLA in SSA (chapter 2).  
Second, the unbalanced bargaining powers in LaSLA negotiation justify why 
we cannot accept LaSLA as procedurally just. An interview with officials from TIC 
revealed that Tanzania offers a number of incentives including huge tax breaks and 
exemptions on imports and exports to LaSLA investors to reduce business cost. This, 
according to TIC officials is a strategy to be competitive in attracting LaSLA 
investments in SSA. The offering of incentives to investors to increase LaSLA deals is 
confirmed in the regional level analysis (chapter 2) in which I find that the cost of 
business startup is inversely related to LaSLA. According to the officials, because 
land and water is the only leverage for Tanzania in LaSLA negotiations, TIC tries as 
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much as possible to satisfy investors and meet their requests. This raises questions 
about the Tanzanian governments’ bargaining power and their capacity to negotiate 
better LaSLA deals. At the local level, villagers mentioned that district authorities 
were protective of the KPL investor and mostly advocated for the investor’s interest. 
This may also explain why at the local level, there is limited capacity to negotiate 
better contract farming terms with the investor. In brief, the foregoing discussion 
shows that LaSLA fails Rawls fair bargaining principles because investment policies 
such as business tax breaks are skewed in favor of foreign investors. 
To consider agreements between parties are as procedurally just, Rawls’s idea 
of free and equal persons in society requires that the agreement is free of threats of 
force, coercion, deception, and fraud. However, both household interviews and the 
focus group discussions (FGD) in Mkangawalo showed that villagers were forced to 
evict their lands. Even villagers who were convinced to transfer their land holdings to 
the investor expressed a feeling of being deceived about the benefits of the project. 
In the context of Rawls’s theory of justices, the Mkangawalo LaSLA project cannot be 
considered as just because it did not occur in a climate of trust and it also did not 
take into account existing power imbalances between locals and government officials 
who pursued the interest of the investor.  
 
LaSLA Facilitates the Accumulation of Wealth and Power in the Hands of 
Investors and Host Governments, While Deteriorating Local Livelihoods. 
 
After examining the distribution of benefits and burdens of LaSLA, this 
dissertation research concludes that in terms of outcomes, LaSLA facilitates the 
accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of the investors and the host 
government, while at the same time deteriorating local livelihoods and living 
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standards in the case of Mkangawalo. Consequently, the local population is made 
worse off and as such, LaSLA is unjust in a distributive sense. Applying Rawls’s 
difference principle to the phenomenon of LaSLA, investors cannot acquire more 
fortune, that is, make profit at the expense of local people. Rather, LaSLA should be 
of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged, that is, local people who may be 
considered poor in society. The conclusion that LaSLA deepens socioeconomic 
inequalities between investors and local population in host countries is based on the 
following philosophical analysis of the findings from the Mkangawalo case study. 
First, LaSLA displaced villagers, which resulted in the loss of livelihoods and access to 
resources such as forest, pasture and water without compensating affected land 
users. Yet, those who were compensated did not receive fair or adequate 
compensation. The displacement caused severe economic hardship for the villagers.  
Second, the investor and the Tanzanian government both failed to fulfill the 
promises made to the village including creating adequate employment, providing 
loans, infrastructure, and more importantly the contribution of an annual amount of 
TSH 50,000,000 (US$ 22,800) by the investor to the village development fund. For a 
village like Mkangawalo, this amount of money can potentially propel infrastructural 
development in the village. The investor also failed to comply with the terms of the 
contract farming including fair and adequate payments. Moreover, the rigidity of the 
contract-farming scheme affected villagers’ ability to grow traditional crops, engage 
in other economic activities to diversify their income, or even exit the contract-
farming scheme. Additionally, women were exposed to chemicals on the investor’s 
farm, which deteriorated their health. Third, the investor did not provide extension 
service, training or any form capacity building programs to enable them to improve 
their farm yields and overall livelihoods. Fourth, the investor did not procure any 
goods and services locally to improve the local economy. Finally, the revenue 
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generated from the KPL LaSLA project by the government did not to benefit 
Mkangawalo. Although, the investor had contributed 50 bags of cement toward the 
building of the village primary school and a health clinic (though villagers pay for 





Currently, a growing body of recommendations and policy changes exist, all 
suggesting ways to maximize the potential benefits of LaSLA, while at the same time 
minimizing the detrimental effects especially on the local population in host countries 
in SSA. Recommendations have emerged from different sources including those from 
the academic community under titles such as “codes of conduct” (Borras Jr and 
Franco 2010; Voget-Kleschin and Stephan 2013), “improved governance” (Palmer, 
Fricska, and Wehrmann 2009; K. Deininger, Selod, and Burns 2012), and “policy 
responses” (Kachika 2010). International financial and development institutions have 
also put forward suggestions under the heading “principles of Responsible 
Agricultural Investment” (RAI) (Olivier De Schutter 2009; FAO,  IFAD, UNCTAD and 
World Bank 2010; Liversage 2011; World Bank 2014). There are also more critical 
proposals against LaSLA from the international human rights community such as the 
Extraterritorial Obligations (ETOs) that require investors in foreign countries to 
adhere to internationally accepted human rights principles. Many of these 
recommendations target foreign investors and they assign blame and obligations to 
investors. However, my recommendation emphasizes the corresponding roles of 
governments in host countries across SSA and the international financial and 
development community. Some of the suggestions outlined by these institutions aim 
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at improving the investment climate, land governance, and the agriculture sector of 
SSA countries more generally. Whereas these suggestions fall in line with the thrust 
of my claim, the recommendations I propose in this dissertation research are 
particularly tailored to LaSLA investments in SSA. After examining the drivers and 
impacts of LaSLA as well as the justice and social concerns raised by the practices, it 
is clear from my analyses that under current practices in Tanzania, LaSLA (in 
particular the KPL project) presents more risks and few benefits to local people. In 
what follows, I put forward for consideration a set of policy changes that could 
potentially steer LaSLA investments towards more sustainable and equitable 
outcomes. Nonetheless, I recognize that this study was conducted on only two LaSLA 
projects in a one country, thus I generalize the applicability of the recommendation 
here with caution.  
 
Recommendations for Host Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
My first recommendation encompasses a list that targets host country 
governments in SSA including Tanzania. As shown in this dissertation research, the 
majority of LaSLA’s harmful effects arise from weaknesses in governance and the 
inability of host governments to negotiate better deals that advance the development 
agenda of their countries. In order to tackle these challenges and harness the 
benefits of LaSLA, SSA governments should embark on rigorous institutional changes 
and strengthen regulatory frameworks on LaSLA transactions. It is particularly 
critical for governments to clearly define LaSLA procedures and enforce policies and 
regulations. The suggestions provided by this dissertation research cover the 
following:  
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Enforcement of Proper Procedure and LaSLA Contracts  
 
For LaSLA to produce positive outcomes, first, it is important to effectively 
scrutinize investors’ business models, technical experience, and knowledge of local 
conditions and culture. Of course, streamlining investment procedures to create an 
investor-friendly climate is a sound idea but this should not compromise due 
processes such as undertaking comprehensive and rigorous environmental and social 
impact assessments (ESIA) to weigh the long-term cost and benefits of the LaSLA 
project. The assessments should be conducted by an independent international entity 
to ensure credibility and thoroughness. Second, governments should put in place 
regulatory mechanisms to efficiently monitor contractual terms. However, they must 
ensure that the contracts themselves include resources and procedures for 
monitoring and enforcement. Investors should be made to pay into a fund 
established to provide the necessary resources to ensure the terms of the contract 
are met. In addition, the contract should clearly spell out the penalties for failing to 
meet the terms of the contract. Third, contract negotiations should be conducted in a 
transparent manner, taking into consideration power imbalances. As Zakout et al. 
(2006) note, this could mean implementing uniform procedures and standards that 
effectively monitor the implementation of LaSLA projects. It could also be applying 
consistent and coherent regulatory and legal frameworks that enforce the rule of law 
to secure local peoples’ land rights and protect vulnerable groups against 
displacement.  Fourth, the host government must initiate and work together with the 
investors and the local population to establish dispute and conflict resolution 
mechanisms. For example, there should be predetermined and clear procedures for 
arriving at fair judgements. Governments must also make every effort to ensure the 
judicial system is accessible to all under fair and just conditions in the event of 
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LaSLA-related dispute settlements. Fifth, governments should ensure that investors 
comply with labor, health and safety standard regulations as established in the codes 
of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to protect the local population. Finally, 
governments should simplifying the procedures for LaSLA investments by eliminating 
unnecessary bureaucratic steps, and reducing opportunities for bribery by 
government officials and local elites. For the Tanzanian government, there is a need 
to improve coordination among the various government agencies involved in land 
administration. In fact, the impression I got from my fieldwork is that no agency 
seems to know who is doing what. Communication and coordination between offices 
involved in land issues needs improvement. For instance, the overlapping 
responsibilities among the TIC, SAGCOT, and RUBADA need to be clearly specified to 
avoid bureaucratic impasses. 
 
Consultations and Involvement of Local People in LaSLA Negotiation  
 
Governments must to work in partnership with local people and effectively 
engage them in decision-making at every stage of LaSLA implementation. This 
include adhering to the principle of free, prior, and informed consent to reduce 
excessive power imbalances and ensure balanced negotiations, a skilled and 
competent facilitator is critical to a successful negotiation and overall participatory 
process. It is equally important to involve advocates, possibly lawyers, to represent 
the local people.  Public defenders may be involved to negotiate on behalf of local 
people. Local people should be consulted through their leaders and representatives 
and it is appropriate to involve local communities at the onset of LaSLA projects, 
particularly when: (a) access to the land is critical for local livelihood, identity, and 
cultural heritage, (b) land is the greatest asset and safety net even for local people 
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whose livelihoods are not land based, (c) local people have historically owned, used 
or have customary rights over the land, and (d) local interests are significantly 
affected by the environmental impacts of the LaSLA project. Further, this study 
supports the Kleemann et al. (2013) recommendation that government should 
encourage public participation in decision-making by providing easy access to 
information and procedures for reporting corruption and misconduct while at the 
same time ensuring equity, fairness and impartiality in service delivery.  
 
Avoiding Displacement and Payment of Compensation:  
 
Displacement of locals has been the main source of LaSLA criticisms. 
Governments must undertake a systematic approach to identify major stakeholders 
such as farmers, pastoralists, fishermen, forest gatherers, and others whose 
livelihoods will be directly or indirectly affected by the LaSLA project. Host 
governments should, as much as possible, avoid displacement of local people that 
leads to loss of access to land for livelihood. Where displacement is unavoidable, the 
first and most important consideration should be to negotiate compensation with 
affected people. They must be adequately compensated, making sure that 
compensations are closely monitored and paid in a transparent process. In 
determining the value of the land to be compensated, the evaluation should take into 






  132 
Capacity Building and Empowerment of Local People 
 
Governments should empower and build the capacity of local people to be 
able to not only negotiate but also comply with the terms of LaSLA, especially in he 
case of contract farming with investors. It is important for both the host government 
and the investor to agree on a fund in the LaSLA contract that will provide resources 
to enable capacity building and monitoring. Local people can be empowered through 
a series of training workshops and education programs on their basic rights. In 
particular, local government authorities must be incentivized to support farmers and 
advocate their interest. However, governments must ensure that LaSLA contracts 
recognize preexisting customary land and water rights of local people. Additionally, 
governments must be committed to also strengthen the collective capacities of NGOs 
and civil societal organizations to enable them to hold the government accountable in 
violation of human rights and redistribution of revenue generated from LaSLA 
investments. 
 
Recommendations for International Financial and Development Institutions 
 
My second set of recommendation goes to the international community, 
especially the World Bank, the FAO, and IFAD. Obviously, the primary responsibility 
for establishing effective legal, institutional, and regulatory policies rests with SSA 
governments; the international financial and development institutions including those 
mentioned here must support country efforts. Although these institutions provide 
technical and legal advice to strengthen the capacity of SSA governments, these 
efforts should be increased through training workshops and skill development that 
can help SSA governments to negotiate better LaSLA deals for their countries. The 
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benefits of capacity building cannot be harnessed without good institutions or 
governance particularly in the land sector. Thus, the World Bank and the FAO should 
help SSA with new and improved methods for land registration to strengthen 
countries’ land tenure. More importantly, these institutions should highly discourage 
LaSLA in corrupt countries. Equally important, the Bank should strongly assert that it 
would not tolerate corruption in its grants and loans for development projects. The 
Bank should also be ready revoke all projects found to be connected with corruption 
in SSA. As noted by Arial, Fagan, and Zimmermann (2011) and Rose-Ackerman 
(1998), the Bank can help to minimize corruption in countries by setting up 
transparent institutional structures that encourage accountability to citizens. These 
efforts may also include helping to create credible law enforcement. The USAID and 
the UNEP can use their assistance programs as anticorruption leverage to incentivize 
countries to make drastic efforts to reduce corruption levels. The World Bank, the 
FAO, and the IFAD have proposed principles, the Responsible Agricultural Investment 
(RAI), but these are more general and inadequate as regulation of policies guiding 
LaSLA investments within countries. The next step is for the World Bank, the FAO, 
and the IFAD to help countries to tailor and apply the RAI to suit their domestic and 
local land acquisition policies. For instance, the World Bank can provide training 
within the context of LaSLA negotiations, investment taxes, and impact assessment 
for both prospective investors and host countries. Moreover, the FAO should increase 
their effort in collaborating with research institutions, NGOs, and civil service 
organization in various countries across SSA to facilitate knowledge transfer, success 
stories and lessons in the agriculture sector across the African continent. Finally, 
while the FAO, the World Bank and others play a key role in capacity building efforts, 
it is critical to underscore that these institutions should only provide support for SSA 
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governments. They should leave the responsibility for countries to make their own 
decisions. 
 
Recommendations for Foreign Investors 
 
My third recommendation targets foreign investors. There is a potential that 
LaSLA will negatively affect local populations especially in countries like Tanzania 
where the national government has not put in place effective and adequate 
regulatory measures to enhance win-win situation for the country and investors. This 
does not mean investors cannot and should not be held accountable for their actions 
such as not complying with international labor laws and safety standards for their 
employees. Although investors cannot correct weakness in a country’s institutions 
such as land tenure per se, they must look for ways and mechanisms to ensure that 
their projects result in positive outcomes for the local populations, instead of taking 
advantage of the weak regulatory environment to meet their own needs. For 
instance, in countries with unclear property (land) rights, investors should move 
beyond accepting land offered to them by the host government and local elites, to 
investigating whether local people are using the land or not. Additionally, investors 
must devise conflict and dispute resolution strategies and understand the local 
culture. Moreover, investors should make formal commitments to contribute to the 
development of local communities. For example, investors could contribute to the 
local economy by procuring goods and services as well as processing agricultural 
products locally. Of course, investors should also honor the promises they make to 
local people including payment of compensations.  
To conclude I would like to say that LaSLA offers great opportunities coupled 
with many risks and challenges. 
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APPENDIX A  

































All residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship--except for refugees not permanently 




A country's total area, excluding area under inland 
water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, 






fresh water per 
capita 
Refers to internal renewable resources (internal 






Agric land (% 
land area) 
Agricultural land refers to the share of land area 
that is arable, under permanent crops, and under 






(% of GDP) 
Value added is the net output of a sector after 











Measures the extent to which investors are 
protected through disclosure of ownership and 
financial information (0=less disclosure to 







up (% of GNI 
per capita) 
The official cost of each procedure in percentage of 
Gross national Income (GNI) per capita based on 
formal legislation and standard assumptions about 






to start a 
business 
The number of calendar days needed to complete 









Assesses the extent to which the legal, regulatory, 
and policy environments help or hinder private 
businesses to invest, create jobs, and become 




FDI net inflows  
(% of GDP)  
These are the net inflows of investment to acquire 
a lasting management interest (10% or more of 
voting stock) in an enterprise/investor operating in 




GDP per capita 
(USD)  
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided 
by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any 




Roads paved  
(% of total 
roads) 
 
Paved roads are those surfaced with crushed stone 
(macadam) and hydrocarbon binder or bituminized 
agents, with concrete, or with cobblestones, as a 








 Captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
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interests. (World Governance Indicators, WGI). 
Unobserved Components Model (UCM) units from -




Captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies (-2.5 to 









Captures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically motivated violence, 
including terrorism. (-2.5 to 2.5 where -2.5 = poor 







Captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote 




Rule of law 
estimate 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular, the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 







 Captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of 




Land price per 
ha (USD) 
The price of land per hectare. The Global Approach 
to Environmental Analyses (GAEA) suggested that 
national land prices would be roughly equal to a 
multiple of per capita income (MAFAP, 2010). This 
was used as a categorical variable where 1 = less 
than US$100, 2 = US$ 101-200, 3 = US$ 201-





The normalized wages refer to average hourly or 
monthly wage rates for adult workers according to 
the Occupational Wages Around the World (OWW). 
For the variable, hourly wage (USD), I used the 
standardized wage with country-specific calibration 
and lexicographic weighting (w3wl) hourly wage 
for  “field crops farm workers” because it provides 
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Analyzing the Opportunities and Threats of Foreign Agricultural Investment for 
Sustainable Development of Sub-Saharan Africa (with a focus on Tanzania) through 
Large Scale Land Acquisition (LaSLA) 
 
Respondent’s Consent: To Be Read Before Beginning of Interview  
 
You are invited to take part in a research survey (interview) about Large-Scale Land 
Acquisitions (LaSLA). Your participation will require approximately 30-45 minutes. 
There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this survey. This survey will 
help improve processes and outcomes of land investment projects in Tanzania. 
Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. If you choose not to participate in 
this study, you can withdraw at any time without adverse impacts. Your responses 
will be kept strictly confidential, and the digital data produced from this study will be 
stored in secure computer files after it is entered. Any report of this research that is 
made available to the public will not include your name or any other individual 
information by which you could be identified.  If you have questions about this study, 
you can contact us at the email address and phone number above. Accepting to be 
interviewed indicates your consent to participate in the research and that you are 18 






























We are interested in finding out the changes in your standard of living (quality of life 
and well-being) NOW, 2015 compared to 2005, BEFORE Kilombero Rice Plantation 
(KPL)/Mbalari Rice Plantation (MRP) LaSLA project was established in this village.  
We will start by asking you information about yourself and your household as they 
have changed between 2005 -2015 
 
 










District   
Ward  
Village  
Livelihood Information  
List the most important livelihood 
activity and crops you cultivate (d) in 










    
TYPE OF LIVELIHOOD 
Farming                                 =1 
Fishing                                  = 2 
Hunting                                 = 3 
Trading                                  = 4 
Casual labor                           = 5 
Sell forest products                 = 6 
Formal salary/wages               = 7 
Other (specify)                       = 8 
 
TYPE OF CROP 
Rice  1 
Maize  2 
Cassava  3 
Others, specify  4  
 
Age   
Sex: M = 1, F = 2  
Yrs lived in village  
Household size (by ages) 
 
Under 14 yrs   
Over 14 yrs  
Total HH size   
Respondent Status 
Household head         = 1 




Married               = 1 
Single                  = 2 
 
 
Highest Level of Education 
No education           = 1  
Primary school          = 2 
Secondary school    = 3 
Training college        = 4 
University                   = 5 








Date   

































GENERAL HOUSEHOLD INFORMATIO 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
  161 
MODULE (A): CHANGES IN ACCESS TO INPUT FOR PRODUCTION (LAND, FOREST, 
WATER, ETC) Note to the interviewer: interview should only be administered to land 
owners & users 
 
Q1a. Did you own, 
or have access to 
land you used but 
did not own, in 
2005? 
 
Q1b. If answered 
1 or 2, do you 
currently own or 
have access to 
about the same 
amount of land in 
2005? 
 
Yes    = 1 





Owned    = 1 
Had access  = 2 
Not owned/ No 
access  = 3 
Q1c. If NO to 
Q1b, how much 
land (acres) did 
you own or use 











changes in the 





Q2. Comparing 2005 
to 2015, how 
worried are you 








Very worried  = 1 
Worried         = 2 
Less worried  = 3 
Not worried   = 4 
 
 
Q3. By what means 
did you acquire your 









Village land =1 
Inherited   = 2 
Purchased  = 3 
Gov’t land  = 4 
Lease/rent  = 5 
Other (specify) = 
6 
  
Q4. What is the 
most important use 
of your land in 







Food crops  = 1 
Cash crops  = 2 
Grazing  = 3 
Fallow  = 4 
Given out  = 5 






Q5. Comparing 2005 to 2015, how has your access to the following 
resources for your livelihood changed over time? Using a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 = much better (50% more) and 5 = much worse (50% less), tell us 
the difference between 2005 and 2015. 
 
Much better (50% more)         = 1 
Somewhat better (25% more)  = 2 
About the same   (0%)            = 3 
Somewhat worse (25% less)    = 4 






B. Seeds & 
seedlings 


























































Q6. Which of the following could be attributed to the changes (better or 
worse) above? Select all that apply and put code above. 
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MODULE (C): CHANGES IN ACCESS TO HUMAN CAPITAL (KNOWLEDGE, TRAINING, 
SKILLS, ETC) 
 
Q12. Did you receive 
extension services? If so, 
from which of the following 
sources below?  
 
  05  15  
Yes =1, No =2    
Source code:   
 
Government          = 1 
NGOs                    = 2 
Family members    = 3 
KPL/MRP               = 4 
Intl agencies         = 5 
Others, specify      = 6 
  
 Q13. Which of the extension services below did you 
receive in before and after? Yes = 1 No = 2 
  
SERVICE RECEIVED 05  15  
Agricultural practices   
Agro processing    
Control of livestock 
diseases 
  
Control of crop pest              
Marketing opportunities       
Post-harvesting methods            
Information on weather           
Agricultural credit/loan             
Storage methods                       





Q9. Comparing before to after, how 
has your income from your livelihood 
changed over time?  
Much Better (50% more)          
= 1 
Somewhat better (25% 
more) = 2 
About the same  (0%)              
= 3 
Somewhat worse (25% 
less)    = 4 
Much worse (50% less)             














05 15  
   
05 15  
   
05 15  
   
Q10. Which 
sources could 
you get loans 
from? 
 





Investors       
= 1 
Gov’T   = 2 
NGOs           
= 3 
Family         
= 4 




Q11. Which of the following could be attributed to the 


























 Q8. Indicate, if your 
household possesses 







Poultry   
Car/tractor  
Motorcycle   
Bicycle   
Bank savings   
Plough   
Generator   
TV/radio/  
Axe/hoe/   
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MODULE (D): CHANGES IN ACCESS TO SOCAIL CAPITAL (NETWORKS, 
CONNECTIONS, RELATIONS, ETC) 
 
 
Q17a. Indicate how these groups have changed 
your life situation between before and after.   
 
Much Better (50% 
more)  = 1 
Somewhat better 
(25% more) = 2 
About the same  
(0%)  = 3 
Somewhat worse 
(25% less)  = 4 
Much worse (50% 




be attributed to 
KPL/ MRP?  
Yes  = 1 
No  = 2  
 











donors, etc.  
 C. Trust in 
village 
members and 
your ability to 
depend on 
others for help 
when needed. 
 
Q14.  Were you 
or are you 
currently a 
member of any 
of these 
groups? Yes 
=1, No = 2 
 
05 15  
  
 
If NO, go to 
the module. 
Q16. How would you 
describe the effectiveness 
of these groups between 
2005 and 2015? 
 





Much better           = 1 
Somewhat better   = 2 
About the same     = 3 
Somewhat worse   = 4 
Much worse          = 5  
 
05 15  
   
 
05 15  
   
 
05 15  
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MODULE (E): CHANGES IN ACCESS TO PHYSICAL CAPITAL (INFRASTRUCTURE, 
RESOURCES, SERVICE, ETC) 
 
 
Q18. Has KPL/MRP project implemented new infrastructure, improved existing 
ones or not implemented any of the following in this village or district? For 
status of infrastructure, use the following code: Implemented new = 1, 
Improved existing = 2, No infrastructure = 3. If respondents answer 1 or 
2, then ask about the quality of the infrastructure or service provided using a 





































= 5                                     
Subsidized or free 
agriculture inputs  
      
Housing & building 
materials 
      
Potable water       
Toilet facilities       
Grain storage & 
milling machine 
      
Irrigation schemes       
Markets        
Electricity       
Schools        
Primary health        
Technology, 
(phones, internet) 
      
Job opportunities       
Veterinary center       
Roads,        
Transportation 
(roads, vehicles) 
      
Banks & financial 
intermediaries  
      
Others (specify) 
 






































Q19a. Since the 
coming of KPL/MRP, 
has your land been 
taken away? 
 
Yes  = 1  
No    = 2  
 
 
If NO, go to Q14a. 
 








Land” by the 
central gov’t  
= 2  
 
For public use                      
= 3 
Others, 
specify                    












Yes  = 1  
No  = 2  
 
 
Q19d. If YES, was 
the value of the 
compensation given 
to your household 
reasonable?  
 
Yes   = 1  
No   = 2  
 
 






Q20a. Has your household 
been involved in land 
and/or water conflict with 
others in this village? 
 
  05 15  
Yes =1 
No =2  
  
 
Q20b. If YES, with who? 
 
Farmers     = 1   
Fishermen     = 2   
Pastoralist    = 3   
KPL/MRP       = 4   
Government  = 5   
Others,  






Q21a. Was your 
household informed 
and consulted 
adequately prior to 
start of KRP/MRP 
project?  
 
Yes   = 1  
No    = 2  
 
 
Q21b. If NO, who 
else in this village 
do you think was 
informed or 
consulted prior to 












MODULE (F): SUBJECTIVE WELFARE 
 
 
Q22. Comparing before to after, how have the following components of your life affected 
your overall standard of living? 
 
Much Better (50% more)            = 1 
Somewhat better (25% more)    = 2 
About the same  (0%)                = 3 
Somewhat worse (25% less)      = 4 





EACH YEAR BELOW, 
PROBE FOR EXPLANATION 



























































































Q23. Which of the following could be attributed to the changes (better or worse) above? 
Select all that apply. 
Government   KPL/MRP  NGOs  Family members   Others, specify    
 
 
MODULE (G): OUTGROWER SCHEMES & CONTRACT FARMING (For only contract 
farmers with KRP/MRP) 
 
 
Q24a. Are you involved 
with KPL/ MRP in anyway? 
 
Yes = 1  
No = 2  
 
 
Q24b. IF YES, what 




If NO, complete/stop 
interview. 
Q25. Before beginning 
your contract, what did 
you agree in advance 





Q25b. Did you sign a 
written contract with the 
investor? 
 
Yes  = 1  
No  = 2  
 
 
Q26. Did both KPL/MRP 
and you comply with the 
original agreement? 
 
Yes   = 1  
No    = 2  
 
 















Q27. Compared to before, how is 
your income from working as a 
contract farmer with KRP/MRP?  
 
Much better         = 1 
Somewhat better =2 
About the same   =3 
Somewhat worse = 4 





Q28. How would you rate your 
satisfaction of working with KRP/MRP?  
 
Much better         = 1 
Somewhat better =2 
About the same   =3 
Somewhat worse = 4 
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